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ABSTRACT

In thisthesis, 1will argue that the Aboriginal peopies whose traditional territories
straddie the Canada - United States border have the rïght to pass and repass the border
freely. Wfi this right cornes the ability to live andor work in either country without
having to appLy for permission each time with Immigration officids. 1have suggested
that instead of Litigating these rights, the governments of both Canada and the United
States shouid commence tri-partite discussions on how best to accommodate these ri-,
both on an inte* basis and permanently through legislation- One of the measures that 1
have suggested is a fom of identification that indicates the individuai biders of
Aboriginai and Treaty rights to pass the border fieely.
lhave argueci that these mobility rights apply to the Aboriginal Nations who
comprise the Wabanaki Confederacyt which includes the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet Nations
who occupy present-day New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island,
Nedoundiand and Labrador, and Maine. It is rny position that these groups have both
Aboriginal rights and Treaty rights to cross the border without interruption. Both
AborÏginai Title cfaims and self-governmentdaims by the above groups wodd aiso
address the issw ofmobLIity within that same territory which Uicludes land in both
Canada and the United States. 1have also detailed my position with regards to who
should benefit fiom these rights, and 1have advocated for an inclusive dennition of
"Aboriginal peoplen so that non-status Indians*off-reserve hdians and Metis people of
both Canada and the United States are not Ieft out,

In addition, certain h t e ~ * o n atreaties
i
namely, the Jizy Treuty of 1794 and the
Treuty of Gent recognized and guaranteed the "Imlian Nations" their right to cross the
border h l y , and that the border was never meant to affect them. I have argued that these
international treaties should be recognized as treaties to be protected under section 35(1)
ofthe ColtStjtUtioonAct, 1982, in so f
aas the s p d c Artides address Indian nghts. Even
if the Crown or the courts feIt that these intemationd treaties were not "deservednof
protection in that sense*the fiduciary duty that the Cmwn owes to Aboriginai peoples
shouid mandate Iegislative recognition of the promises containeci in these treaties with
regards to the border.

The honor of the Crown deman& that

trea~meatbe afEorded to the Aboriginal

peoples on this Continent calfed Turtle Island by its Fîrst Peoples. The Crown can not
now in good niithrefuseto recognize the very cights it promised to uphold so that tàey
muid d e this country for themselves. The Aboripind and Treaty rights with regard to
border passage aIregdy exist, and it Îs tirne the Crown worked in partnership with
AborÏgkaI people to fiditate these rights, insteadofrely on ütigation Iflitigation wilI
continue to be the dennlt position for the Crown, then 1h o p this thesis adds to the
position of our peoples.

CHAPTER ONE:
THE BATTLE INSIDE AND OUT:
THE STRUGGLE FOR MOBILITY AND

THE POLITICS OF WHO
GETS TO GO.

'LAttackthem with your best courage and conduct and
do your utmost to take, kiii and destroy them. By al1
possible merns, fhd out, suppress, and destroy the
Indian enemy."'

..

INTRODUCTION:

The focus of this thesis will be on N I A N COUNTRY and our rights as the

guardians of this temtory to pass freely over the border; the political iine of colonialism.'
This Iand bas been M a n Country &ce time immemorial, and wi11 continue to be
viewed as such by the Aboriginal Nations of this Iand, despite the incredile hardships

our peoples have endured and managed to survive, in order that they couid pass
something better on to their children's children, seven generations into the fitture? The
Aboriginal Nations of what is now cailed Canada and the United States, live on the land

that we c d TURTLE ISLAND.Since the European popuIations settied this land,
AboriginaI Nations have been cheated out of their traditionai Iands, and some o f those

Nations no longer exist due to the bounties awarded by Europeans for their scalps. There
-

-

-

' Letîers of Colonel Tiornas W

h o k and Othm - New England Ektory, ~01.47.Deremafter Lenm of

Westbrook](no page referenceavailabIe).

'1am e t m g thispapa m my capacity as a studcnt at Diûhowîe University as a part of the recpkments
to obtani m y Maskis Degree in Law-The opinions and ideas expressed hereïn are my own unies
otherwise statedand h no way repment the views ofmy emphyer the Department of Justice Canada.Iii
addition, the views expmsed hereh do not reaect the vkws of my client the A h t i c RegionalOffice of
the Department of Iiidian andNorthm A f W sCanada,
PIeaic note that Som of the sources Iisadwere obtained îhm the Conficienu'alLand CIaim and Treaty
Files at theNew B-ck
A b o Peoples
~ ~C o t m d @LEUP-C.)mFredericton, New Bnmswïck.
Permisslermisslon
was obtained h m the -dent
ofthe Organhtion ta use these documents m firrtherance of
variousAbonginai issnes-As a &t,
the somccs do not dways have firllbÎbiiographîc material ayaf'tslbIe

forthepurpose offbotnotes and bibii~graphies~

was one singe European motto that rang out for aü AborÏguial people to heed, lest they

choose to assi.Iatebto oblivion:

BY A U POSSIBLE MEANS, FIND OUT, SUPRESS,
AND DESTROY THE INDIAN E N E W
Even for those Aboriginal peoples who did sunrive European colonkation, their
f i l i e s and cultures were still attacked by European politics and values. Even today, the
right to c d oneselfan "Indian" is determïned by the Canadian governrnent through the
Indian Act, RKS-C. 1985, c 1-5. Now, instead of being identifïed as a Mi'kmaq,

Mohawk or Cree, the federd government has reserved unto itseif the right to pronounce

which Aboriginal people in Canada are deserved of the nght to be called an "Tndian".

This right confers upon the holder the right to iive on a resenre and receive various
benefits under the I d a n Act. Unfortunately, with this "priviIege" aiso carne domination,
p o v w , loss of culture*discrimination, suicide and perhaps worst of ail, division among

It is nom this social context that Aboriginal groups today are asserting thek rights

and ütigating them in court. The path which has emerged h m the courts is a case by
case, Nation by Nation and right by right approach for determinmg the scope of

Aboriginal rights. This creates difnculty in the sense that we only get one srnaII piece of
the picture each t h e a case is Iitigated, but for now, this bemg the set path, 1wdl make

my arguments for one aspect of aborigmaI ri@: mobiIity, for one srnaII part o f Tude
Island- the Atlantic pVmces, and for one part of the Iarger Aboriginal groups in Canada;

the members of the Wabanaki Confederacy. It is fkom this political context that 1plan to

make rny arguments for an Aboriginai nght to cross the Canada - U.S.border.

It is my submÏssion that the Aboriginal Nations which have traditionaiIy lived on
or near the Canada-US. border have a nght to cross the border unmolested, for traditional
purposes. By traditiod purposes I do not refer to a "fiozen rights" concept whereby they
codd oniy cross the border to hunt deer with stone tooIs. I believe that every culture has a
right to evolve aad thus a modem evolution of their rights wouid include bave1 by car to

visit family or attend a pow wow or many other activities. These purposes

incIude

travel for hrmting, work, cdtrnal gatherings and other ceremonial pqoses. This right
should also inchde the right of fke passage for the purpose of choosing to live in either
country to be with family or to start a new famiIy. A related nght wodd be to import
goods tax and duty-fke for the purposes of persoual consumption or for consumption by

the traveler's family. 1have chosen to deal with the mobility issue as a separate issue

fiom the importation of goods due to thne and space Iimitations.
It is my assertion that the member Nations of the Wabananki Confederacy have a
right to cross the border unmolested for the p q o s e s listed above. When I Say
'immolested" I am using the concept as it was used in the earIy treaties of the 17007s

which were signed with the memba nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy. The treaties
and promises made by the Crown mcIuded rights for Mans to go about their activities as
they have always done with the promise that they would be left done or "unmolested" by

either the settiers or representativesofthe C

wi& the C m ' s right to pmtect its bord-

m Today, this t a m wodd be baianced
and codd mean that some fom of

identificationcodd be ased to deteminethe beneficiaries of such a bord~crossingright,

as opposed to behg detained at the border, forced to attend unmigration hearings or
nIling out numerous f o m .

The identification to be used at the border to signify Aboriginal border crossing
rights, codd be an agreed list of cards that w o d d be acceptable to both the AboriginaI

peoples and the Ihmigration officials, such as status car& or membership cards for
Abonginal o r g h t i o n s such as the New B M c k Aboriginal Peoples CouuciI who
represents status and non-status Indians Iiving off reserves. A sirnilar process exists for

other federd organizations such as the Department of Fishen-esand Oceans to idenAboriginal fishers. Another form of identification might dso be worked out whereby

membership iists are supplied to h t g r a t i o n for them to issue speciai border cards. It is
not acceptable to many in the Aboriginal community to go through the current process as
it exists under the Immigration d e s and policy. Some ofour traditional members would

take offense to signing declarations a s h g the goverment to accept a traditionid
marnage as the basis ofthe nght to cross the border. They do not wkh to have to ask for

permission to cross the border on a reguiar basis. They wish to assert the right îhey

akady have, as one based on Aboriginal rights, as recognized by the J i TreaM and not

one which stems h m modem day mimi-grationIaws. In the end, it is not the form ofthe
identification that is sigrdicant, but the recognition of the right itself.
Due tu tirne limitations, this paper will not ded with such issues as the right to
miport h a r m s or tax-fiee goods for the purpose of commercial sale. 1wiU base my
arguments on various aspects of AborigÏnaI rights hclruimg "ternational treaties",

Indian treaties, Abonginai rights and negotiated rights incidental to Aboriginal titie and
self-gove~11nent~
I have written this thesis with the hope that it may prove to be of benefit
to those Aboriginal Nations who have difncdties traversing the Canada4J.S. border in

the+ attempts to work, visit theu familes, participate in cultural activities or other
traditional activities. Whiie some of my arguments codd be applied to other 'border"
ûiies who rnay aiso be able to establish Aboriginal rights with regards to crossiag, I have

Iimited my arguments to the specinc state of the Wabanaki Confederacy and their
pdctiiar treaties and cultuml traits7etc.

This issue of border crosshg is especially relevant to the members of the
Wabanaki Confederacy whose member Nations occupy the present-day Atlantic
provinces and Maine.1wilI assert that these groups have an Aboriginal right to pass

fieely over the Canada - United States border. One of the most contmversiaI sources of
this nght cornes nom the J i Treap of 1794 and the promises that were made to the
Aboriginal Nations about £ieepassage over the then newIy formed border. While the

courts have not recognked the J i Treaty as an international treaty that has been
incorporated into o u .law today, the= remains the unresolved issue of the Crown's

promises made to the Indian Nations so long ago. It is my assertion that not only do the
Iater Indian treaties serve to reinforce those earlier promises, but the provisions of the J i
Treaty dealing with the rÏghts of Aboriginal peoples shodd itseifbe reçognized as an

Indian treaty. At a minnnum, the Jay Treafy provides evidence of an Aboriginal right to
cross the border,

TIiere are modem ways uiwhich to correct the problem ifthe court was so
mched to protect the interests ofAborigmal peopIes. It wodd be unconscionabIeto

d o w the Crown to benefit h m the promises made by the Indians to rehïn fkom
hostiiities, while at the same time failing to Iive up to their own promises to the uidians of

fiee border passage. The Indian Nations relied on these promises to theu detriment, in the
sense that they refhbed fiom attacking, oniy to have the Iaw recognizing these Bghts,
revoked years Iater. In addition, Aboriginal title claims in the same area add strength to
the quest for f
kpassage based on AbonginaI title rights over the land and the
conesponding right to govern within those Abonginal temtones.

The case Iaw tends to deai almost excIusively with the "legal" aspects of
Aboriginal rights and the Iegai reasons why justices decide in favor or against the indian
Nations seeking affirmation of a paaicular right. Recent decisions have corne a Iong way
towards understanding and developing unique methods by which to asses these claims
and give vaiidity to the modem-day exercise of them. The= is an inherent Limitation on
these cases, as the judges mua base their decisions on Iegislation, common law, property

Iaw and contract principles, in order to resolve Aboriginal issues, as the Canadianjustice
srstem expects of them. It is this very system of Justice, which uses foreign languages,

vaiues, d e s and laws to adjudicate Aboriginal issues that underlies the erratic way in

which courts have dedt with Aboriginal people and our issues. They have recognized that
the issues are sui genenk,yet still rely heaviiy on the very common Iaw concepts they

wam about. In the end, the suigenerik principle isjust another Iegai principle and needs

ütigation to be put to any use. WhiIe the prtcpose ofthis paper is to present possiaIe Iegd
argummts why Wittlanaki members shouid have the rÏght to cross the border, it is
miportant to understand that there exkts many other views in the Abonginai comme@

as to the spintPaI and cuIanaI sources ofsuch a right, which isnot the focus of this thesis-

ABORIGZNAL MOBIZITY

K€UT IS MOBIUTYFOR US?
This thesis wilI begin with an introduction to the concept of Aboriginai mobility

withul the Wabanaki Confedemcy. This introduction is followed by an explanation of the
politics of Aborigind issues and who gets to benefit fkom positive court decisions. Too
o h Aboriginal issues are cast in light of the theoreticai legal arguments and neglect the
very people they most affect. Once a decision has been handed down h m the Supreme

Court of Canada, the idea is that now the Crown and Aborigind people wiU sit down and
work out a process by which to implement the particulars of the right The question of
who gets Ieft out of the bargaining process is either ignored or lefi out, with claims that

this issue is too cornplex. There are groups which are habitudly left out, including
Aborigind people who Iive offreserve or do not qualify for status unda the Indian Act as

an "InciÏan". While 1can not spend much time solely on this issue, it wil1 be included in
the anaiysis of court decisions and possible solutions for the hture. I will attempt to

present this thesis in my own voice and do aot profess to be the voice for ail Abotiginal
people. Just as other peopIes around the world have dinéring views within their own
culture, so too do AboriginaI peopk differ on many poIitica17social and legd issues. This

is a positive aspect ofour peopies and 1o d y desHe to add to the discussion- In the end, I

hope that we can work through a solution to the problem of fiee passage over the border
for the benefit ofthose AboriginaI Nations who iive near, work or travel over the border
that is inclusive ofthe Abon@

people affected.

There are certain characteristics of Aboriginal Nations which appear to be
common lmowledge among anthr~pologists~
sociologists, archaeologists, historians and
anyone who has researched h t o the ways of life of different Aboriginal people. Some of
the more common traits ÏncIude EMng in Iarge extended families, living off the lands and

the seas as hunters and gatherers, and following either nomadic or semi-nomadic lives.
For the most part, each Nation or alliance ofNations had their own particuiar temtories in
which to hunt and fish. Sometimes wars wouid change the temtories and sometimes the

Nations moved according ta the ability of the land to sustain them. Some Nations lived in

one place in the summer months and other places in the winter months, whereas others
just moved accordhg to food supplies or alliances. There are various sources for this type
of anthwpoiogical and historical information and o h experts prepare reports for court
about the particuiar Nation in iïtigation. Aboriginal people lmow their histories through
the oral stories told by their elders which are passed down fkom generation to generation.

The non-AboriguiaI researchers know this Somation thmugh their various studies
which ùiclude absenring gmups and documenting cuituraI traits and Ianguages and other
characteristics. MobiIity, was no doubt the key to suMvai for many Aboriginal Nations

as a part ofadaptability and the slow evoIution or progession of t h e witbin a cdture.
The purpose o f my paper is to present the IegaI arguments for fiee passage over the
border. Due to time and space limitations, 1can not present an archeaoIogid or
anthropoIogicd overvÏew of the varbus Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy other than
to reférbrieffy to examples of the type of hÎstorÏcaI evidence that wouId be r e f d to in

litigation. That kind ofin-depth historicai research wodd be necessary for fidirre

Iitigation in order to support the Iegai assertious with regards to estabIishing Aboriginal
nght~.

What mobility means to us spans over thousands of years of traditional usage of

our lands which we know has been done since tune ïmmemoriai. WIde each of out
separate Nations may have had Merent terrïtories, we were neighboa and as such

traveled this common territory for trade, intemarriage and warfare. The traditio~d
temtories of the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy and Penobscot comprise the areas
of what are today refened to as Maine, New Bnmswick, Nova Scotia, PEL,

Newfoundland and Quebec. Our elders tell us of ancient travels over temtories that

wouid now span territory in both presentday Canada and the United States.
Unfommateiy, I wÏlI not have the time to include an anttvopoIogicaior ethnohistoricd
background on alI the member Nations of the Confederacy. Obviously, in any hture

Iitigation the specinc group asserthg mobility rights wouid have to cornpiete mch a t

e

but for my purposes, I wÏlI use the ='kmaq as an example and present a brief ovenriew

of evidence relating to tenitory, trade and traveI.
The Mi'kmaq peopies were considered by anthropologists and other sociaI
scientists, to be part of the Maritime Archaic tradition which dates back fiom 7500 to

3000 years aga These peoples of which the M Ï k a q were a part, relied prbady on

marithne resources for SlIlYivai. Many arc6aeoIogists consider that th& territories dong
with the other mies of the Confederacy spmed an area îÏom northern Labrador to
Maine. Later archaeoIogicaI nnds contabed evidence of trade as between Nations nithis
ares Trade items mcluded both procîucts made Gont ivory tusks ofsea m a m a i s and

tooIs flaked h m distinctive stone? One pdcdar site in northeastern New Brmswick
refet~edto as the "Augustine Mound"contained evidence that these peopIe "...were in

contact with reiiipw idem and cmemonialpractr'cesfomjàr to the south. "These
items were unmistakably not local:
Stone artifacis interred with the dead nichde largefinel'y
flokedpoints and hives, gorgets (potirhedstonependan~.
perforateedfor wemng on the chest). and pipes. Man.
wealth goocls were made of raw matmals not available
locally, the most spectaculm of which wme rhousanh of
rolled copper beau3 and inipCements of nntive copper. a
raw material obtuinedfiom the western Great Lakes
region.'

The artifcts and bu~t~aipractices
indiccite affilation with
the Adena culturefar to the s d , with its centre in the
Ohio VuIley. [O
It is this kind of evidence that would be used to assert that the Aboriginal peoples

ofthe maritime area, later rnembers of the Wabmaki Confedemcy, had trade contacts and
religious affiliations with peoples far to the south into present day United States. Groups
iike the Mi'krnaq and MaIiseet continued their relations with Nations h m the United

States through the Confederacy and were most strongIy ailied with the Penobscot of
Maine. Interestingiy enough, today, whiie the fkderai govemment has placed most
Mi'kmaq on reserves in New Bnmswick and Nova Scotia, a Iarge concentrationof

Mi'kmaq remab in Boston. Even m modern times, many Mi'kmaq people haveremained
transient or mobile and continue to traveI, work and live on both sides of the border, so

'k D. McMÎih, N i e PeopIés and Cu~turesof Canada (Vancouver: McMùlan, 1988) at 31-53.
[hMc;Mi/hJ
'BUi,at 38.
16rif,

much so that the concentration of Mi'kmaq in Boston is considered to be Iarger than the
concentration f o n d on most of the Mi'Iunaq reserves in the Maritmies." There wiII be

littie trouble substantiatingthe daim that the member Nations of the Wabanaki
Confederacy traveled the border area for political, social and ceremonial, as weil as trade
reasons. Their history spans thousands of years on this continent, since time

immemorial. "
A lecent court case deaihg with the Abonginai nghts of Mohawks with regards to

the borda addressed the issue of trade and how this impacts the analysis of the possible
Aboriginal rights. One significant finding by the trialjudge in Mitchell v. Canada

(Minister of National Revenue -M.NX)*', was the fact that trade was Found to be
integral to the Mohawk culture. The evidence h m ancient village sites indicated that

trade started at about 3,000 B.C. and dennitely by 300 B.C. The interestïng factor m the
trade evidence was who and where they traded, which Ïncluded a mde route eastward to
the Atlantic Coast for marine-shell beads. The focus of this thesis is on the Nations that

inhabit the Atlantic Coast area and Maine, which include the member Nations of the
Wabanalà Confederacy. WhiIe the judge fomd that the trade may not have been on as

I q e a scaie as it was for the Hurons, it was enough to be considered of 'Wai
importance" to their culture." For the ptirpose of this thesis, 1wilI use this kind of

evidence in my anaiysis ofthe AborÏpinai rÎghts of t ~ group
s
as a whoIe.

-

[O

16ii

lZ

R v. Y i der Peet, Cf 99q 2 S C &

" Ibid-at 52-53,
507. bereniafter Y i derPee&

"Mitchell v. Cmada (Minaterof N m a l Revenue) 099n4 C N L X 103. (Fed. TD-)@eremafter

Mitciiefl, mu&
"Ioid-at pam tO8-

The question which is yet to be answered is how this type of information wouid
be treated ifit were submitted as evidence to establish a claim of border crossing rights

by an Aboriginal group. What ifthe MmtNations o f the Wabanaki Confedemcy

asserted as an Aboriginal right, the right to be nomadic or semi-nomadic? It does not
sound iike a nght which has farreaching implications such as an Aboriginal nght to 6sh
or hunt or clah a certain ami of land. On its face, it would appem that if a Mi'kmaq

person or an Abenaki person wanted to iive in one place in the winter and another in the
SuLIlIller, they would simply go ahead and do it as an exercise of their ancient traditions.

By cornparison, many Canadians have winter homes and summer homes or fiy to hotter
places in the winter and stay at home for the sumer. Very few peopIe wodd deny a

New BnuwKick'er the right to move to Nova Scotia hthe summer and Horida in the
winter. The onIy limitation for these Canadiau citizens, is that they must go through
Immigration as dl international traveIers must. By cornparison, Canadians have a right to
have1 within their own geographical temtory, free h m restrictions based on provincial

borders. An individual couid have a crimind record and that wouid not supercede his or
lier right to traveI k I y within his or her Canadian territory. Aboriginal peoples are

asking for no less than the right to traveI kely within their traditiona1 territory, which
mcludes [and In both the United States and Canada

Canadian citizens derive theit right to Ieave and return to Canada h m the
speciflc provisions of the Irnmi,gration Act which details who has thÏs rïght of mobility.

AboriginaI peoples have an additionai protection of theu rights: constitutiomd protection
of theg aasfiogAborÎgUiai and tre,atynghts,Providing that they could show that they

have an existing Aboriginal or Treaty right of m s s border movement, these rights codd

not be so easily restricted under the Immigration Act withoutjustification and
consultation. Non-aboriginal Canadiam do not have this added protection and therefore,
it folIows that the d e s would be different as between Abonpinal peoples and Canadian

citizens. 1wiii argue in my the's that Aboriginal peopks do have this right and its
constitutional protection mandates a dinerent set of rules for Aboriginal peoples.

The individual Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy wish to exercise their
traditional modes of mobilïty, yet are experiencing Immigration problems gohg back and
forth over the Canada - United States border. 1 am not suggesting that Canada open up its

borders to aU peoples without restriction. The Crown has a valid right to protect its
citizens by rnaintaining controI o v a the border, but this right must be baianced by the
Aboriginal rights at issue. The Supreme Court of Canada in V i <ler Peet, supra, hhas
aiready held that Crown sovereignty must be reconciled with the Aboriginal and Treaty
rights. It follows then that those Crown interests must also b e baianced with Aboriginal

rights which relate to freepassage over the border. The Crown's legislation must not
hfihge the nghts of Abonginai peoples protected under the Comtitution Act without

justification, possible compensation, consuItation and minimaiimpairme~d~
While the Federal Govenunent has Iegislated certain ''ririgh' for status Indians

under the Imigraton Act, the scope of these rights are yet to be d e t a d n e d There also
remai& the intere~f~
of non-status Indians and Metis with regards to cross border

movement that are not specifTcaIIy dwlt with under the l i i g ~ o ~n~

c tIt, ' ~notabie

is

'* R v. Spmow, El9901 1S.CK 1075. -Spmm+jE

"1hpve chosennot to mchde the Iiiint, as they are nonhempeopIes who have not occupiedterritorles îhat
States borda areas-A s the basis ofmy thesis t e k on bra&onaL usage
ofthe area, this wodd ody indude what have beenreferred to as bordert n i such as the Mohawk and
pppiithe southem Cana&Ui&d

that these rÎghts were IegisIated without regard to the différent rights which may exist as

between border and aon-border trrcbes,

By individuai accomt, the problem until recently, has not been with the United
States border as they used to let Canadian Indians back and forth to Live work or visit

without having to have au &en card or green card, without having to register at the post
onice as an aiiea, and without having to obtain work authorization. However, in recent

times the US.border has been more struigent about the exportation of tobacco and other
sellable items and also travel generally. Nonetheless, there has been Linle problem with

Canadian Indians going back and for& to Live, work or visit in the United States. The
problem appears to be at the Canadian border, with Canadian officiais refiising io let
American-bom Indians back and forth over the border without a great deal of paperwork,
if at aIL" The Canadian government appears to be taking action based on the citizenship
of the p a o n s as Canadian or Arnerican and ignoring their membmhip in their own
particular Aboriginal Nations and that of the Wabanaki Confederacy. Subject of coune to
issues of national concem, associations with terrorist organizations and 0th- such safety

issues, I will argue that the members of the individuai Nations which make up the
Wabanaki Confederacy have the right to pass fkely over the Canada-U.S. border to Iive,
work and travel regardes oftheîr citizenship as Canachns or Americans.

Nations of the W a b e Confederacy. At the same the- 1do aot wish ta be seen to exclude
t6em fiom any fbture c h h s in tEmt regad L have also not d d t with the Abonpinal peopk who iive m
Maska and my possiife argumentsthey rnay have to cross the
borders due to time limitations m my
the&*
"Facts bout rheJay Treotyfor Cmadiim-BornNarrive A ~ m r k mO
,-e:
Wabanalri Legal News
Homepage h t t p J / w w w . p t f ; t . o r p / w a ~ v(visite&
~
13 Noveniber 1998)- Pi& Tree Native
AmmeLIcan
Unit M97,See aIso I m p ~ r t a n t ~ n f ~ ~ m Cànadi'm-Born
Ottfo~
N i e Amen'cans: CmssBorder
- *
Righ& ontlne: Wdanaiii Legd News Homepagehm.J/u~wnr.~tiaofe/wabanakr/info
98.htm (vislted 13
tEie me&
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The question of '*ho

we are"is more a question of politics, than it is what we

mean to each other as the Fust Peoples of this continent. This is a sad situation to find

ourselves in, but I ais0 r e a e that we have evoIved to this position as a resdt of
tremendous hardships, racist govemment policies and decades of suffering and isolation

nom ourselves and our traditional ways of Iife. At the same tirne, we have to take
responsibility for our children and our cdtures and sincerely try to focus on whit is
important about our StnrggIe and set aside the discrimination which exists among some of
us due to ignorance, greed and petty politics. When 1 Say petty politics, 1 do not mea.our

organization into groups to advance our causes particular to our temtories or Nations. I
fully support this type of advocacy to advance our causes on the potiticd @ont.What 1do
not support is the divisions within our own Nations that would see us see women's issues

as separate fkom children's issues and family issues and men's issues or community
issues as a whoIe. There are aiso divisions that reIate to who7sfarnily is in power at the

band IeveI. The worst division is among not only the Federai Govemment, but ais0 our
own AborÏginal politickm who profess to decide who c m be considered an AborigÏnal
person based solely on their own seKinterest without considering the issue in its entirety

and deciding what will be best for the future generatiom. Until recently, this has included
fimiting the voting pool. The Supreme Court of Canada in Corbiere Canada (Mhirter
of Indimz Affaits and Nortlim ~evelopment)).heId that section 77of Indiun Act whic6
deaIs with the prevention ofoEreserve manbas h m votmg on Band ma-

offended

' Corhkrev.. Canada (Minkter of lirdimr andNorthen Affairs) [i9991S . U CNo24 (S.C.C.), online: QL
(S.C.J.),

mefemaftef Corbiere],

section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. With regard to off-reserve

band mernbers, the court explaineci:
In the context of this vulnerable group. and these important
interests, tlik distinction reinforces the stereolype that band
membms who do not lnte on resenres are "less Abonngrnal',
and less valuable members of their ban& than dose who
do. A remonable person in the position of the claimants,
firi& opprised of the contert, wouid see the dzferentiaal
treuiment contained in S. 77(1) us suggesting that offreserve band members are Iess worrhy or valuabLe as band
m b e r s and members of Canadian society, and giving
them less concem. respect and conrideration than band
members living on resetve. I9

There seems to be a prevailing fear amongst sorne of us that if we open our
cornmunities to those who have been forced to separate h m the^ reserves or for those
who never had the benefit of close relations with families members due to adoption,

Ministeriai apprehensionof children or

by birth, or the h d i m Act, that somehow

everyone hCanada wouid be able to claim they were an "Indian" and ai1 would be Iost.

In reaiity, 1do not think the statistics bear that doomsday prediction out Currentiy,
Abonpinal people are projected to comprise 2.7%

'O

o f the population, according to

Statistics Canada To pose that everyone one of that two percent has had relations with

the other 98% is more than incredtûous. I can't Unagine why they wouid want to make

arguments to support the Federai government's defcinition ofwho we are as First PeopIes
and members of

Aboriginal Nations. Certaidy being defhed as "...a person who

* Ibid- at 120,
Cana& Report of the Royal CommisPsonon Abortjjai Peuples.- Lookmg Fornord, Looki~gBack; VOL1
(Ottawa= Supplyand Senrices Canada, 1996)at f 5, perehdkrR U ,VOL4,

Indionf* wouid not ody take the culture out of who we are, but belittles us to mere

administrativenumbers that do little more than teii the govanment who they have to pay
for with regards to services. Given the fact that there are a sufficient number of children
and women who hold status as "Indians" under the Indian Act, but have no Aborigind

blood &g

in their veins, or my cultural history with the Nation, stands for the fact

that one does not even have to share the same culture as our ancestors to qu-

as a

"govemment Indian".
What is woae is that even "govenunent Indians" are not treted equaily, nor do
they have the same "priviIegesYTas others Eom within this group. Aside fiom the voting

issue as explahed above, here is how Indian -tus

entitlement is established under the

Act:
6. (1) Prrsons enailed tu lie regisered - Subject to section

7. a person tr entitled tu be re@tered

if

(a) that person was regrgrstered
or entitled to be registered
immediateljp ~ o to
r Aprii f 7, 2985;

(6) thut person ùa m e d e r of a body of pmsons that iiar
been dechmi by the Govenor in C m d on or ofter A p d
17, 1985 to be a bandfor the purposes of this Act;
(c) the n m e of that person was omitted or dektedfrom the
Indian Regzkter, orfiom a Band Lirt prior to Sqtem6er 4.
1951, under ~~bpm~graphl2(l)(a)
(N),parugraph l,2((1)(6)
or subsectibn 12(2) or under subparagraph I2(l)(m)
pursuant to an order made under srrbsecrin 109(2). as
each provision read hmedr'ate&priorto April17,1985. or
undm anyformer provision of this Act reIating tu the smne
subject-matter as mty of thmeprovisions;

(4 the name of that person was omitted or d e l e t e d m the
Indàn Reg'ster, orfiom a Band LrStprior to Sèptember 4,

1951, under srtbparagruph I2(1)(a)(ni) pursuant to an
order made under subsecrion 109(1), as each prowon
read immedintely@or to A p d 17,1985. or under any
former prowsion of this Act relating to the sume subjectmatter as any of ihoseprovisions:
(e) the name of tliatperson was omined or deietedfiom the
Indian Reeter, orfiom a Band Listprior to Septmnber 4,
1951,
(i) under section 13. as it read imrnediatelyprior to

Sepember 4, 1951, or under unyformer provirion of this
Act relating to the same scrbject-matter as that section; or
(6)under section 112, as it read irnmediatelyprior to July
1, 1920, or under anyformer provision of th& Act reluting
io the same subject mutter as that section; or

0 that person is a person both of whoseparents are or, if
no longer living,were ut the time of death entitled to be
registered under this section.
(2) Idem - Subject to section 7,a person is entitied to be registered
ifihat pmsott is a person one of whose purents i s or. ifno longer
IMng, wwar at the time of death entitled to be regktered undm
dsection (2).

(3') Deentihgprovision -For the purposes ofparugrapph (I)Ct) and
subsection (2).

(a) a persun who was no longer [Mng irnmediatelyprior to
Apd 17,1985 but who was at the time of death entitled to
be registered s h d be demed tu be enritled to be regrstered
under paragraph (l')(a),-and
(B) a persun deswibed in pmagraph (1)(c). (4. ce), or It)
or nr6sectim (2) wfio was no longer liMng on April17,
1985 s h d be deemed to be entitled to be regrsiered under
n
that provr'sr'on.

The Act does not Say much about ancestry, cdhtre or commmiity. A simpler way
to tmdeatand entitlement is as folIows: a section 6(2) hdim can not pass on uieir stanis

to their chrldren unles they marry another 6(2) Indian or a 6(1) Indian*In contrast, a 6(1)

Indian can pass on their status regardless of the status of their spouse, although, without
their spouse having status, their children wouid bbonly'be 6(2)M a n s . This explanation
solmds just as ndicuious as the sections h m the Act look The govemment has

concocted this racial fonnula to decide who w2.I and wili not be considered as Indians in
this country without regard to tradition, culture or the community. The arbitrary nature of
these formulas and cut-off dates for who can be an Indian determines the rights of oniy

part of the Aboriginal popdation and stands without justification. There were groups of

Aboriginal peoples recognized as such for hundreds of years before the Indian Act, as the

concept of ngistration o d y came about in lg%The Act was originally designed as an

assimilistic tool to ensure that within a few generations the Indian population wouid be
weii subsumed h t o the broader more bbcivilued"
population? Larry Gilbert argues that
these provisions ofthe Indian Act are

"...bold attenzpts at reducing the Aboriginal

population.. ."of Canadax With regards to thÏs mandate of reducing the Aboriginal
popdation, Gilbert explains:

...that the m e n t indian Act continues with that tradition,
Subsection 6(2) of the present I n d h Act is a case in point
which many obsmers cumü.ertu be a draconim attempt
by Par~iamenrto limir the llumber of Indians in CanadaaIt
is ofirt r4erred to as the second generation nrt-ofdeSubsection 6(2) iS simpïj~a new techniipefur an old habit
of Ottawa'sr it w u oftén calledpurgng or correchitg baird
Irsts..,"

-

-

-

"Indfm Act, RSC. 1985. c32 (PSupp.), SA;c.43 (4?"Sopp.), 0.1.
"L. Gubat, Enritlement to rd- Stam undMembmsh@ Coder ik Canada, (Toronto: ThomsonCanada,
1996)- DereniaftexMemhershIp Codea.
=Riid, at 1 2
=16rif,

Today, thiskind of policy justification wodd not stand up to any of the test the
courts have created for Aboriginal 15ghi.s.The issue ofwho we are, involves more than
just Indian Act dennitions. We are divided among many social and politicai Lines. The

Aboriginal peoples of Turtle Island have their own Wations* such as the Mi'kmaq, Cree
and Mohawk Nations as weil as those traditional unions such as the Iroquois Confederacy
or the Wabanaki Confederacy. These Iarger unions were organizations of smaller Nations
for the protectioa of temtones and cultures. Today, these once strong united Nations are

now divided for the most part into bands under the Indian Act. Each band under the Act is

headed by a chief and councilors usuaiIy elected by the residents of the reserve. The
struggie to have some power over the Iife of your family and yourseif after years of

poverty and depression, while understandable, detracts fkom the Iarger politicai issues.

Where is the debate over fishing rights or the plan for how we wi11 unite to organize
negotiations for self-government or land daims? The larger picture is Iost in the battfe to
provide for one's family. Therein lies the agony of decision, since many of us put our
f d e s before aii else, but how can we effectively balance this need to s w i v e with the

needs of our chiIdren7sf d e s into the fbttrre?
This is not to Say that this band system has not ever worked. What 1am saying is
that this systan is a foreign one to our Nations, one imposed on us by the Indian Act and

has fded mi~erablyfor many Nations. The system is made wone by decades of poverty
and dislocation h m otr histories and our traditional beliefs-An aspiration to get back to
orn traditional beliefs does not mean that 1am advocating the views ofthose few who are
atternpthg to go back to the ways thmgs were 800 years ago. But certainIyl we cm Ieam

h m our ancestors about what we can do to improve the path to our future. At the
present, many ofus are left wondering who are we and who represents us?

Given those unanswered questions, we stiU have the many political iines as they
are currentIy drawa. We may be members of our Naîions, in the traditional sense of the

larger Mi'kmaq Nation or other Nations. We may be status Indians, registered under the
Indian Act. We rnay also be members of a particuiar band or reserve. 'Iltese bands are

represented generally by the chief and council who for us in the Maritimes, usually means

an filiation with the provincid Union of Chiefs. For example, many of the bands in

New Brunswick are represented by the Union of New Bninswick Indians (LINBI.),
which is a Iarger scaie politka1 union of the chiefs in the province, Some dissatisfaction
with this group has lead some of the bands to pull away fiom the Union and join forces

under the auspices of the MAWlW Council which has been loosely described as an
association of the non-UNBJ. bands. In Nova Scotia, their sister organization is cailed
the Union of Nova Scotia Indians (ü.N.S J.), Nationally, the Assemb ly of First Nations

(A.F.N.)claims to represent the interests of the chiefs aud First Nations, as bands are
offen c d e d Within the provinces, there are aIso triid associations nich as the Saint John

Tnbai Council in New Brunswick. ALI of these organizations demand recognÏtionand
involvement m the politicd arena Ofien their claims as to who they represent overlap

with other groups, and sometimes Abonginal peopk f d through the cracks.

Even the Iarger National o r g ~ t i o nare
s chalIenged by other political
organixations such as the NationaI NatÏve Indian Women's association which promotes
women's issues. These women's issues mcIude tfie issues of aII Aboriginal women in

Canada, and do not necessariiy depend on an affiliation with the AFN. The Inuit Taprisat
of Canada (I.T.C.) represents the concerns of the northern Aboriginal peoples on a
national basis. The Metis National CounciI (M.N.C.) cIaims to represent the Metis

"Nation"of Canada which by their own voice, are those Metis who are descendants of the
Red River Valley Metis. They refer to the Metis as a separate and distinct culture as
opposed to a group comprised of memben with mixed ancestries. There is aiso the
Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (C.A.P.)formerly lmown as the Native Council of

Canada (N.C.C.), which represents Abonginai peoples on a national basis. CAP claims to
represent the interests of those Abonginai people who Live off reserves in Canada This
includes people who identifjr as status Indians, non-status Indians, and Metis. They have
afnliates in the provinces that represent at a local level, off-reserve Aboriginal people in
the various provinces.

For New Brunswick, the New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council cIaims to
represent the off-resexve AboriginaI comrnunity and for Nova Scotia it is the Native
Council of Nova Scotia These organizations often have a hard t h e being heard by
govemrnental departments or securing fiuiding for thek projects due to the uncertainty
which befalls being an Abonginai person without also being registered as an Indian under
the Indian Act. This, of course, ignores the fact that many of their members aIso have

their status under the Act. Within the provinces there are ais0 other organkationswhich
put yet amther Iayer of politics into this already cornplex mix. In New Brunswick for
mstance, there are also other ad hoc p u p s which form as a d

t of current poMcaI

issues in the news, such as the Native Loggers Association which fomed der the ment
%fAWLW ka Matiseet word that IoaacIy transIatesmto "the peopfe'.

timber rights cases, to negotiate the nghts of native loggers. There is dso the recently
formed accountability group who are demanhg more accotmtability fiom their
poiiticians at the band Ievel.

ThÏs year was my first year in Nova Scotia and 1have met many people through
the Iaw school. One of the first things 1noticed was how the Abonginal people 1met

introduced themselves. Every single one associated hùnseif or herself with a band or

political organization or local lobby group. Not one penon said, 1am a Mi'krnaq from the
Mi'kmaq Nation of Nova Scotia or theu own padcular group. I know for me, I have been
easily caught up in the politics and have felt the same disassociation from my culture as
others. I see no reason why there can not be both the active politicai lobbying and the
cultural identity with one's Nation. Even this simple, idedistic comment, invites the

highly political questions of who then can c l a h to be a member of the Nation. Many
chiefs and persons womed about having to share resources and social programs wodd
E t membership to those who meet the requirements of the Indian Act for both status

and band membership. This method of identification as stated earlier is a arbitrary, racist
fomuIa that I believe wili not stand up to the many chaIlenges to the Bill C-31 legislation
to shortly corne before the courts. This legislation, while reinstatingsome women with

their stanis, at the same tene imposeci the second-generation cutoff nile and exclnded
many people fiom "quaIifymg" as status Indians under the Indian ~ c t ?The Act is simpIy
not compabiIewith onr method of determÏningwho cm daim rights such as treaty rights

and AborÎgbaI rights, and who we are as members of our Nations.

"An Act tu Amend the hdr'imAct, RS-C- 1985 c- 27-

When we speak of treaties, other layers of subtle politics creep into play. Those

who cIaim to be the beneficiaries of local treaties are quick to point out the difference
between temtorid Indians and non-temtond Indians. This is rightfidiy so, given the
forethought and sadices our ancestors made so that OLK children and their children
codd preserve as much of what was ours as possible. Other Nations did this for their
own peoples and we must respect the path our ancestors set for us. For Nova Scotia, a

simpIe way of explainine a non-territorial Indian wodd be someone who beIongs to an
Abonginai Nation who's traditional temtory did not inchde present day Nova Scotia,
such as the Mohawks, the Tiingits,or the h

t t of Northeni Canada The essence of a

treaty right as set by the courts to date is that you must prove a nibstantiai connection to

the original group of signatories to the ûeaty. " These Treaty rights are also tied to the
Iand base or traditional tem-toriesof the Bgnatories. So, if the Mi'krnaq were signatones
to a treaty then presumably, modem day Mi'kmaq codd claim the benefit of any of those

treaty provisions. The questions r e m e though, who are the Mi'kmaq aside from the

broad theoreticaI concept of Nation. Wouid these peopIe be oniy status Indians registered
mder the Indian Act and who are members of the local Mi'kmaq bands in Nova Scotia? 1

donTtthink so. We have a few cases which support the concept that aü that is required is a
substantiai comection. So, in the Fowler case for instance, it was good enough that the
accused hunter show his direct heage to his mother who was a status Indian and a

member of the band that c d d be traced to the onginaI signatories. WhiIe this court
appeared to have attempted to corne to a fair and reasonabIe determhation ofthe
beneficiary issue, they were dohg so based on the Iaw. The question
is really whether the

courts are an appropnate forum for deciding such rnatters that are inherentiy tied into the

culture and poiitics of Aboriginal Nations seeking self-govemïngpowers.

In a recent case fÏom the Ontario Provincial court, R v. P0wIey7qa man and his
son defended charges for dawfkliy hunting game by claiming they were Metis and as
such had vaild Metis rights to hunt Neither of the men wére status Indians and the
provincial d d l i f e legislation only excluded status Indians fiom the act. The court held
that the PowIeys were of mked ancestry and therefore Metis,and that the Metis had a
right to hunt for food. As a d
t
,
there was no justification for excluding Metis rights in

the provinciai hunting Iegislation. Vaillancourt Rov. J. held:
ifthe Metis erercise th& AborigrgrnaIrights without the
beneft of a liceme, they are not on& putting themselves at
risk of legisative sanctions but they have areforced to
SMtfiroughtheforests like miminais as opposed to
h t e r s exerdisng their consti~utiionalr?ght~.'~

This case relied on Fowler.supra, in not limi*tingthe rights of Aboriginal peoples
to only status Indians. Often Aboriginal people are made to feel inferior or less worthy

than those registered under the Indian Act as uidians. This right to be recognized as an
AborÏginaI person in the eyes ofthe law, wiU have to be incorporateci into the Iunited
right ofAborîpinai Nations to control their membership. The RoyaI Commission

recognizes the Iegitimacy and Hideed the right ofAboriginal Nations to determine their
own citlzens or members, but that it shouid not be an dettered right The ComrnÎssion
recognizes that due to the history of Aboriginal peopIes in Canada, the Iack of sufficient

R v. Powféy [199911 CNL& 153. (Ont).
f i f i l at para 16.

land bases and resonrces, that this would factor mto the membership issue and some

Nations might be inclined to restnct membership Imfkirly.
1believe that in the end we will have to corne up with a reasonable concept of

membership that will include a comection, but it is neither too stringent, nor arbitrary

like the Indian Act. The connection can not be too remote so as to have no limit, but not

so shzngent as to deny Aboriginal peoples their valid claims to ancestry. CIearly the
jtrrisdictïonto control the membership Iists and the process by which to make

determinations must be retained by the Aboriginal Nations thernselves as part of their
cu1tura.i rights and inherent right to self-government At the same tirne, there wilI have to
be a set of checks and balances in pIace to ensure fainiess is part of the process. The

politics are such that 1suspect that in the beglluiing there will be many challenges to the
denid of ùidividual memberships. There are many Aboriginal people with valid ancestral

links that shouid not be excluded arbiharily. 1wodd support a method by which we
adhere to the "substantial connection" test. It appears to provide the necessary flexibility

and reasonableness necessary when deaIing with human beings and their cuitural, social
and political associations. The Royd Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concluded that

we can not rely on r a d characteristics to determine who Aboriginal peopIe are:
3. Abon'ginalpeoples are not racial groups; rather they are
organic poIiticaI und cuitural entities-ACthougfi
contmporary Aborr'gniafgroups stem h&oricu~yfifiomthe
o ~ ~ p e o p lofèNorth
s
Am&,
trhey o j b huve maed
genetretrc
herrerrtuges
and hclude individuak of vmied
ancestiy- As orgmic polirical enritfis,they huve the

''Canada, Report of the Royal Conrntiksr'onondborigihalPeoplm: Restructuriïtg the Relar'omM,VOL2
( û î t a . . SuppLy and Services Canada, 1996)-

RCQP voL23.

capacity to evohre over time and dange in thefrintemal
composition."

With regards to the issue of First Nations and the large number of non-statu

Indians who are not permitted to reside within their Nation's territories by v h e of
disquaMication under the Indian Act, the RCAP states that the federd govemment m u t
fully disclose their policy with regards to this issue. The commksioners recognized that

given the power of self-government, the Aboriginal Nations may UnfairIy exclude this
gmup ofAboripind peoples:

Since an Aboriginal Nation must be constituted Ni an
indurNe manner to q u a wfor the ngfit of selfdetmination, a large-scale membership dispute ofrhis
kind could be very signifcant."

So, we are left with the question of not who we are, but who will we be? It is

obvious that at Ieast for the time being, we are a varied bunch, but who wil1 we be in the
new miIIemium? It is interesting to note that the Conrtihction Act refers to Aboriginal
peoples as Indian, Inuit and Metis,without providing corresponding defhitions for each
of those terms. It is equalIy interesthg to note that when doing the federd census,
Statistics Canada divides Aboriginal peoples into four groups, those being: (1) North

American Indians registered under the hdian Act; (2) North American indians not
registered tmder the Indian Act; (non-status popdation); (3) Metis people; and (4)huit. It

is niteresting for two major reasons, one that thae is some recognition that the non-status

population aiso comprisespart ofthe Aboriginat population and more specinc to my
papa, that these numbers inchde more thanjnst Canadian Indians, and indudes Man of

"fiid- at lm=fiid at 183,

North America,namely Mans who originated in the United States. The approxmiate
numbers of recorded 'Indians" are as follows: 438,000 status Indians and 112,600 nonstatus Indians. RCAP wanns that the effects ofBILL C-3 1 must be addressed or there

wiIl be rapid decline in statu Indians and the non-status population will sweli.
Although the Metis peopIes are protected in our ComtitutionAct, according to

RCAP,the federal government did not keep records on them. Only 139,000 peopIe
idmtified as Metis in the 1991 census, whereas the Inuit population is about 38,000.
Despite ancient predictions that Aboriginal peoples wouid soon be extinct and despite the

assimilistic laws within the lndian Act which atternpted to Mll this prophecy, RCAP
has recently reinforceci the fact that:
It is cieur that, despite decliningfertiiity rates, AAborigrnal
people wiil be a continuing presence in Canadian society:
Nideed. th& population shme is projend to inerettse.
Demographic projections thur reinforce the assertion of
Aboriginalpeopie t h they will continrîe as dim-nct
peuples wfioseprerence repires a renewed reiutiomhip
wilh the rest of Canadian society. "

It is realïty then, that demands that the issue of Aboriginal peoples' rights and

concems, be dedt with and a new relatiooship fomed It aIso demands that issues of
identity and membersfiip be dealt with m a principled, fair and open mamer so as to be

indusive of dl Abonginai peoples and not just those registered under the Indim Act as

Indians. This issue, whüe avoided at aii costs by most politicians, must be de& with if
any of these Aboîiginaf Iegal issuesbrought before the courts can be resoIved effectively.

It Ïs too easy to say that MÏ?miaq people have a treaty nght to htmt in Nova Scotia, but it

ismuch more di.€EcaItto deveiop a method that wilI deteminewho is a Mi'kmaq, This is

the reason why I thought it mciaI that 1present thÏs issue before I proceed with the legal
argument for why AboriginaI people have a Bght to cross the Canada-US.border. I thmk

the background is relevant and so too is the m o d e d a y politics. While we have no
definitive rnethod of resolhg the issue yet, I want to reiterate that when 1speak of
Aboriginal peoples in my thesis, 1wilI b e using that term in an inclusive marner to
include those that live off the reserve and those who do not have status, but nevertheles
form part of out many Nations. I WU
be focusing this paper on the Nations which
comprise the Wabanaki Confederacy to give the issue a concrete context h m which to
deveiop my legai arguments.
WMANAIP;C CONFEDERACY:

The Wabaaaki Confederacy was essentiaily an aibance of the different Aigonkian
groups whose temtories were comprised of the present day Atlantic Provinces and our
neighbor state of Maine? Historicai sources use Man names interchangeabIy and it can

be dificuit to sort out the difference between the Abenaki and Wabanaki Conlederacies,
the Eastern Indians and the Abenaki Nation themselves. Anthropologists, historiaas and

missionarîes aU used a different means to distinguish beiween the Nations, using simiiar
names for different combmations of gronps, leadmg to even more confusion for present
day researchers. A passage h m a doctoral thesis on the Abenaki i1iustrates this historicd

codkion:

16M-at 23,

"MW of the Northemm Algonkr'mt h m r LT.Aliams, Atlas ofAnrm'cm Hisory (NewYork Charies
S a i i e r & S o q 1943) at 39.

Map ofAlgonEàn~-

fiom the Pennacook in the west to the Micmac in the east.
In additon. the special case use ofAbenakifor the enrire
group, und Abnakifor the localpopulation of the Kennebec
niter meutes disrinctiom that seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury tenns do not support. There arefkther
complicatiom Aivin Morrison notes that the Etchemin
'éither developed bto. or were repiaced by. today 's
Malecite and Passmaquoddy peoples. " Pierre Baird. the
first Jesuit missionary in the area. used Etchemin to
designare both K m e k and Penobscot Abnaki. The eariy
French in Acadiu alm refmed to the lndims of southern
Maine as the Almouchiquoik, while the Englkh spoke of al1
the Indium e u t of the PLscataqua River as the '*Eastern
Indians': Hisroncal usage md unthropological raxonomy
rmains in confict. For hhtorical purposes it s e a r
cleurer to refer - as in standrird French pracrice - to the
Abnaki as a generic tennfor the entire Indian population of
what is now the State of Maine und to distinguisli groups by
their riverine or coastal location: Sacos, Andruscoggrhs,
Kennebecs (synonymot(slj?the NomXgewocRs Ger the
village site), Penobscots and Passamaquoddies- 36

The Confederacy was primarily fomed to combat the increasing pressure from
Iroquois warfare. It was probably established somehe around the mid-eighteenth
centtxy and at times the Confederacy was also ailied with the Ottawa Indiaas and the

catholocked Mohawks at Canawagua3?The Groups of Nations had a history o f alliances
as they Lived m dose prorUmity throughout the territory presentiy know as New

BnmswfnmSwf&
Nova Scotia, Newfoimdland ,Prince Edward Island ,Maine and the
surmunding areas. '"eu

strong ties were evident during the treaty conferences and

negotiations in the late t6OOYsand eariy 17007s.The various Nations o h let the Iarger

pups send representatives to meet with Engiish oEciaIs about treaty signulg and
-

-

"ItModon, ThePeople of the Dmu>c The Abnaki and In&

Relmionr with Nov Englmd and New
France, Id00 - 1727.(Mahie: University ofMaine, 1975) at 11.12 [hereMer People of the D-1MeMüm, supra note f at SI.

ratifications. Many of the srnalIer Abenaki triis named as parties to the peace-making
process have disappeared or been absorbed into the bands in western New England and

Quebec. These incIuded the Arresaquntacook, Ahwenok, Passanawack, Pamadniak,
Weesungawok and some otherdg

While 1 do not have the time to get into a thorough review of the history of the
Wabanki, for the purposes of my thesis, I will assume that based on the above
information, the Confederacy included at l e s t the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy,
Penobscot, Nomdgewocks and the Abnaki. The main groups are the Mi'kmaq and
Matiseet as they have temtories in the Atlantic provinces and Maine. I have chosen the

member Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy as they were al1 participants in the
conferences Ieading up to the Treaties of 1725 and 1726 which I will discuss later, in

Chapter Two of this thesis. They dso occupy the generd temtory of the Atlantic
provinces and Maine, thereby "qualifying'' as border-hibes, based on their history of

trading patterns, close pohticd ties and intennarriagewhich spanned a m s s the border. I
wiII therefore present arguments that they have Aborigulai rights to cross the border, and
rights fiowhg h m Abonginai title to the area as well. They wouid have also been

Iocated close to the action when the J i Treuty was being signed promising Lndians rights
of Eee passage over the border. I am not making generai arguments that wodd apply to

other Aboriginal groups as some would not have lived near the border and othas wodd

18th Cenhay
and Nav England :Seiected Feotures Map ~ I . I KNative Commm*cations
Society ofNova Scotia The Mi'kmaq Treaty Hmdûook (Nova Scotk: Native Co~ll~~~~lll*cationç
Society,
1987)- 11he r e h f k Le" Century MopT') D e p a r û m ~
ofhdimAffairs and Nonhem DeveIopment, WeShouïd Wak nt rhe Trua Mr. h m e r
Made (New BrtmwÏcIr= DIAND, 1992)at74 76, m
n
a
if
t
e
rDumnter 's Tractf.
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have signed different treaties. 1 intend to present ail ofthese arguments in my thesis

sofelywith regard to the member Nations ofthe Wabanaki Confederacy.

CHAPTER TWO:
FAITH IN OUR ANCESTORS:
MOBILITY THROUGH ABORIGINAL
AND TREATY RICHTS

<niis landwhere you want to become absolute master,
this Iand is mine. 1have corne out of it Uke the grass, it
is where 1was b o m and reside, it is my Iand that is
mine Indian..?"

INDIAN TREATIES: MPLIED MOBILITY?:
M a n Treaties in Eastern Canada are agreements th& were negotiated by specific

Aboriginai Nations and the British Crown in the 1600 and 1700's. The treaties signed in
the Atlantic provinces included the members of the Wabanaki Coafederacy and have

been cded Peace and Friendship Treaties as they were signed generaily to secure peace

h m the various Iocd Indian Nations. At one time, the hdian Nations f
a outnumbered
the British population and were very skilled in war. The British relied on the kindness of

the Indians to survive on this Continent. The Indian Nations signed these treaties often to
ensure that while they were permining senlers to occupy minmiaiterrîtory, they also
wanted to ensure that this would not affect their rights to their lands, and their rights to

hunt, fish, a .so forth. Today, the sacredness of these documents are seen differentiy by
the Aboriginai Nations than they are by the governments in Canada The Royal

Commission on Aboriginal Peoples explained the ciifference in viewpoint between the
two cultures:

Tu tlie AborigtnaI nations, treatratres
me w'taip(Nfng
insrnments of relatinsh@.Ineyforged dynmc and
powerfl reI&tarronsItips
that remmk in Hect to this dw.
Indeed the spin't of the treatr-akas remaiired more or [ess
coltststent across this continentrevmr as tlie tennr of the
beuliani?s
have changed owr the.

C 0 i i ~ o 1of
1 unpublisheddocuments on Canach nndAmerÏca: PubWed by FrmdiCanada, L 17-19.

Canadiamand th& govmnmentr, howevm: are more Iikeiy
io look on the treuties as ancient hirtory. The treaties. to
Canada, are often regarded as inconvenient and obsolete
relies of the emiy days of this counby. With respect to the
early treaties in part~èu~m~
which were made with the
British or French Crown. Canadian governments disniiss
them as hmng no relëvance in thepost-Confederation
period. Thefact remanis. howewr. that Canada hm
inhented the treaties that were made and is the benefciary
of the Zan& and resources semed by those treaties and
stiil enjoyed today by Canada 's citkem. ''

There are other treaties which affect Aboriginal peoples which have not been
considered in the same iight as Indian Treaties. The Joy Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent

are considered international treaties and to date have not been usehl in securing nghts for
Aboriginal peoples with regards to the border, despite the fact that they specincaily

provide for Abon'ginai mobiüty rights. Despite the fact that Aboriginal rights were
recognized and protected in these internationd treaties, they have not been held to be
enforceable by Aboriginal people IargeIy because the Indian Nations were not signatories
to the treaties. 1wiU deai with these intemationai treaties ai the next Chapter.

There have been numerous uidian Treaties negotiated and signed since contact,

but one of the most important series of treaties for this geographicd area are those that
were agned by the Indian Nations and the British Crown. For the purposes of my thesis,

I wilIo d y be dealing with two of the numerom treaties and promkes that were issued

between 1675 and 1794.1have chosen the Treaty of 1725/26"for its inclusion of aII the
Nations of the Confederacy, and the Treaîy of U S Z . as this treaty has been interpreted by

the Supreme Comt and pmvides a usefid precedent by which to d y z e the possiiIe

'' RCRP v d l , supra note 20 at 128-130,

"TneSubinr'ssroa mdAgreencent of the Eaptent fndim, December 15, t725, Boston, New EngIand,

mobiIity rÏghts? Thae are simply too many treaties and histoncd information for me to
cover aü of them in this thesis. It is my belief that the mobility right could be established

relying ody the two treaties I have chosen.

These treaties have gained renewed importance in the lives of AborighaI people
in the years fo1Iowùig the protection of Treaty rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act.
Treaties have been used to validate AboriginaI hmting rights, fishuig nghts, and even
rights to limited commercid activities of the pa.*cularAboriginal Nation signatones.

The vaiidity of some of these treaties has aIready been recognized and pivm effect in

many Iower court decisions in the Maritimes. The o d y one that has been andyzed by the
Supreme Court of Canada to date is the Treaty o f 1752, cailed the Treaty or Adcles of

Peace und Friendship Renewed, 1752. The courts find thernselves having to interpret
various provisions in the treaties with very Iittle Wntten context or explanation. Given the
importance of the Crown's roIe in s e c u ~ these
g
treaties, the courts must guide their
interpretations with this history in mind. The Supreme Court of Canada recently held in

nie key hterpretiveprincipleswhich app& tu neahès are
fist. that -y ambiguity in the
will be resdved in
favour of the Indians und, second, that trean'es shouki be
intetpreted rit a manner t h t m a i n t a h the integrity of the
Crown,parffarffcuIlanly
the Crown 'sfiducimyobligation
towarrls abotiginal peopier.?

The court deait with the histoncd background to the treaty era ofCanadian and

Indian history and summarizedthe d e s h m previous case law that [ends saisitivhy to
the unique nature ofthese agreements. Cory J. in Budger, outlined the basics of treaty

interpretation:

Fht,it must be remembered that a treaty represents an
exchange of solemn promises between the Crown and the
vm'ous Indian nations. It k an agreement whose nature is
sacred ...Second the honour of the Crown t3 always at
stake in its dealing with Indian people. Interpretatioons of
treaties and stattdtory provisions which have an impact
upon treaty oraborigmal rights n w t be approached in a
manner which maintains the integnty of the Crown. It ii
always assumed that the Crown intendr tofurfii its
promises. No uppearance of 'sharp deuiing " wiii be
sanctioned ...Diird, uny ambiguitiesor doubrfui
q r e s s i o m in the wording of the treuy or document mt
be resolved infavour of the Indians. A curoI1ary to th&
principle is that any limitations wliich restrict the rights of
Indianr under treaties
be narrow[y
comtmed ...Fmrth, the onur ofpraving that a treaty or
aboriginal kght iiaP bem atznguisshed lies upon the
C m . Tiiere m t be 'Sm*ctproof of thefact of
extf*nguishrnent"and mevrdence
of clem and plain intention
on the pmt of the govmnmmt tu extr'rtgubh neas, rigfits..."

I wili focus on the Treaty of 1752 as its interpretation by the Supreme Court of

Canada has set the precedent for treaty interpretation in Canada and wiII apply to my
anaiysis of the other, earlier Treaty of 1725/26that has not been mterpreted by the
Suprerne Court of Canada to date. This analysiysis
fiprovide the background to my
review of the international treaties and why 1think they too, provide enforceable rights

for the member Nations o f the ConfederacyY

In Simon v. Ine Queen * the Supreme Court specifically dedt with the Treaty of
1752 as it pertained to the huntuig rights of the Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia. This case

involved a band member ofthe Shubenacadie Indian Brook Band who was registered as

an Indian under the Indimi Act. James Matthew Simon was charged under the Nova
Scotia Lan& and Forests Act "for possessing shot larger than the prescnted lunit and
possessing a rifle during closed hunting season. Simon admitted the ai1the elements of

the charge but asserted that his right to hunt in the Treaty of 1752 was protected h m
provincial legislation by m

e of section 88 of the Indian Act, which provides as foilows:

88. Subject to the tenns of any treaty and any other Act of
the Parliament of Canada. aall laws of general application
from rime tu tirne in force in any province me applicabfe tu
art in respect of Indiam in the province. except to the extent
that such Iaws are incoIISi;Ptentwith thk Act or nay order.
rule, regulation or by-law made therettnder, and acept to
the extent thm such Iaws ntake provision for any mutterfor
which provision b made by or under this Act.
The Treaty was upheld by the court as a valid and binding, as were the hlmting
rights contained therein. The Supreme Court ofCanada in so holding, set out a method

for treaty anaiysis which is relevant to my anaiysis as to whether the Treaty of 1752

contains any rights upon which the Aboriginal beneficiaries mÎghtc l a h a right to pass

keIy over the Canada - US.border. The relevant questions as set by the Supreme Court
were:

(1) Was the Treaty of 1752 validly createdby competent parîies?

R Y. Simon, CI989 2 SICA.387. [heremaiterSh0n3~
"Lands and Forestr A m , RSN.8 1967, c-163, S. 150(1).
a hdim Act, mpra note21, S. 88.

(2) Does the Treaty contain a right to hunt and what is the nature and scope of that

right?
(3) Kas the Treaty been terminatecl or Iimited?
(4) 1s the appellant covered by the Treaty?

Ch the fÏrst question ofthe capacity of both parties to enter into the treaty,
Dickson, CJ.cited the case of Nowegiiick v. The Queen " as standing for the principle
that treaties should be constnred liberally and any ambiguities resolved in favor of the
Indians. The court in Nowegijick held:
It seem tu me, however. that treaties and statutes relating
to Indians should be liberuflyconstmed and dmbtful
expressions resolved infavour of the Indians.-*.

In Jones v. Meehan, 175 US,1 (2899). it was held that
I n d h treaties "rnust ...be construed, nnot according to the
technical meaning of [their] w o r h ... but in the sense in
wliich they wmld naturally be understood &ythe helndian~"*~

adopt a broad and generous interpretation of what constitutes a treaty as well as the

preliminary question of capacity to sim. Justice Lamer explained that capacity must be
seen h m the point of view of the 'uidians" in determining whether it was reasonable for

them to assume that the other party they were deaIing with had the authority to enter into
a bindmg treaty. He went on to state that the person making the agreement on behalfof

the Crown need not have special powers, as the '%dians'' were not on parwith a

sovereign state, and thus fewer fomalities were required The simple reguirement is that
the person must have represented the Crown in an hportanf authoritative hction?

In Simon the court pointed out that many courts have aIready assumed that the
Treaty of 1752 was validly created. Chief Jusfiusfice
Dickson heId that not only did the
Mi'lanaq delegates have the authonty to bind the Mi'kmaq Nation, but so did Govemor

Hopson, as he was a representativeof His Majesty and thus had suEficient authority to
bind the Crown? The court oniy dealt with the Mi'kmaq Nation and thus the treaty
would have to be re-examined if another Nation were to assea that they fell under the
same Treaty. The relevant part of the Treaty which States who the parties are, provides

that it is between His Majesty in the old territones ofNova Scotia, aiso called Acadie
and:
Ma~orJean Baptisre Cope chiflachem of the T d e of
Ma& Indian4 inhabiting the emtern Coast of the
said Province. and A n d m Ha& i M h r t . Gabriel Martin
and Francis Jeremiah members & Reî&gatesofthe Suid
Tribe,for thliemselves and their said T d e and their k i r s
anci the heirs of their kirsforever.
(emphasis added)

"

It seerns clear that the oniy signatories or intended beneficÏaries to this Treaty are
the members and heiis forever of the Mi'kmaq Nation. Not ody does the Treaty

specincaüy date Mick Mack, but they aIso mention theu generaf temtory, Le. the eastern
coast of the said province, which at that time was oId Nova Scotia Looking at the map of

oId Nova Scotia " and the tnid texritories 56, it Ïs easy to see that the Mick Mack were

the only tnbes within that territory in the eastern part of the Province at dl, and the rest

were in the south and west. A different interpretation might have been possible had the
Treaty stated "Eastern uidians" as opposed to soIeIy the Mick Mack. since the English
ofien referred to al1 the tni%es who occupied the territory hold Nova Scotia as Eastern
Indians, or Abenaki. The -ers

were not oniy specific in the triie name, but also their

temitory and suice past treaties included ail the names of hibes, or used a generic name to
indude them dl, it is assumed the &amersdid this purposely to treat only with the Mick

Mack. With such specificity, it is doubdul that broad, Iiberal phciples in treaty
interpretations couid be used to enlarge the category of these particular beneficiaries.
It has also been argued that not only is the Treaty of 1752 Imiited to the Mi'kmaq,

but it was onIy referring to a small Band of Mi'kmaq living in Eastern Nova Scotia at the
tirne of the Treaty. 1 believe that this is the narrowest of interpretations and is not
befitting the unique nature of relations among the entire Mi'kmaq Nation. The Treaty

refened to the Mi'kmaq, their hein and their heirs forever. Followîng the Iiberai
interpretive principIes as discussed above, and given that there is ambiguity in the
wording of the document, hîs cIause shouId be nad m favour of the entire Mi'kmaq

Nation. Therefore, wwhile the actuai signatories may have ody resided in one area of the
Mi'kmaq Nation, that does not mean that there was no mtention to cover the Mi'kmaq as
a whole, in a representative capaci@.

Regardless of whether or not those partidar Mi'kmaq did sign the Treaty in a
representativecapacity or not, the broad, liberaI hterpretative p ~ C i p I e wouid
s
appIy to
what is meant by the % e k and h e k forever? Who the Mi'kmaq consider as ''heirs" may
--

"TdaC T d o n ' s : Approxiinate Bounddès
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M i h m r Dtnmner'E Tract,szïpra note 39.

not be the same as what the British htended it to mean. Mi'krnaq today stül have large

extended f d e s and often even nonrelatives are refmed to as "Auntie" or "Unde" and
are treated in every other way as f d y 7because to that particuiar Mi'kmaq famiIy, they
are family. It wouid be an onerous buden to expect a Mi'kmaq person to trace thek
ancestry back to the particdm group ofMi'kmaq that sïgned the treaty. The court in

The Micmacs did not keep written records. Micmac
iradirions me large& oral in nature. To impose am
NnpossibZe burden o f p o f wouid, in efect, render
nugatory any nght to hunt that a present-day Shtibenacadie
Micmac Indiart would othew&e be entitled to invuke bared
on this treaty?
I wodd argue that while the Treaty 41752 is not so broad so as to apply to aii of
the rnember Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy, it is e q d y not so narrow so as to
appIy o d y to a handfiri of Mi'kmaq and not the whole Nation. With respect to the rest of

my andysis of the Treaty of 1752, I wilI proceed on the basis that the rights contained
therein, applies only to the Mi'krnaq, but to al1 ofthe Mi'kmaq. The court in S i o n was
deaihg not only with the hunting rights that were contained in the Treaty, but also rights

which may be incidental to the f
kexercise of those hunting nghts. The relevant portion

of the Treaty states:

It is agreed that that the said trilie o f l n d i m shall not be
hindwedfrom, but havefiee liberty ofirmtmgandfishing
as m a i ...58

The court went on to explain that the phrase "as d"
dÏd not limit the types of
weapons that codd be used tu hmt to those nsed ni 1752, but was to be mterpreted ai a
sr Simonf supmnote 46 at 408.

ffexibie way that is sensitiveto the evohtion of hunting practices over t h e . It was held
that the right to carry a weapon was a nght which was incidental to the fkee exercise of
himting contained in the treaty. Wtiile subsequent cases deahg with Aboriginal rights

holds that a right cm ody be protected ifit is not incidental to a larger right, the same is
not tnie of treaty nghts." It is my view that a right to cross the Canada-US. border is
necessady incidentai to the '%ee Iiberty of hunting and fishing as usual" since it was
prornised that they should never be hindered Eom the exercise of this nght.

The prohibition by Immigration officiais against the £teepassage of Indians wodd
not o d y hinder hunters who wanted to hunt in their traditional territory, but totally
prohibit it. Since these rights are protected in the Constitution A a under section 35(1), 1
wodd argue that these immigration laws should be ofno force and efféct to the extent
that they are inconsistent with Aboriginal treaty rights as per section 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The relevant portions of the Imnri@mionAct do not amount to a

cIear and plain htent to extinguish these rights, nor does it specincaily address the issue

oftreaty rights with regards to mobiIity across the border. Yet,the other articIes of the
Treaty are relevant to the issue of the neces*

of fkee movement over the border m

order to exmke theu treaty rights. Articfe Three of the Treaty deais with the promise by
the Mi'haq to:

...use th&

utntost Endemors to b r i e in the other Indians

to Renew and Ra@ thh Peuce, ..?

PresumabIy, the Mi'kmaq wouid have to have the ability to travel throughout the
territory in order to bring in the 0 t h Nations who signed the Treaty of l725/26 to renew
~e peace by signing the T m t y of 1752.This wouid involve traveling across the lands of

what is now Canada and the United States in order to accomplish this task. Not ody are
there rights which involve present-day cross-border rnobility, but there was an obligation
which necessariiy inferred the right to cross what is now the Canada - U.S.border. Given

that these ~ a t i e were
s
signed in good faith by both parties, the Mi'kmaq would have
every right to believe that they would forever have the right to travel over these
temtories. Any other interpretation would Iead to an absurd result, in that promises and
obligations were made that couId not be carried out. Certainiy, this cm not be the result
that either party intended. In addition, the Treaty of 1752 confirms the rights promised in
the earlier Treaty of 1725/26. As I will argue in the aext section, I believe that the earlier
treaties recognized the right to cross the border, if not explicitly, then implicitly. I wouid

submit that the Treuty of 1752 recognizes previous rights and obIigatioos that necessarily
infia right to keIy travel the lands that are now divided by the Canada - US. border.

In regards to the third branch ofthe treaty analytis, the court heId that the
evidentiary requirements for proving the termination of the Treaty had not been met. Fnst
of aiI, an Indian Treaty is sui generis and not created nor terminated according to the d e s

of international law. As well, once it has been estabtished that the Treaty is valid, the
party armg its texmination bears the bmden of proof oftemination. StrÎct proof is aiso

reqimed Îfextm~shmentis to be proven, which ui this case, it was not The court
contempIaiedthe possibility of whether a Treaty couId be exthguished, but gave no

answer?' That question has been answered in more m e n t cases on s.35(1) of the

ConstitutionAct, which have heid that treaty nghts protected under s.35 cm not now be

extinguished, akhough they might have been abIe to be extingukhed prior to 1982."
Thus, the court in Sinon held that the Treaty of l7.U is of as much force and effect today,
as it was in 1752.~
At least in terms of the Mi'kmaq members ofthe Wabanaki

Confederacy, they shouId have the nght of Eee passage over the border at least to

facilitate traditionai and modem day hunting, fishing and trading practices, and to
maintain social and political relations as guaranteed in the Treaty with the other member

NatÏons. Unfominately, the Treaty of 1752 may provide M e assistance for other Nations
of the Wabanaki Confederacy.

THE TREATY OF I7.5/26:
The Treuty of iï2X26 is another treaty between His Majesty and the various
Nations wCthinthe area of New England and Nova Scotia This Treaty was ratified by the
Nations m severai documents, incIuding Mascarene's ratification, his promkes to the

Indians, and the 1726 Nova Scotia ratification and Govemor Doucette's like promises to
the same bbIndians''.The relevant portion of the Treuty of 1725 reads:

.

P unto the Penobscot. N'dpwalk

and other Tribe~
*in HLS Majesty S ProMnce afresaid md th& naturai
descendants respective&gü th& lands. libertiés and
merti'ees not by them conveyed or sdd to orpossessed by
any of the EngZisIt Subjects as aforesaraid.As ah0 the

" Riid*

"Y i der Peet. supranote 12.
"Sniop supra note46.
Timy of I î ' S , supra note 42.

At the coderence of the C'Indian"delegates with Govemor Dummer in Boston

several promises were made by Dummer to ensure the Mans' " concerns with regards
"

to the effect of the Treaty were addressed One particular promise read:
That the said Indshall peaceably Enjoy al2 their lands
andproperttes which have not been by them comeyed and
sold unto orpossessed by the Engfish. and be no wuys
molesied or disturbed in their planting or improvment:
andfirrther that there be aibwed t h the-fiee 1md
priMIege of Huntine Fîdiine; and Fowling, as f o * i n e r [ ~ ~ ~ ~
(emphasis added)
As weU, Mascarene made promises to the Indians, after their ratification, which

That the Indians diail not be rnolested rSi th& nerson~,
fkntiw Fishing and p l d n g groundr nor in anw otlrer
lawfii occusion~by His Mujesty 5 subjectr or their
.
dependents ror in the exercîe o f the1't relr~ton..*66
C

(emphasis added)

Similady, Lt Governor Doucette's promises at the 1726 Nova Scotia ratification

And 1do F~rfherpromise
in the absence of iris honour
the LI.GovX of thepnwhce in beharfof this said
Govemment, mut the said Jitdinrrs shall rrot be tnoîesîed
Person's. Huntrihg Fishing and Siooting &
plmting on theirplanting Ground ~ oinr an-v othet their
JiwhiOccmion~By irisMajesty 's subJects or their
Dependents nor in the aercike pf thml reiioipa...

"

Goyenor WiIIim Dummer 's hmrSes to d e Delegaies of the Eostem Indians. ffom Dummer f T

,

supracnote 39,
M<~tl~cmene's
AmIciès of Su6mLsston and Agreement, t 725 and Mascarene 5Promirer to rhe Delegaies of

rhe Emrm lirdm,fiid

"R~@catibnof the Attr'cfepEntered liito atBoston by Chids of the Emrern Indiun T
Made by the LL GovernorDoucette to the Chi*

of the E m m Indi0ltsOltS
Bid-

i and PromrSs

The Crown promised repeatedly that the Mans would have the liberty to hunt

and fish, practice their religion and carry out any other Iawfbi activity without
moIestation, as had been done fomerly. The miautes of various confierences about the
Treaties between the govemment officiais and the delestees evidence the necessity that

their rights be protected in order that they wouid even consider signing these Treaties.
Even in the 1700's. the "Indians" knew they had rights and reminded the English officids
ofthis fact Most recent court cases on hunting or fishing nghts of the Mi'kmaq or

Maiecite in the area have assurned the vaiidity of the Treaty of 1725 and upheId it. As a
resdt, I wodd argue that were the Treaty of 1725 put to the test in the Supreme Coint
treaty anaiysis as set out in Simon, it would be found to be in hill force and effect today.

Thus, to apply the treaty andysis to the Treaty of 1725, these four questions
would have to a~sweredaccording to the evidence:
(1) Was the Treaty of 1725 validIy created by competent parties?

(2) Does the Treaty of 1725 contain either direct mobility rights or rights

incidentai to the prbary rights which wodd give a mobility right, and
what is the nature and scope of such rights?
(3) Has the Treaty of 1725 been terminated or limiteci?
(4) Are the vanous mies of the Wabanaki Confederacy covered by this Treaty?

The nrst question is one of the Mian delegates' and Crown deIegates7capacity to
enter into a valid and binding treaty. The court in Simon accepted the case Iaw which

permh extrnisic evidence in the detemination of micertainties or ambiguities m treaties.

The Treaiyc f I 7 ' 5mentions the names of two Penobscots who cIaimed they were
empowered to enter mto the Treaty for dI the maes-HistorÏcaI documents such as

conference minutes indicate that the four chiefs who ended up signing the Treaty did so

with the authority of the other tnibes. One British observer wrote:

...tribes sent belts to those f i e sfor confirmation of their
agreeing to what shall be conchded-."

As weU, the Iater ratifications of the Treaty by ail the tnbes is fùrther evidence
tbat the deIegates had the authority tu speak for the other tnibes. Major Mascarene had

spent the whole Swnmer of 1726 ratifying the peace with those tnaes. JoumaIs were kept
of the day to day business regardmg the Indians and presents were recorded for each tnie
who ratified or signed duplicates of the Treaty. There is corroborahg evidence that the
original signers to the Treaty of 1725 had ample authority to sign on behalf of dl.There

is also anthropologicd evidence, already mentioued, which desm%esthe political ties
between the goup of Abonginal Nations ofien referred to as the "Eastern Indians",
"Abenaki" or Wabanaki Codederacy. The Penobscot were considered the superior or
stroager of the groups and it wouId therefore be na-,

taking into account theù

refationship, that they would assume a Iead role orbe spoke persons in Treaty
negotiations." The Penobscot were so outspoken about their land rights in negotidons
becanse they were responsible for the welfare ofthe other triies and they took that
responsîîility seriously. "

The second part of the nrst issue on capacity is the capacity of Governor D m e r
to negotiate the Treaty of 1725on behaffof the King of Great Bntain- The questions to

m e r wouid be: (1) Was Governor Dummer a representativeofthe King who hefd an

"Docmnentaqr Wory of ttie State ofMame, ConferenceKth TheMegotes VOL EL (nopage refefe~lcc).
@

~~

New Brunswick Magazine,
of the MuIi;FeetsVOL1, no, 1,1898, @upage referace),
PenhaflowPfndrmt W i (nohMio&rap6icaIintiormati'oua d b I e ) .

important and authoritative position? and (2) Wodd it be reasonable for the Aboriginal

Nations to conclude that Governor Dummer had the requisite power to bind the British
Crown with this Treaty?

On the f h t question, Dummer had been given specifïc instructions as a Govemor
on how he was to deal with the tribes. These instructions included a mandate to maintain
or establish peace and fnendship with the Indians and to deal justly with them in their

lands and possessiofl~.~'
Governor Dummer was the Govemor of the whole
Massachusetts Bay Colony, which included oId Nova ScotiaR,where the Treaty was
negotiated and was the highest up in the chah of political power in the colony. He was a
direct "arm" ofthe KUig of Great Bntain who gave him his commi*ssionand thus, his
position was one of great a~thonty?

Due to his high ranking position, it wouId be reasonable for the Nations to have
believed that he could bind the British Crown. In the Conferences between the Engiish

and the Aboriginal Nations, usudiy the chiefs were sent as deIegates and Governor
Dummer as the representative of the Crown. Even when Major Mascarene was sent to
have the Treaty ratined by the Nations in 1726,he was assisting Govemor Dummer,and
the Nations were well aware of that fact Any questions or disputes regardhg the Treaty
were mostly addressed to Governor Dummer-

" Thus, considering theu varÎous deaIings

with GovemorDunmier on Treaty issues and alliance issues and hÏs high ranking

--

-

Our Land, supranote 43 at 140- 156.
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position, I wodd argue that it would have been reasonabIe for the tribes to believe he had
the capacity to bind the British Crown.

The next issue set out in Simon is whether or not the Treaty contains direct
mobiiity rights or rights incidental to the exercise of the primary rights which wodd
UicIude a mobility right, and an indication of the scope of those rights. Agaiu, the court
accepted that the case Iaw had demonstrated that a fair, Iarge and liberal interpretation of

ambiguous treaty provisions is necessary. Again, it is to be noted that the Treaty is to be
read as it was understood by the Indians and not that of the Cmwn's lawyers. The court in

R. v. Home " dso agteed that wording alone does not sunice to detennine the legal
nature of a treaty and therefore extrinsic evidence may be used. Finally, in R. v. TcIylor

and Williams " the court had to interpret a Treaty with regard to hunting rights. The court

allowed the use of the minutes ofthe negotiations leading up to the treaty which detailed
the concem by the chiefs for protection of those nghts. In this case, the minutes of the
counciI were as much a part ofthe Treaty as were the written articles. The court heId that

extraneious matenai is properfy before the court when there is ambiguity in the treaty.*
It is documented the concems the AborighaI Nations had in regards to the borders
between the different powers and constantiy queried oftheir mobility rights. The
accumdation ofthese concenis were Iater addressed again in the J i Treaty, which
specifrcaIiy recognized that Indians M g on both sides ofUie border bad the ri& of fke

passage. Thus, I wodd argue that these promises of fiee passage be mchded m any
d e m o n of '%ee Iiberty ofthe pason" and "non-molestation of the person" 9r the

present treaty's text. It was noted time and t h e again in the minutes of the conference

Ieadùig to the Treaty of 1725,that the Indian Nations were not giving up their lands and
that whiIe some s m d settfement was permitted, the Mans retained aiI the rights
associated with their traditional territories which would include mobility.

From the case law, it is appropriate to look at the context of a word or phrase
when trying to establish its scope within a treaty. Knowing ail the concems indians had

over their ability to tnwel theu territones, undisturbed for huating and fishhg and other
travel it is not surprishg that they had their concem addressed in the Iater Jay Treaty.

The Jay Treaîy h p l y addressed concems that were already present and put to paper, the
ability to cross the border. The promises under the Jay Trenty were meant to address
mobility concerns that had evolved after the Treaty of 1725 was signed and the Indian
Nations saw the power struggIe between the two Eurupean powers over Indian land.

Given the large, liberal interpretation that treaties are entitled to, I wouid argue that the

"fmIibeay" and "non-molestation" promises m regards to hmting and 0th- activities,
referred to in the Treaty of I725 wouId include the nght to cross the traditional te~~itones,

now divided by the border, to hunt, fish, trade or any other traditionaI activity, without
behg subject to the Immigration Act. CertainIy, these rights wouid preclude Confederacy
members £tombehg harassed or detained or m any way imposed upoa by either
government at the border. I beiieve these rÎghts wodd be in keeping with the principies as

enunciated niSimon.

The court in T i f o r ,supra heId with regard to Cmwn actÏons:

In approuching the t m s of a treaty-.. the honor of the
Crown ik ulways w d v e d and no appearance of "sharp
dealing"shouId be sanctiuned. "

The occurrence of "sharp deaiings" on the part of the Crown g e n d y in treaty
negotiations is well documented An English official wrote to the Council of Trade and
Plantations about the then recent wars with the Indians, where he stated in part:
neir quarreis and wurs were notfor ambition, empire
or bloudthirstmess but to defend their property and
bmn& ... Their injures have been very great, as dntesting
them of their land by force orfiaudJirst making them
d m k and then to sign what they knew not what...
Ad to this our inhumuniîy tu them ... We vi@ t h m with al1
rnanner of nanies. and opprI0z~sIanguage, cheat abuse and
beat them. somerimes tu the loss of limbs. pelt them with
stones and set dogs upon them ... tu0 ofien
an Article of Peace h a nrn in one sense in English and
quite contrav in Indian. by the Govmor S express
order...

As can be seen fiom this passage, the Eugiish admittedly dedt unjustly with

Aboriginal Nations, through the use of force, intimidation, aIcohoI, h u d and faIse
promises. It wodd be hard to thmk of a situation more unjust and thus I wouid argue that
these actions by the Government firrtherjustines giving the rights contained in the

Treaty, and any incidentd rights, as broad and large an interpretation as possibIe.

The scope or extent of the rights shouid be considered h m the perspective of the
"naturalunderstandingof the Indians". In this case, the Nations throughout history
stresseci repeatediy the importance of their ability to pass fieely within thek territory

which was not fashioned around the political bordas of the Engiish, Not ody were the
.

-
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groups promised fke hcberty of their traditionai huntkg and fishing practices as usuai,
they were promised truck houses, kedom of religion and that no one would molest them

in the? bbvels"as evidenced in the Treaty, its ratifications and promises, as welI as
conference minutes. Similarly in the IaterJay Treaty, the Indians were given an

exemption b r n border duties to cornphnent their right of fkee passage. One of the moa
important histoncd documents supporthg a specific right of Eee passage over En@*&
territories and borders, were the instructioas to Crown officiais directing them to promise
the indians:

...t h e wilC nevet be moleste4 in their hunting. travels or
ut any time wronged or iinposed U D O in
~ their
fuhing,
pade or truck of thekfurs, etc." (emphm*sadded)

1 would argue that the signatories have a Treaty right to not be molested, wronged

or imposed in theu travels, which inchdes travek for the purpose of transporthg or
tnicking their fius for trade or their travefs in the pkt

ofhunting or fishing. They aIso

have an Aboriginal treaty nght to not be molested in the practice of their religion which
would indude the performance of ceremouies in traditional temtories obiivious to any
"borders" as set by the European powers. This would include ail their traditionai activities

whether it be sustename activities or sociai and poiiticaI interaction. AU of these treaty
rights are dram fkom the articles of the Treaty of 1725126 and the correspondhg

promises as provided above which are aIso part ofthe Treaty.

The third issue m the mterpretationofthis Treaty is whether or not the Treaty has
been te-ated

or rmiitecL8' In S h m , q r a , the court deak with termination by

"LG Dunbar to ML Popple. C o I o d PapasCadendiarvol 37.(no page derence). [[ieLelnafter DunbmI.
"Shan,supz note 46.

hostiIities and termination by extinguishment and heId that once it has been established
that a valid treaty has been eatered into, the party a
r
m
g for its termuiation bears the
burden of proving the circumstances and eventsj u s t m g the termination. Thus, in
regards to a daim for the rïght to £kee passage, uninterrupted travel or non-molestation of

hmting or religion, it wouid be up to the Ctown to i d e n w any specific hostilities and
prove that these hostilities ifany, had the effect of terminating the Treaty. The b u d m is
the same shouid the government d e g e extinguishment. As explained earlier, the Crown

requires "strict proof of the fact of extinguishrnent" as welI as evidence of c1ea.rand plain
intention to extbguish treaty rights. I believe that the Crown would have no more
evidence in a c l a h today, to establish termination or extinguishment, than they did in
Simon,and thus the Treaty 41725 wodd be of as much force and effect today, as it was
at the t h e it was concluded.

The fourth issue is whether those who subrnit iidaim are covered by the Treaty of

1725. The case law and the histoncal documents aIready presented, are evidence that the
Cape Sables (Mi'Ianaq), St. John's (Maliseet), Penobscot, Naridgwalk and the other
smaller m%es previoudy mentioned, were mciuded in the Treaty. Aiso, the joumds of

English officiais and minutes at Conferences refer to the Eastern Indians, Abenaki and
various tnbes mterchangeably. Zfthere had been any doubt as tu whether the Mi'kmaq
and Maliseets and Penobscots were mcluded, CoIoneI Westbrook in his letter noted that:

...St John mrd Cape Sable indians have agreed to abide
by what the Penobscot indiam have agreed to m d obide
by whar tliqr s h d agtee to - tltey m e w~-ning
tu be at
82
peace.--

-
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Theù hclusion in the Treaty is mainly evidenced by their ratification of the
Treaty during the summer of 1726. nie Chiefof the Cape Sables Indians ratifîed the

Treaty on May 31,1726 with Major Mascarme. 1believe we can conclude that the entire
group of Abenaki or Eastern Indians as descn'bed in the territorid maps provided, are
covered by this Treaty. Further 1would argue that the Treaty of 1725 gives the uidian

Nations theu mobility rights either directly as a protection fiom imposition of their

travels or incidental to their nghts of fiee exercise of their hunting, trading and religious
rights, and is stilI in force today. As a resuit, that Treaty would be protected under section
35(1) ofthe ConstitutionAct, 1982 as an "existing" treaty right.

As well, section 88 of the Indian Act, provides that the terms of a treaty wilI be

paramount to any provincial legislation which may be in conflict. Therefore, it would
foIIow that provincial Iaws shouid fdI in the face of a treaty right. Unfortrmately, the case
law has held those treaty rights to the same justification test as seen in R v. Sparrow." a
case on Aboriginal rights that wi11 be deait with later in this chapter. In the case of border

rights, we are deaihg with federd legislation, under the Immigmton Act. With regards to

federaI legidation generaily, there is a divergence of opinion as to whether the same
priucipfes that apply to Abonginal rights, shouid dso apply to Treaty rights.

1 thuik there is an inherent d i f f i c e between Aboriginal and Treaty rights in the
sense that while the former is significant for its basis in the history and d t u r e of a

Nation, the latter has those characteristicsand an additionai soîemnity in the good faith

exchange of rÎghts and respollslcbiIitiesthat the Aborigmal Natiom have relied on to the
most part to thek detriment. Pa-

MackIan in his artick "FkstNations Self-

Government md the Borders of the Canadian Legatlmaghation"'" argues that treaties
are solema agreements that shodd remain paramount over both provincial and federd

J d c e Larner's statement in Sioui that "{the) v - y
defiition of a treaty ...makes it impossible to avoid the
conclusion thut a Peary c m o t be exthguikhed without the
consent of the Indians iirvolved" ought [O be taken
s&usly as precederttiol supportfor the proposition that
feded and provincial IegtsIation is not paramount over
conjricn'ng treuty gumanteesr promises made to natives by
the Crown acght to be imagined as setting the boundaries
ofpemtirsible [egidativeactii@ in thefirtw~~
Imagining
treaties in thù wayforces recoizrt'deration oftraditionai
undwstundings of the nature of legiautive mthority: its
end result would be to view treuties entered into &ythe
Crown with nativepeoples rn constitutiontd documents
dmmca~ingpermr.Ssible
and impennbsiib[espheres of
legisutive authorityas it intersects with native interests."
1agree with the above interpretation of the paramountcy of AborigEiai treaties.

There can be no greater "Iaw"or obiigation, than a treaty between two Nations who have
put their min& to the future and their solemn agreement as to how that future will

evoIve. S a a c e s are made and compromises are negotiated m good faith with the
presumption that both sides will honor their promises. There is no conceivable way Ui

which the Govemment coddjus*

an infiingement ofa treaty right. The Treaty is a

solemn past between two Nations that is meant to be honored mtiIsnch t h e as both
parties consent to achange. The court m S M while holding that there was a treaty m
that case, interpreted the Treaty in such a way so as to mcorporate the '%aIidity" of

European settIement- So too couid the court address issues such as National Secrrrity

issues as an implied condition of the Aboriginal treaties inctuding the Jay Treuty. Justice

McLaughh in her dissent in Van der Peel stated that the way to reconde Aborïginai
rights and Crown interests is by negotiation that ends in an agreement; a treaty protected
under section 35(1). With regard to reconciliation, McLachlin J. held:
Tradtionaolly this h m been done through the b-eatyprocess.
bused on the concept of the abonginal people and the
Crown negotiating and concluding ajuît solution to their
divergent interests, @en the historicalfict that they are
irretrrtrrevably
compelled to [ivetogethm. At th& stage. the
stage of reconciliction, the courts play a iess important
mie. It isfor the aborigrnul peoples and the otherpeoples
of Canada to work out ajust accommodarion of the
recogniied aborignal rights?

ifthere are problems with those commitments later, it is for the Abonginai group

and the Crown to try to renegotiate, otherwise,the treaty as uitended, stands "as is'. The
situation of treaty nghts is very different fiom Aboriginal nghts. Mthough both are
protected mder section 35(1) of the Constitution Act. 1982. treaty nghts are by theK very
nature Aboriginal nghts that have already gone through the process of reconciliation,
Treaties are the resuIt of the Crown and the Aborighai Nation reconciluig the Crown's
sovereignty with the haditional AbonginaI rights of the Nation. The deaI has aiready been

made and reconded with Crown interests. The Crown at that time not oniy had input into
the reconciliation, but dso had the drafters &te up the Treaties IargeIy in their favor.

The Crown c m not in good faith, Iater suggest that because they have new interests to
protect that the Treaty itseifmust be re-reconciled with these new interetm. That process

-
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is cded re-uegotiation and it takes both parties to participate and consent to the changes
that will be made to the treaty* if any.
Unfortunately, the current situation is Canada is that any federal legislation would

have to pass the justincation test as set out in R. v. Spamowt7In this test, once the
Aboriginal claimant has shown that they were acting pursuant to an Aboriginal right, the
Cmwn must show that the right has been extinguished or the burden shifts to the Crown
to prove that there is a valid legislative objective for interfiring with the Aboriginal nght.
Here, the Crown would have to reconcile its fiduciary duty for Aboriginal peopIe by
showing that the right was infringed as little as possible, that where appropriate,

compensation was paid, and that the Abonginal group was c o n s ~ l t e dAs
~ ~stated above,

this process o f double reconciliation is fundamentally flawed, as with regards to treaties,
reconciliation has aiready taken pIace.
With regards to the f e d d lmmi&ation Act, I believe, that based on the above

discussion, the Mi'lanaq could show that the nght to cross the Canada - U.S.exists in the
Treaty of Z725/26,and that thjsAct interferes with that right. In addition, the Crown bears
a heavy butden m proving extinguishrnent Given that the court in Simon found that the
huntmg rights under the same Treafyof 1752 had not been exthguished, and that the

evidentiary base wodd be similar for this treaty, as it was in Simon, 1have no doubt that
the Crown would lack SUffXcient evidence to establish extinguishment FinaIIy, with

regards to thejustincationpart ofthe test, 1 wodd argue that the justification test does not
appLy to Treaties-NonetheIess, wo&g

"Badg-,
"filil,

supranote 44.

withli the present case law, I wodd argue that

while protecting the Nation's borders wouid be a valid legislative objective, 1beIieve that
the Crown wouid be unable to demonstrate that they impaired the Treaty right as Little as

possible or that they have compensated or consulted with the Aboriginal Nations affected
by the legislation. 1have already alluded to less intrusive ways of dealing with the border

issue in my previous chapter, such as identification cards. 1think the Crown wodd be

bard pressed to Say that there exists no other way, but the current way, when no nation
wide consultation has taken place with the Aboriginai groups to fhd out. No one has
offered the Nations any compensation yet, so I doubt the Crown has reaily put much
thought into their fiduciary duty to take these preIhhary steps. As a result, the Crown

would fail to both justiQ their legislation and to reconcile their fiduciary duty towards the
member Nations of the Confederacy.

The last aspect of the treaty test as set out Shon is who cm claim to be a
beneficiary of the right to cross the border. The AboriguiaI Nations of the Confederacy,
be they now Canadian or American, should have a complete right to h e passage based
on their T r e u o~f U2.X The specific Aboriginai people who would be entitled to mobility

rights, incIude the "S tatus Indians" as defhed in the Indm Act, as welI as the n a W
bom descendants of the orÏginaI Nations who signed the Treaty. The Treaty of 1725.26

specincaliy Ïncludes the descendants of the Nation signatories, stating:

...S m g unto the Penobscut, Nm'dgwaik and other m-bes
within his Majesty 'sprovince aforesaid md thek naturaï
descendants..?(emphasis added)

The Tteaty of 17'2was even more specinc as it mcIuded:

M W Jeun Baptiste Cope chièfsachem of the Tibe
of Mick Mack Indians. IInabitiig the eastm corn of the
saidprovhce, and Andrew Hadey Martin, Gabriel MMamn
und Francis Jeremiah members and delegates of the said
M e . for themeives and the& suid triXe th& Leirs and the
heirs oflheir heirs-formerrg0 (emphasis added)
The case law has only required that the claimant show a substantiai comection to
the onginai signers as held in R v. Fow[er 9'.

In the case of status ''Indians" in Canada,

the substantial connection is a legai one as provided by the Indian Act. in regards to the

non-statu or Metis claimants, the same general test is appiied, Le. whether they have a
substantial comection to the original agnatory Nations. In the Fowler case, the court

held:
A claimant who could ...prove a substantiai connection
with a signatory of the treaty, could mail himerof the
rights enshrined in the treaty without regard to his staîus
under the Indian Act, 92

The accused ui that case had shown he was an AboriginaI descendant of the
orighaI simatory Nation, by vunie of the üneage traceci through hÏs mother who was a

status "Indian", even though he was not a "status" Indian,It is subrnittedthat the same
connection test wouId appIy with equaI force to Arnerican Man descendants ofthe

treaty signers based on their ancestry. The court in Simon heId that there shouid not be an

"impossible" burden of p r ~ o 1
Ewould
~ ~ argue that based on the case Iaw and the hiberal
interpretiveprhcipIes regarchg treaties, that all the Wabanaki members wouid be
beneficiaries ofthe treaty rights under the Treaty of l725/26be they C d a n or

Arnerican, based on their substantid comection to the treaties as descendants of the
signatones. The citizenship Lnposed on Abonginai peoples, based on a political border
that was estabfished welI after the nghts were agreed to in the Treaties, should have no

affect on those rights. The Cmvn, whether it is the provincial Crown, the Federal Crowu

or the American Federal Crown,was stiU the Crown as seen by the Indians back when the
Treaty was signeci. The Crown,is the Crown, is the Crown,and can not now Say they
never intended to hifi1 its promises, and must, in good faith iive up to its obligations.
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T e villify them with aii manner of names and
opprions Irnguage, cheat abuse and beat them,
s o m e h e s to the las of ümbs, pelt them with
stones an set dogs upon them

...""

ABORIGINAL RïGHTS AND CROSS BORDER MOBILITY:

SECIION ilS(I) OF THE CONSlTTUTTONACT, 1982:

In 1982, section 35(1) was included in the ConstitutionAct 1982. It is under Part

II, entitIed: Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples ofCanada and reads:
35.

(1) The exzsting Abonginal and trenty e h t s of the

Abonngrnalpeoples of Canada are hereby
recogniked and aflmed(2) In this Act, "'Abo@inuipeoplesof Canada "
includes the Indian. IImr and Metis peopks of
Canada,

(3) For greuter certainty, in subsection (1) "'treaty
righrs'include~rights that now &t by way of land
cluim agreements or mqy be su acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding a s , otiierprovision of this
Act. the AbonC@naLand treaty r-ights referred to in
sthsection (I) me gtraranteed equally to male and
fmtae personr. ''

The probIem for the courts, after the new additions to the ConstitutionAct, was
how to interpret section 35 as it appiied to AboriginalpeopIe and their "Aboriginal

@hW-The Sparrow case was the first Supreme Court ofCanada case to deal with this
issue and became "thet"defïnition
ofAborigmaI rights, dthough the case specincaüy
dedt with fishing rights. This case set out the test ofwhether legisfation was ûdiinging

Aboriginal rights. The case Iaw which foiIowed fbm the Supreme Court ofCanada,
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supra note 79,

nameIy R. v. V m der P e e R v. ~ladstone,
'' and R v. N.T.C.Smokehwe," sets out a

more detailed test, referred to as the "integrai to the culture" test For deteminhg whether

an Abonginal right exists. Two other cases which came out in the same year, nanely, R.
v. ~ d d and
' R v. Cote,"'

expanded on some ofthe evidentiary considerationsin

litigating Aboriginal rights cases. AU ofthese cases will be discussed in this section,as

they relate to Aboriginai rights held by the member Nations ofthe Wabanaki
Confederacy.Abonginai rights are both part of the common Iaw o f Canada and recentiy,

part of Canadian constitutional Iaw, yet they are different ffom rights as held by nonAboriginal Canadian citizens. John Burrows in his text on Aboriginal Legal I s s ~ e s ~ , ' ~ ~
explained the ciifference:

Abon*grhalrights dc~erfioomother common lm nghts Nt
another sign~ficantrespect. Genetaily, rights in a
dmocracy m e dependent tpon their recognition or
fimation &ygovernmental authority or Imv. Aboriginal
nghts a'st because they are dmivedfiom aboriginal
pracrices. customr. und traditions. Bey exist in Cmadh
lm rrot becme of governmental recognition, but because
they were not atzhguiSled upon Bntish or French
assertrions of sovera'gnty or their estabiishrnent of
goveninientd atithority rir what ùnow called Canada-By a
process known as the Doctrine of Conmiuity, the rights of
the aboriginalpeoples remained until such t h e as the
European powers erplicily altered or abrogated tfiem."

''Consîitun'on Act, 1985 s.35(1). Sections (3) & (4) w a e added in 1983.
%

V m der Peet. supm note 12-

* Glaktonn, Npra note 59.

a SrnoRehouse, supranote 59.

* R Y. ~ d - ,

1199613 S.CE 1O 1. @aemaftnAdatlfs1.

"R v. Cote, LI9963 3 S.CK 139- [heremaAer CoteI.
'O'

~~Butierworths, 1998)

1. BUPOW*Abort'gtiral Legalbsuer: Cm- Matmàk & Commentary,

In the foIIowing section, 1wil1 review the case Iaw on Aboriginai rights and how
it relates to cross border mobility for the mernber Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy.

I will aiso address the probIem of bcAmm~can"
Indians asserting Abonginai rights in
Canada, and what it meaos for the Confederacy.

One of the most important aspects of Aboriginal rights is that they are not derived

h m Legislation, nor are they dependent on expiicit recognition by the European powers
that settied this land and brought their law with them as stated above. Recentiy, the

Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Adams explained that:
[Vhe fact that a particuiar practice, mtorn or tradition
continztedfollowing the amval of the Europeuns. but in the
absence of thefuma1 gloss of le& recognitionfiom the
European colonriers,shoufdnot undennine the protection
accorded to aboriginaIpeoples. Section 35(1) wouldfail to
achiwe its noHe purpose ofpreserving the intetegr and
definingfeatures of distinctive Iraorignal societies i f t on&
protected those definingfeatures which werefortunute
enough to have received the Iegd approval of British and
French coion~zers!
O3

This case was a d m h a t i o n of the previous case Iaw on Aboriginal rights, which
are mostly based on the Spanow case mentioned earlier. Before I address border crossing
nghts for the Wabanaki Confederacy, it is important to review this key case in Aboriginal

The Supreme Court ofCanada in Sparrow, supra med the previous case law on

AborÏgmaI peopIes in the determination of their rÏghts to corne up wÎth a test for

'03 Adams, Supm

note 99 at 12ï-122-

interpreting the rights as protected under section 35(1) ofthe Constitution Act, 1982. The

.

Court started with Nowegriick supra which held:

...Reaties and statutes relating to Indmshouîd be
Iiberaily constmed and doubtjiii expressions resolved
infavor of the in di an^^'^

Then, they cited an Ontario appeai court case, R. v. Agwa

los

which held that this

p ~ c i p l in
e Nowegijick shodd apply to the interpretation o f section 35(1). FinaLy,
Guerin v. The Queen

'" was referred to, for its principle of interpretation that the Crown

owes a fiduciary duty to AboBpinal people and that section 35(1) ought to be defhed m

iight of this histork relatiouship.

The test as enunciated in Sparrow was compnsed of Four basic questions, which
were: (1) Has the applicant demonstrated that he or she was acting pursuant to an

Aboriginal right? (2) If so, has that right been exthguished ? (3) If not, the colut must
then decide whether the Iegislation has the e f f i of interfering with an existhg
Aboriginal right, the burden of which lies on the group claiming the right, (4) If yes, then

the burden switches to the governrnent to justi& the Iegislation, by answering: (a) Was
there a vaIid legislative objective, Iike preventing h m to the populace, consenration, or

oths objectives which are compellnig and substantid ? Here the court m Sparrow
considered and accepted the prÏority as set out in Jack v. Tite Queen, which was:
(i) c o ~ ~ ~ m u t i(ii)
o nIndion
;
fishq; (iii) non-Indian
connnerciaIfishing; or (N) non-Indian sportsfihing; the

h d e n of conrenration measUres shouId notfallprimanani'y
upon the I n d i a ~ f i s h ~ . ' ~ ~

"NowegiJick, supra note 49 at 36.
(1988), 28 OAC. 20 1. [ h e r e h f h AgmaI.
335-@ m 5 d kGuerin].
'"Jack ILR,CI9801 1 S.CK294at313-@ereïi&erJack].
R. v. Ag-

'06

GU&

v- R,[19w 2 S.C.R.

The next question wodd be (b) Did the Crown reconcile its fiduciary duty to
Aboriginal people with the legislation by: (0 ensuring the legislative plans treat
Aboriginal people in a such a way as to ensure that their rights were taken seriously?

Some of these considerations wouid include: whether there has been as Iittle infigement
as possible in order to effect the desired result, whether in a situation of expropriation

compensation is available, and whether the Aboriginal group in question had been
consulted, 'Og
Yet, despite this case being heraided by Aboriginal rights advocates as "THE"
case which established a favorable tool for determining section 3S(I) rights, there were

some inherent problems with the Sparrow test. First of ail, the lower court decisiow
which fo1Iowed adopted various hterpretations of what the test entailed. Some decisions
vigorously upheId anythÏng which looked Iike an AbonginaI rÏght to fish and some courts
vigorously upheId the Legislation which was infi.inging upon these rights, under the guise

of conservation. Despite the hoped for predictability in interpretation Sparrow was
expected to give, the decisions of the lower courts which ensued were just the opposite.

The decisions conflicted with one another over whether the test was intended to uphold
Aboriginal rights or to uphold conservati~n.'~~
It aIso begged the question whether section

35(I) was more important for the recognition ofAboripinai rights, or the recognîtÏon of
the "asserted" sovereignty over AboriginaI people. Michael Asch and Patrick Mackiem in

"S p m w * supra note

15.

'" S eR Y. MysIlraII (I993),146N B R ( 2 0 345. R v. McCiy (I992), 127N B K (26) 328, R v. Denny
(1990), 94N S K (26)253,(1991), IO4NScR (2d)257, R v- TnomarPeter Pau1 (t996), 182 N B X (2d)
270, (1998),196 N B K (2d)292,[19981 S.C.C.A. No. 298, R V, Pe&Jeziw(l996), 175 N B K (26)70,
FwIer, ,supra note 28.

Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essuy on R v. ~~arrow,"O
explain this
inherent problem with section 35(1) and how the court in Spmow uiterpreted its

meaningr

In sum, although the Court in Sparrowpays attention to an
inherent theory of aborigiul right. its reasonr uitimately
betray a reiiunce on a contingent rîghtsperspective, which
serves to rein in the scope of s3S(I) riglits. The arsertton
of Canudian sovereignty h qfiicient to nulZlifL und render
non--tent
any pre-exrkting d a i m of ubonngrnai
sovereign& which would otherwise constitute an "eristing
aboriginal right " within the meaning of s - 3 w ) . ...
The Constitution Act, I867specij7es that Indians und landr
reservedfur Indiansfail under the exciusive Iegidative
authority of Pariiument [in section 91(24)]....
Yet nowhere in the Constitution Act. 1867 does it actuaIi"y
state that the Canadian State en~oyssovereignty over its
indigenous population. ...

Tlius, despite initiai appearances to the cuntraryCthe
~ t ~ ~ c u for
t i othe
n assertion of Canadian Sovereignty. un
assertion which undipins the ccherence of the contingent
theory of abori@ai rights, cmnot be focated in the text of
the Constitution Act, 1867."'
There was dso a problem with the test itselfas laid out in Spamow. Despite the
cornt's anphasis on the Crown's heavy burden ofjustification stemmiag from their

fiduciary duty to Abonginai people, the test had the effect of revershg that onus back
onto the Aboriginal people in pmving their Aboriginal rights. The nnt step ofthe test
req@red the Abonginal people to show that there was an ÏnEngement of their rights.

That would be an easy enough task had the court not gone on to defÏne what additional

items to consider in order to establish a prima facie hfihgement. It read:

To detennine whether thefishing n ' t s have been
interfered such os to constitute a prima facie infEngement
of s.35,certain u u e s t i rnust 6e asked. First , is the
limitation unreasonuble? Second, does the regdation
impose undue harhhip? Third. does the reguIatiort dmy to
the holders of the right theirprefmed rneans of aercising
that right? The onus of proving a prima facie infngement
lies on the individual or grorp challenging the
Iegidation!" (emphasis added)
The first consideration is whether the inningement was unreasonable. Since the
govemment m u t later prove that their Mrbgement on the Aboriginal nght was
masonable in t m s of its objective and in light of its fiduciary duty, it seems odd that the
Aboriginal people must tirst prove it to be unreasonable. The test was only supposed to
be whether there was a prima facie idkingeusent, not the additional burden of

reasonabIeness. The inequitable burden on the Aboriginal peopIe did not stop there. The
next question which "rnust" be answered in order to prove a prima facie infringement of

an Aboriginal nght is whether the legislation hposed "trndue" hardship. Once again, the
test Ïs lackmg in cIarity,since no "hardship" is "due" and it is doubtful that a m m
inconvenience would be considered a hardship at all. Thus, the word "imdue" is not

necessary, d e s s the court only intendeci to mclude the severest of hardships. 1wouid
consider that having to wait untiI a band office opens to cegister for a license is a

hardship, and delaying a traditional or ceremonid tri@ for hours or even days is a hardship
for some eiders. The court did not espouse a test or serÏes of questions by which ta

Io

Sparrow. supra note 15 at 111 2

determine if the hardship was "due" or 'imdue': Yet, in Spmrow, the court held that it
couid not be a 'tnere inconvenience".

Six years iater, in R v. Nikal '13, another Abonginal f i s h g rights case, the
Supreme Court confhned its position on having to prove 'bdue" hardship in
establishg a prima facie interference with an AborÏginal right. In N W ,the appellant
was an Abonginal person charged with fishing without a Iicense con-

to the British

Columbia fishing regulatioos. Under these reguiations, Aboriginal persons were entitled
to fish for salmon in the manner that they preferred, but they had to have a Iicense under
the fisheries regulations. Although the appellent argued that the license requirernent was

an f i n g r n e n t of his Aboriginal right to fish, the Supreme Court held it was a necessary
part of the identification process which cecognizes that right-

It must aiso be remedwed that abo@frtal rights. 6y
definition. c m on& be exercked by aboriginalpeople.
Moreover. the nature and scope of abon'ginaI rights wi&l
flequentiy 6e dependent on upon rnembmship in particuiar
bands who have established purtin<lm rights in specific
localities. In this context, a licerrse may be the l e m
intrusive way of estubilising the existence of the aborîgrnal
nghtfor the a6ongrnaIperson as well asprevenring those
who are not a6origrnulsfi.onrerercl'sr'ngaboriginal
right~."~

While I agree that there must be some sort of identification used to establish
AborÏgind people h m non-aborighai people, certaidy a license is NOT the least

intrusive way of accornpfishingthis task A simple form of identitication that cumntly
are hdian status car& which indicates ail the necessary mfomation: a v d a b l e

registration number, a picime and which band the fisher belongs to with regardsto

territorhi fishing. A license signifies "permission" by the Govemment to fish, as opposed
to an acknowIedgement of the AboriginaI right to fisk I thÏnk the issue of the c u I M and
ceremonid aspect of fishùig is Iost when the issue is made bbhardship"as opposed to

necessity. At a minimum,the Department of Fisheries and Oceans could have consulted
with the band, and perhaps agreed upon the band cards or perhaps a unique card which is

used soIeIy to identify Aboriginal rights holders and is culturaily sensitive of the nature of
the nght. Abonginal people beîieve that this nght came form the Creator, not a
goverment agency. With respect, the court couid have been more sensitive to the
Aboriginal aspect of our rights. Rather than expand my critique of either Sparrow or

Nikal m e r , 1I I I now discuss the Supreme Court of Canada's clarification of the test
in the Van der Peet tnlogy."'

The Spamow case, respectfûiIy, did not him out to be as promishg a tool for
Aboriginal people as fkst hoped, aithough, it was more progressive than past decisions
such as CaLder. supra for instance. Then came the Smokehouse, supra, Van der Peet,
sripra and GIaaStone, supra tdogy which reconsidered the whole issue of Aboriginal

rights m light of their commercial aspects. Since the issue in Spmrow was fishing for
food or ceremonid purposes, the Supreme Court had to revisit Spmow and the test it had

set out. The 7-2 rnajority in Vonder Peet enunciated a more detaiied test for definmg
Aborigina.1rights and expandeci on the major considerations that the Iower courts must be

aware of m determining suigeneris nghts, such as Aboriginal f i s e rights. In the end,

the accnsed m V i der Peet f

'''Ibid- a t para 95.

a to meet the AboripinaI rights test to uphoId a right to

"* Y i der P e e ~Npm note 12, Gfadstone,. ~ p m
note 59, Smokehme, supraynote 59.

sell the fish she caught under her Indian Food Fish License. While 1respectfùIIy beiieve
that this case was wrongly decided, the decision did mark a clearer "Iegai" method for
determinhg the scope and extent of Abonpinal rights. It is obvious that a more equitabIe
altemative to rights adjudication is needed as the courts decide these issues based on
fiawed assumptions such as Cmwn sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples as a given, or the
need for Aboriginal people to prove to the Crown their rights as opposed to the Crown

having to dispense with the burden of disproving the rights. In actuaiity, the Crown
should be talking with Aboriginal groups and workuig out viable soIutions for Aboriginal
peoples as opposed to the constant Iitigation. In this thesis, I will use the Iegd tools as
given in these cases and try to take advantage of the positive aspects and show how they

c m be used to expand Aboriginal rÏghts in terms of mobility. This, of course, does not
mean that I endorse the rigid Iegd system as the best route to senling Aboriginal claims.

The Supreme Court explaineci that in Spamow it was not seriously disputed that

the Musqueam Nation had an Aboriginal right to fish for food and thus it was
unnecessary for the court to answer how the question of rights under section 35(1) of the

Constitution Act, 1982 are to be defined. Whereas in Van der Peet's case, it was

necessary to recognize both the "rights" aspect and "Aboriginal" aspect of AboriginaI
rights?which the court thought codd best be achieved through a ptrrposive approach to

hterpreting section 35(1) of the Consttution Act, 1982. Ln that regard, Chief Justice
Lamer heId:

In my viav, the doctrine of A b o r i , a l rights d s , and ù
reco@ed md q@med by S. 32(1). becmrre of one simple
fact- wrien Europe- arrbed in North A r n e ,
Abo~gàdpeopfes
were already dere,living h
communitties on the Cm4 iïn6parfiarfi~atiirg
h distrncfive

cuitures, rn they had donefor centuntunesS
It is thisfact, and
thisfact above allotiter minority groups in Canadian
society and which mandates their special legal. and nav
constitutional s t a h r ~ . " ~

The Chief Justice went on to explain that Caldm recognized Abonginai rights as
part of the cornmon law and that the above basis for Abonginai cights is consistent with
the approach taken in Calder which held:

Aithough I think that it ï3 c h r that Indiun title in British
Columbia cannot owe itr ongin to the Proclumatiorz of
1763,thefact is that when the settiers came. the Indians
were the% organized in societies and occupying the Iand
as theirforefathers had donefor centuries. mis is what
Indian titie means and it does not help one in the solution
of thik problem to call it a 'personalor tmjiuctoos,right ':
What they are asserting in this action is that thqy Lad a
nght to contmue to [iveon their [an& as theirforefathers
had 1Ned and that this nght h a never been lb@iIiy
ating~ished"~

Section 35(1) oow ensures that the Aboriginal rights recognized and anirmed
theremder can not be e~tinguished."~
Afier a iengthy consideration of Canadian,

American and Australi*ancases, the Court in Van der Peet held that the jespnidence
supports the proposition that Ab0ngina.i rights protected under section 35(1) are best

understood as the means by which recognition is given to the fact that distinctive
Aboriginal societies occupied North Amerka before the Ettropeans came, and the means

by which to reconcile this prior occupation with Crown sovereignty. Then the court set
out the test to identify whether an appellant has established an Aboriginal nght protected

under that section:

"'Y i clerPeet, supranote 12 at538.
'" Calderv. Attorney Grnerot of Brffiih CoIumbia,cl9731 S.CR 313. at 328.BefemafterCaIderI.
V m <ler Pe- supra. note 12

...in order to be m Alo@$naZ right an activity mtat be
an element of a pructice. o.utont or tradition integral to the
dktr'nctnre mltlcre of the dbonginalgroup daiming the
right*
The court then set out ten factors to be considered in the application of the
''Integral to a Distinctive Culture" test. The first factor is that the courts must take into
account the perspective of the Aboriginal peoples thanselves. Yet, at the sarne time they

must be careful to do so in terms which are cognizable to the non-Aboriginal legal
system, Secoady, the courts must identiQ precisely the nature of the c l a h being made in
deteminhg whether an Aboriginal claimant has demonstrated the existence of an
Abonginai right. This identification process wouid include: (a) the nature of the action

done by the Abonginai person pursuant to an Aboriginal right, (b) the nature of the
governent regdation, statute or action being irnpugned, and (c) the tradition, custom or
practice being reiied upon to establish the nght. In regards to this anaiysis, the court
specifically noted:
Moreover, the court must beur in mittd that the activities
may be the exercike in a m o d mfonn of a practice,
tradition or m t o m that exisedpnor to contact, and
sharid v q ifscharacterization of the daim a c c ~ r d i n ~ l ' y - ~

The third factor to consider m the integral test is that in order to be integrai, a
practice, custom or tradition must be of centrai significance to the Aboriginal society in

question. This means that the Aborigmal person must show that this practlce was one of

the thmgs which made the culture of the society distixictive. The cIaimant does not have
to prove that the practice was distinct, as in mique, but the practice cm not be tme of

every society; like eatmg to survive, for example. The practice aiso can not be occasional
or incidental to another custom.Another way ofIooking at the assessrnent wodd be to

ask, whether without this practice, would the culture be fundamentally altered. IZ'

Contmuity oftime is the focus of the fourth factor. It states that the practice,
custom or tradition which constitute Aboriginal rights are those which have continuity

with the traditions, customs and practices that existed prior to contact. In regards to such

an apparentiy onerous evidentiary burden the court clarified that:
That this ik the relevant time shoufd not suggest. however,
that the Abonginal group ciaimikg the nght rnust
accompikh the nert ta im~ossib?etask ofproducing
çoncIusme ewXenceFom pre-contact limes about the
practices, custom and traditions of the& comrmrnity. It
would be entirely contrav to the spirit and intent of s.35(l)
to d i Aborignal rights in mchfushion so as to
precfude in pructice <rny successjù~clamifor the existence
of n<ch a nght. The evidence relied upon &ythe applicant
and the coum may relate to Aboriginal practice, mtom
or traditionspost-contact; it si*
neek to be directed at
demonstrating which aspects of the Aboriginal community
and society have their origins pre-contact. "(emphasis
added)

It is this concept of continuity that avoids the "fiozen rights" approach to section

35(1). Thus, the evolution of these practices bto modem fonns wili not prevent their
protection as Aboriginai rights under section 35(1) as long as they have this contmuity
with pre-contact times. The court dso stated that the Aboriginal group need not prove an

unbroken chah of practice. The a c t ~ t codd
y
have ceased for a tune iu the past and have
since resurued again. Judges were aIso directed to adopt the same flexibk approach with

continuity as they are to adopt in regards to evidence of the right. Continuity in ternis of
the Metis was an issue to await detemination in a fiiture Metis cIaim.'"

The fifth factor requires COLU& to approach the d e s of evidence in light of the
evidenhary difficdties inherent in adjudicating Abonginai claims. In terms of

interpreting the evidence and enforcing the rules of evidence, fuhne courts are directed to

be conscious of the speciai nature of Aboriginal claims and of the evidentiary dificulties

in prowig rights which originate in times when there were no written records of the
practices engaged in. This factor ties in with the sixth factor which requires that the

claims ofAbonginai rights must be adjudicated on a specific rather than generai basis.

The court held that Aboriginal nghts are not "general and univend", that their scope and
content must be determined on a case by case basis. Similarly, the seventh factor states

that for a practice to coastitute an AboriginaI right it must be of independent sigdicance
to the Aboriginal cultun in which it exists. This means that the right can not just be
incidentai to another practice in that society. In other words:

Incidental practices. ~ o mand
s traditions cannot qrraiify
as Aborigrkal rights through a process of piggybackt'ng on
integml practices, ~~stoms
and traditi~m.''~

Another factor to consider is that the integrd to a distinctive culture test requires
that a practice, custorn or tradition be distinctive; it does not require that that practice,
custorn or tradition be distinct This means a practice must make the cuIture ' t h a t it is",

as opposed to the practice being different fkom the practices of other culturestures
The &th
factor states that the idluence ofEuropean cuitare wilI o d y be relevant to the Inquisr ifit

is demonstrated that the practice, custom or tradition is odv integral because of that

influence-More specincaIIy, the court heId:
Ifthe pructice. w t o m or tradition was an integral part
of the Abon'fiai community 's cuitareprior to contact with
the Ewopeonr. thefact that the traditfoncontinued Mer
the arrivai of the Europeans, and adapted in response to
their m v a i , is not relevant to detennination of the ciuim;
Euzopem &al
and influence cannot be used to depme
an Abon'gritai group of an othenwse valid daim to an
Abonginal right."

The Iast factor to consider states that the courts must take into account both the
relationship o f Aboriginal peoples to the Iand and the distinctive societies and cultures of
Aboriginal peoples. This consideration is a recognÏtionthat Aboriginal rights aise not
oniy h m pnor occupation of the land, but also fÎom prior social organization and their

distinctive cultures. The dissents in this case were more generous to the interpretation of
the scope of Aboriginal rights. In this regard, Justice McLachh stated:
Ifihe Abo~ginalpeopleshow that tfiey traditionally
mtained themseIvesj?om the mteT or sea, they have a
prima facie nght to continue to do su. absent a ireaty
exchmging that ngfitfôrother considerution. In most
cases, one worrld expect the AboriginaC tight to trade to be
confned tu what ïk necessmy to provide basic hmaing
transportation. ciothing and amenities - the modern
equivaht of what the Aborïgina[peopk in question
forme* tookfrom the land or thefihery, over and above
what was repz"edforfood and ceremonialp~poses!'~

The dissents in Von der Peet wouid have been more generoos to the Abonginai
claimants, and reflect the tme nature of the rights to which Aboriginai peoples are due.
AborigfnaI peoples have Iived off the Iand on Turtie Island since time immemonla1. They

have supported themselves m the manner in which they chose as most bomtifiû. This
method ofliving off the land and chooshg how to go about doing so wouid appear to be

most integral to a culture that indeed it codd not sunrive without doing so. The court has
already paid iip service to what is integsal to a culture, and 1 can think ofIittie which is

more inte@. It is uonic that it is a foreign court, with foreign laws and a foreign judge
with the assistance of foreign anthropologists evidence, who in the end detemiine what is

integral to that particular Nation- Mary-Ellen Turpel in her article Home/Land speaks to
this foreign Iegai system:

Tlie complerty stemfrom what can be called the 'aboriginal
dimension ' of the legal dispute. This refus tu thefact that the
dispues that have arrSen in these cuses stem directlyfom the
[egacy of a colonial regime that continues to be imposed on
aborigrird people by decontexr~aIkingthese conflicts and
ignoring the impact of the iaw on aboriginalpeoples' lives- T'do
oflienvisewould denrand macal reflction on the adequacy and
oppressive nature of the colonial regime establisited by the
ConstitutionAct, 1867 and the Indian ~ c t*" .

The courts appear to be carrying on the same paternalistic legacy of deciduig what

is m our best interests, that the Department ofthe Interior and the Indian Act started years
ago. WhiIe the court, at the same time as it dismisses the h z e n rights theory, (whereby

the Abonginai Nation presumably does not have to exercise their rights in the same

rnanner as they were exercised at contact) the court aiso adopts the theory in reaiity, by
only recognizing practices that were integraï to their cdture pnor to contact. The c o r n

have Ieft IittIe room for the evolution of the AborigmaI cuitmes to change and adapt to

theIr ckciimstances. Yet, no one ho[& the same anCient standard to the European
commmuties-One of the most precious characteristicsof Aborigmal people is not that

they provide a sentimental giimmer in the eye of Canadian society of the noble savage,

but their abiIity to withstand the atrocities committed upon them by the Emopeans. It is

their abiiity to stand in the face of death and SHI have the courage and forethought to do
what they could to provide for their firture generations, hie our treaties for example that
rnake them the peoples that they are today.

The Europeans couId not trade fast enough with the Aboriginal Nations and take
advantage of them, for the sake of profit back in Engiand. On the same note, there exists
no reason why Abonginal peopIe can not sustain themselves today by the very same
practices if they so choose. I wish to reiterate that while I will continue with the legd
maiysis of Abonginal rights, 1 do not accept some of the underlyuig assumptions and
principles upon which the courts make their decisiou. I am simply trying to take the best
parts of the decision and make them work for a right for Abonginai peoples to exercise

theu rights, iike the right to fieely cross the Canada4J.S. border. It is with this
understanding that I will proceed with the rest of the Van der Peet tnlogy.

The Gladstone case did pick up on one of the problems with the Spmrow case,
that being the test for prima facie kfrhgement of an Aboriginal rÏght. The Supreme
Court explained:
nie S p m w testfor infingrnent might semn, atfirst
giance,to be intentai& cuntradictory. On the one han4 the
test staies that the appeUmt needsimply show that thme
hm been ap*a fucie htetjiérence with their rights in
order to demonstrate t h those nghts have been infnged,
sugge~fcingthereby t h any meankgfùf diinnrutiort of the
appellant k rights wtïl constirte m higrnentfor the
ptnpose of t h analys&. On the othw han4 the questrionr
the test dkects camts to unswer nt detemtnting

wliether un fnfnngementhad takm place incorporate ideas
such as unremnublèness and "undue" hardrliip. ideas
which suggest thai something more than meaningfid
diminution is required to demonstrate infnnement This
intemal contradictron is, however,niore apparent than real.
Tire questions asked &y the Court in Sparrow do not define
the concept ofpnmafucie infngment; they on& point to
factors whkh WiII indicate thut S U C ~m injkhgtment hm
taken place."g

In order for the signatories of the Treaty of 172.5 to establish an Aboriginal right
to fke passage over the border in a future court chalienge, they would have to begin with
the four-step Spmrow test, which consisis of (1) is there an Abonginai mobility right, (2)

Ifyes, was the right extinguished before 1982, (3) If no, is there a prima facie

infiingement of the right, (4) Ifso, was it justified? In order to deai with the fïrst step of
the test on establishing the Aboriginal right, Van der Peet provides the factors to consider
m the integral to the distinctive culture test The nrst factor is that the court must take into

accotmt the perspective of the Aboriginal peoples themselves. The alIied nations of Old

Nova Scotia, being the Wabanaki Confederacy, have, fiom t h e irnmernorial, relied on
their fkedom to hunt and fish, traveI, trade, practice their ceremonies and intermarry

wherever they chose, within Abenaki territory which incIudes land m Canada and the
United States. They have a very unique aiTiance which Uiciudes many diffcrrnt Nations
under the Wabanaki Confederacy. Much anthropoIogical and historical evidence wodd
have to be produced in a court case, but the presentation of this kind and amount of
historical and anthropologicai evÏdence is beyond the scope of this papa. Some ofthe

sourcesalready cited clearly evÎdence a relianceon fkedom of mobility for every aspect

ns Gïadnone,mpra, note 59 at 757.

of their traditionai Kves and this practice continueci &er contact and was v d e d by the
various promises made to them in conference minutes, Indiau treaties and international
treaties. Many of the eariy Europeans recorded their experiences with these groups and
thus, their information provides somewhat of a written record for tunes when Abonginal
practices were not recorded by the Indians thernselves due to their oral traditions. The

standard of evidence in regards to pmving an Aboriginal mobility right is flexiibIe, as is
the interpretation of it, as held by the court in Von der Peet.

These Nations c m even assert evidence of post-contact practices as long as it is
directed at showing its ongins in pre-contact &es.

There are numerous anthropoIogicai

studies which indicate how most tribes al1 over North Amenca were either nomadic or
semi-nomadic and theu very swivai depended on this abzty to travel as they needed.

But this case is distinct in the sense that dl these different Nations had allied together for
various reasons even before the Wabanaki Confederacy was formaiiy named. In contrast,

a p u p iike the h u had no specid connection to lands near the Canada-U.S. border and
nothhg in their Iives depended on free access to this area.

Thus, the ability to have fiee passage over this area is very specific to these

Nations under the alliance and afYected every part of thek traditionai practices h m
hunting to tradmg to reIigious practices. More ment anthropologicaiwork anaIyPng

ancient Mi'kmaq and Malecite buriai cites in New Bnmswick and Nova Scotia show that
trade was very important, and probabIy created tribal ailies as a resuit The AboriginaI
trading system in the area ofpresent day Atlantic provinces connected them to most of
the mbe~
near theirtraditional territories from present day Nova Scotia tu present day

Maine and beyond Anthropological widence h m mch sites mdicates cuIhnaI and

tmding ties of the aiî the Nahons in present day Atlantic Canada and aine?' A distinct

system had been set up here and was integral to the cultures ofail these eastem M a n s .

The importance oftrade increased with contact and was continueci, but this expansion o f
a pre-existing practice cm not by Van der Peet f anaiysis detract hom their valid trading,

thus mobility right.

In the second factor, the court wodd have to determine the precise nature of the
claim. It is submined that these Nations have mobility rights which are impe~ousto the

borders that were later hposed. The conferences and intemationai treaties such as the
Jay Treaty provide very convuicing evidence that these Nations were never meant to be

included in those persons who had to account for theu cross-border travels. The Jiy
Treaty specificaily granted them fiee passage. As we11, this evidence would likely support
the notion that this right was of centrai significance to these Aboriginal societies as to

make it distinctive ofthe cuItine as required by factor three. The question to be asked is
whether without this practice of fke mobiiity over the border area, wouid the culture have
been hdamentaiIy aitered, and 1argue that it would have been. Had thete been no free
passage, there wouid not have been the triid alliances either before contact or after

contact. Htmting tenitories wodd have been différent and familial ties wodd be
drasticaiIy akered h m the lack of contact, languages, and culturai practices would no

doubt have been significantly aItered
AboriginaI mobiiity across this a r a is fidamental to these groups' very
existence. A specinc intemational treaty, The Juy Treaty,which I wiil deaI wiih in the

next Ch-,

was considered necessary p d y because ofAborigÏnaI concems over the

border issue. The M a n s were wen apprised of the impendïng division of land betweai
what wouId Iater become Canada and the United States. As weli, conference minutes and

Indian treaties more t
hadequateIy document not only the Indian concern over the
border, but aiso c o d k n their rights to fiee passage in d.erentclauses of the Jay Treaty.
These kinds of documents provide evidence of recognition of an Aboriginal right aiready

recognked by aU the parties. Again, in the fourth factor, the same evidence would

establish the traveling patterns and the practices' continuity Eom pre-contact times to
present day. Even the modern forms ~Fexercisingthese rights would be protected if the
Aboriginal right was established, as judges have been directed to be flex.i"b1enot only in
the d e s of evidence, but aiso the interpretation of the evidence.
Factor five means that the courts would have to realize that the kind of evidence
that a Aboriginal elder would contxiiute otally, cannot be under-valued simply because
this kind of evidence does not conform preciseIy w*ththe d e s or standards o f evidence.

in this case, there are elders h m various Nations who attest to the historic fiee passage
in their territories and the subsequent fixe passage after the bordtwo more recent Supreme Court cases, Ad-

were created. Aiso.

and Cote7Iessened siightly the evidentiary

requirements to establish pre-contact practices. The court in Adams held that no

Aboriginal group wilI ever be abIe to provide concIusive evidence ofwbat took place
prÏor to contact, and thus:

...where there i s evidmce that at thepomt of contact a
practice was a sign@cantpart of a gr- 's cuitwe...then
the Abon@taZ group will have dèntomtrutedthat the
pmctrke war a szSZgn@cant
paivt of theAbori@nuLgroup 's
c u b e p r i w to C O ? ~ ~ ( I C ~ - ' ~ ~
' % f d i . supra note 99 at 128-

SimilarIy, Cote held that evidence that a practice was signincant at contact wiII be
evidence of si@cance

m pre-

on tact.'^' Von der Peet aiso stands for the proposition in

factor sut that whatever rights these Nations codd estabiish would apply solely to these
particdar Nations and not other Aboriginal groups generaily. 1would argue that the
evidence wouid aiso show that inter-territorial travel was not occasional or incidental to
other practices ofthe different groups claiming the mobility right. Mobility is a right in
and of itself. The nlationship AboriginaI peoples have with their traditional territones is
a unique aspect of their culture, and the use of these solely for travel is a connection that

can not be discounted. The anthropoIogicaI and archaeologicai evidence illustrates that
mobility was essentiai to d v d , hunting practices, and religious practices such as

f i g and other aspects of Aboriginal life. Their special connection or alliance would
aIso be different fiom other groups in Canada, and their connection and reliance on free
passage over the border temtory remahs today.
[ would argue that

m ternis of factor eight, an Abonginal right of mobiIity or fiee

passage over the border wouId be supported by the evidence. Since factor nine is about

European innuence ody being relevant ifthe Aboriginal practice of travel or rnobility

onIy became integral because of this influence, it wouid not apply in this case. The
anthropologicd, historical and oral evidencewouId support the claim of mobility nrithin
this territory as integral to these groups particuiar culture and this did not corne about

soie1y because of contact. F M y , the tenth factor regardmg Indian relationships with

their territorÎaI and other lands is alsu supported by the evidence. Wabanaki territory has

"'Cote. supra note 100.

not changed in any significant amount since before the Europeans arrive4 and they have
hunteâ, fished, Iived and traveIed in the same areas for centuries. On that basis, 1wodd

argue that the right of fiee passage over the border is one of the rnost important rights
these Nations could assert as it Bects aU the most important cuitural aspects of their iives
including familial ties. How thai codd the right be recognized for only Canadian

Indians? The centrd sïgnificance of Aboriginal nghts wodd be completely irrelevant if
the court were to then read a narrow interpretation of the definition of Abonginal peoples
under section 35. There is a historicai context that must be recognized when dealing with
references to Aboriginal peoples. Since contact, they were often refmed to as Nations,

and the cases cited earlier demonstrate that they were dso treated as Nations through the
Treaty process. They are refemd to in section 35 as peoples as they are part of their
collective Nation, and not presented in the same context as individual Canadian citizens.
These Nations inchde ail those Abonginai p u p s whose traditionai territories included

land m what is now Canada, or those whose traditional practices were exercised on the
same Iands. Also included Ui the dennition of Abonginai peoples are those AboriguJaI
Nations to which Canada made solemn commitments and promises under both
internationai treaties and Indian treaties. In regards to mobility rights, this inchdes aiî the
member Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy that may presently be considered

AmerÏcan citizens,

Once an Aborigmd right has been estabfished, the next question is whether or not
that right has been extingm'shd The Sparmw case stated that the word "existing" m the
CollStirUtionAct, meant that section 35(I) applies onIy to those rights that were in

d e n c e m 1982, and did not revivenghtsthat had been extinguÏshed This does not

mean that the right is exercisable as per a certain time m history. An existing Aboriginal
right cannot be read so as to incorporate the specific manner in which it was reguiated
before 1982. Most ùnportantly, the court held that these rights must be interpreted

flexibly so as to "permit their evo1ution over tirne''. Although the tespondent Crown IL
that case tried to use the long history of fisheries regdation to prove that their rights had

been extinguished the court was quick in pointing out that the argument confiised
regulation with extinguishment. The court in Sparrow held that:

The test of exttnguishntent tu be adopted. in our opinion. is
that the Sovereign 's intention must be clear and plain if it
is to extinguish an aboriginal right.IJ2

The court went on to explab that the extensive history of fishery regdations and
the specific mention of Indian fishers was not enough to extinguish their rights. AU the
Iegislation did was control the fishery, not dehe the mderlying rights. The court
recognized that despite any uncertainties of the RoyaL ProcIamution, and its different

judicial interpretations, it stands as a basic declaration of the Indians' substantial interest

in the lands, Thus. I wodd argue that although the Customs and Immigrations Acts were
created to control border issues Iike the m o n i t o ~ of
g who goes back and forth over the

border. nowhere does it specificaiIy eXtmguÏshthe right of Aboriginal people to fieely
pass without being "moIested'' or "disturbed".

The Inimigation Act m particular ody IegisIates in regards to one small group of
Abonginai people, and in no way arnotmts to an extensive treatment of aii Aboriginal

peopIe in terms of extingrtisbhg their rights- It merely amoimts to reguIatmg an actMty

for ody a srnaII percentage ofAboriginal people. Even ifthe Act were constnied as

granting certain rights, certainly the act of granting rights, can not be said to amount to
strict proof of extinguishing other rights not even mentioned in the legÏsIâtionnThe

relevant part of the IegisIation states:
4. Where riglit to corne into Canada - ( I ) A Canadiun
citrz:en and *apermanent resident have a right to corne into

Canada.. .f

a

(3)Rights of lndians - A person who is regrstered as an
Indian pursuant to the Indimr Act haî, whether or not that
person is a Canadian cituen, the surne nghts and
obligations under this Act as a Cartadian citiren.
5. Whereprivilege tu come into or remuin in Canada - (1)

No person, other tltan a pmson d e s d e d in section(rl). h a
a nght to come into or remain in C~nada!~'

I wotdd conclude that the Immigrarioon Act does not have the effect of
extiaWshing an AborÏgind mobility right for the treaty signer groups, but mereIy seeks
to regulate the border activities of Canadian citizens as a whole. The Act mentions Stahis
Indians as registered under the Indian Act presumably to make sure that they were

included, since they were not considered citizens in either Canada or the United States
d l this century. Jack Woodward in his text Native LmJ" explains that prior to Indian

AEairs comuig under the Department of M a n M a i r s in 1967 pursuant to the
Department of lndim Affuirrs and Nirthen Development Act

"6,

it was under the

Department of Citizenship and rimnigration in 1951. Most Canadian Indians are citizens

"Spmrow, supranote 15 at 1099.
T h ep
h "abject to section 10.3" is added h m to the subsectr*onby SC. t 992, c 49, ~241)which is
iu force on proclamation,
'Y The Immigratron Act and Rel-d
LegrSIatio~J
996 Cumoilidaon(Ontano: Butîerworths Canada,

1996). S. 4,5. pecemafterfdgratrbn.
'JS

O"

1.W o o d .N u k Lmv (Toronto: Carsweii, 1990) at 145.
D e p m e n t of TdimAfm'rs and Northenr DeuefopmentAct RS-C. 1985, c. 1-6.

by operation of the Citizemhip Act13'- The Act c d y does not purport to specincally

regdate in regards to the rest of AboriginaI people in Canada Conversely, ifthe Act were

accepted as regdahg in regards to a i i AborigÏnaI people, then I would argue that the
IegisIation is discrimihatory in its different treatment of Canada's Aboriginal people who
are defked in section 35(1) of the Collstitution Act, 1982. The Act wouid ais0 be in
specifk violation of its own legislative objectives, that being section 3(f) of the
Immigration ~ c t . ' ~
That
' section States:
3. Immigration 06Jectives - It is hereby declared that
Canadian imnii@ution policy an& the rules and
regulations made under thisAct sMl be desijpd and
administered in such a munner as to promore the domestic
and international interests of Canada recognizing the need
(B to enme that any person who seeks
admission to Canada on either a permanent
or tempormy b& is subject to s t a n d d of
admksiorr that do not dhcrimimte in a
manner inconsistent with the Canadian
Charter of Rights und Freedoms; '"

Section 15 of the Canadan Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibits
disdmhatÏon on the basis of race, which 1beIieve this section of the Immigraton Act
does, by addressing the rights of one group of Aboriginal peopIe and f w g to give

consideration to the other listed groups in section 35 (l),and Amerîcan Indians to whom
Canada still owes a duty to by virtue of the Treaties signed with those groups - 1befieve
that either argument addresses the counter-argument that the Iegislation extingukhes
Aboriginal mobiIÏty rights. The court in Corbime stressed the

Cit&mh@ Act RSC. 1985, C. C-29.
lbr;cL
Il9

fiid s3,

ort tance of land to the

c u b e ofAboriginal peoples and the effect that discrimination based on residency has on

such peoples, which 1believe is equally applicable to Confederacymembers who Iive on

the AmerÏcan side of the border. The court cited an excerpt fiom the RCAP Report on
Aboriginal identity and their lands:
Aboriginal identity lies at the heart of Aborignal peoples '
m'stence; maintuining t h t identiiiy is an essential and seyvalidatingpursuit for Abon-grka1people in cities...
Cultural idenrityfor urbm AborigrgrnaIpeop[e
is ako tied to
a Iand base or ancestral terrrlory. For muny, the two
concepts are mseparabie...
ldentipcution with an ancestral place is important to urban
people becme of the associated ritual, ceremony and
traditions, as well us the people who r m i n there, the
sense of beiongtng, ihe bond to an ancestral commrrnity,
and the accessibih?y offamly, community and elderx ''O

Surely, if the Suprerne Court in Corbiere. supra, wouId not permit discrimination
between groups of Indiaas based solely on mideacy off the reserve, it wodd not support

the discrimination between Indian signatones on the basis of residency a w s s the border,
both of which are circumstances that were imposed by the Crown. It wottid be
ttnconscionabIe to aüow the Crown to reIy on its failed promises and racist policies to

defend rights claimed by Aboriginal peopIe. Certdy, the Aboriginal groups had no
control over the policies or Iaws miposed on them by the British or American Cmwm

Therefore, Corbime might be used as an andogous situaiion to prevent discriminationby
the Crown against the exercise of treaty rîghts by AborigmaI people because of their

The next question wouid be whether there was in fact any idbgement of the
mobiIity right. This question would be analyzed by the court based on the specific case

brought before it. It can be generaiiy analyzed here using the example of a Wabanaki

member who is refised re-entry into Canada to reunite with his wife and children after a
visit with his family in the United States. The scenario could be that an Amerïcan born
Indian cornes into Canada and marries a Canadian bom Indian by traditionai marriage

and decides to live and work here. Then, some time later the American bom Indian
travels to the United States to visit with family and fiiends for sorne time. Upon seeking
re-entry back into Canada he is refiised entry and separated from his € i l y for 6 months

whiIe he awaits a d e t h a t i o n about his re-entry. Meanwhile, his wife and children can
not see the man. Assume that the man is neither a Canadian citizen nor has he appiied for

registration under the I n d h Act, but he is uot a terrorist, but does have a criminal record
for drug possession. This would be a simila.situation to the case in Watt,to shortIy go
before the Supreme Court of Canada.

The first step wouid be to prove that he has an Abonginai right to cross the border

kely and remain withui the country. The Aboripinaî claimant might offer evidence to
prove his ancestry with the Penobscots or Passamaquoddies for instance. He might then

make the same arguments that I made earlia with regards to the Treaty of 1725i26
containing a right offiee passage. He might aIso make an AborigînaI rights argument that

cross border rnovanent was integrai to his cdhne, and that the Indian treaties provide
evidence of t ~ right.
s He may aIso use the Jhy Treaty(which I will discuss in the next
chapter) in the same way that he might use the Indian treatÏes, as evidence of an

Aboriginal right to cross the border. In m y opinion, this evidence dong with the historicai
and anthropologicai review, is more than enough to establish the right.

The Crown might the.attempt to prove that the right had been exthguished For
ail the reasons noted above, 1would argue that the Crown would not be successful in its

attempts to show that by v h e of the enactment of the Immigration Act, that aii border

crossing rights were specincally exthguished. Simply providing for rights in legislation

is not enough for the courts to infer extinguishment given the strict proof, which is
required. James [Sa'ke'Jl YoungbIood Henderson in his paper Impact of Deïgamuuwk
Guidelines in Atlantic Canad~'''~
explained what Delgamtvwk had to say in this regard:
The Court a#lnned that provincial orfedrral acts or
regdations couid not artinguidi constitutional e h t s of
AborigUtal peoples. It heid that s.35(i) cannot be read so
ar to incorporate the specific rnanner in which
constitutionai nghts were regulated bt$ore 1982. and
stated thatfederaal-provincial statutory or regulatov
control of a constitutional right d m not mean that the
right is mnguished. oren ifthe control is exercised in
"greut detail': Finui&, the Court stated that the
soverei' 's intention U controlling and attnguishment of a
constitutional Rght c d d on& be proven
sovereign 5
wn'tten commattd ïk ciear and plain. The Court declared
that s.35(I) not on& meutes a comti~n'onalfidtîciaryduty
on thefedkralgovenune~orAborigina&peoples,&ntalso
operates as a 'Snong" limitation on the legislamiepowers
of the/edeaL Parliment ar well asprovincial
LegsIatures. No r e m exiss wljr these coll~n~tutionaL
principies do not apply fit Atlantic Canada to nunz5 miy
incomiitent provincial legklation prior to Confedwation
orfideral legiPation der Ciqfiederation.

me

Assuming that the Crown couid not prove that the right had b e n extinguished,
the AboripsiaI clahnant wouId have to address several questions in order to establish a

prima facie inningement of the right. The firstquestion wodd be whether the
infikgment was measonable. In this case, 1would submit that forcing an Aboriginal

man to stop at the border, detain bim for a substantid penod of t h e , deny hun entry, and
suggest he submit himseLfto immigration hearings, or go through the application and

approvd process, is unreasonable when such an important nght is at stake. 1 would argue
that total deni-aiof the right to mobility is the moa extreme example of unreasonableness.
Given that a less intrusive system could be devised to identify the holders of border
crosshg rights, absolute ddaI of entry Ïs unjustifiable.

The second question as to whether the infiingrnent causes undue hardship would
be best told by the family of the exampie man, who was denied entry to be reunited with

his family. The present immigration Iaws not oniy cause undue hardship for the traveler,
but dso their fimdies and fnends. The third question about whether the Iegislation denies
the cIaimant the prefmed means of exemking the right, is not as applicable as it wouId
be in a fishg case where there are dozens of ways to catch fish. There is only one way to

get across the border and ifyou are denied entry, there is no otha alternative but to hope
and wait for a review. These considerations are more thau is necessary to establish prima

f&e mningement and tum the btuden back over to the Crown to justifjr the Iegislation.

The f h t question to be answered by the Crown wodd be whether there was a
vaüa legislative objective, Idce preventing h a .to the popdace, conservation or other
objectives which are compehg and substantid-UntÏI the Suprwe Court's ruling in

~e~gmnuuwk'"
the case Iaw had only definitively accepted h m to the populace and

conservation as valid objectives in hfhging Aboriginal nghts. In Delgamuuwk, the court
held that in the context of Aboriginal titIe7there arejustifiable lunits on AboriginaI nghts,
which is a question of fact that wiI1 determined on a case by case basis, which ùicludes:

[me

development of agngrrcuIture,
forestry, rnining, and
hydroelectnc power. the genera[ economic development of
the intenor of BII-tkhColumbia,protection of the
environment or endangered species. the building of
infrastnrctureand the settlement offomiign populations to
support those a i m...144

Thus, the Immigration legishion would k e l y have to be anaiyzed on this basis.

The Immigralion Act sets out its objectives under Part 1entitled Canadian Immigration
Policy. It tates their declaration that the poücy and rules under the Act will be
administered to promote a Est of objectives which include: (a) dernographic goals, (b)
enrichhg the cultural and sociai fabric of Canada (taking into account its bilinguai
character), (c) facilitate the remion ofCanadians with their relatives abroad, (d) facilitate
adaptation of person granted admission, (e) to facilitate the entry of visitors, ( f ) that

admission -dards

are not discriminatory, (g) to uphold Iegal obligation to the refiigees

and persecuted, (h) foster a strong and viable economy, (I
to
)maintain and protect heaIth
and (h) to promote international order and justice by denying entry to those who are

iikeLy to engage hcrimina1 activity. '"
That beîng so, there wodd appearto be no particdar concem raised by Abonginai
people crossing back and forth to iive with and visit famiries and fiends, w 0 4 hunt,

trade or partake m any other 1awfÜ.i occupation, so cornpebg that there couId be no
other way to address the problem than to totally deny some Aboriginal people free

passage. The objectives a c t d y poctray a more accommodating view of border aossings

facilitating visitations, cul-,

family remions and non-discrimination. These objectives

while reflective of the French and English dual nature of Canada, blatantiy ignores the
special nature or culhue of Canada's First Peoples, which wouid cast doubt on the "duai"
nature of Canada in addition, the objectives cast a brond stroke over "criminals" and
fails, on first glance to take into accotmt the social conditions which may have given rise
to a cnmind record on the part of Aboriginal peoples. The few existing cases on the
border issue have yet to even make this type of andysis; this will be dealt with in more
detail later on in my thesis.

The next consideration on the Crown's part would be whether the Crown
reconciIed its fiduciary duty to AboriginaI people withui the Iegislation. This would
inchde whether there is as Little inftingernent as possible on their Aboriginal mobility

rights, whether the Aboriginal group has been consulted in the drafbg of the relevant
Iegislation, and in the event of expropriation of their nghts, what compensation was made

available to them. The govenunent c e r t d y has the right to protect its borders, but not at
the expense of constinitiona.IIy protected AborÎgmal and Treaty rights. To date, littIe if
any Aboriginal p q s or organizatiom have been c o d t e d in determinhg the content of
immigration Iawsand thus most groups and individuab continue to reIy on historicd

promises such as those contabled in t h e J i Treaty for their fkedom of rnobility. The=
are &O many different ways to monitor border trafnc, than to deny entry or re-entry to

Aboriginal peopIe whether they are American or CanadianCIndeed, refusal ofre-entry is

the rnost drastic method that could be empIoyed to achieve the objective. 1wouid argue

that the Immigration Department, being a feded department, and representative ofthe

Crown has failed to consider the mobility of Aboriginal people or the potentid harm

caused by the enforcement of the Iegislation drafied without Aboriginal input. The Crown

has made no attempt to compensate Aboriginal people for the h m they and theù
families have suffered h m lengthy detainment periods or absolute refusal of entry or reentry into Canada

Fwther, I wouid argue that were it put to the test set out above, the Aboriginal
people affiected could establish their mobirity right based on Aboriginal or treaty rights.

They couid establish a prima facie interference and the government wouid not be
successN in establishing a valid concern pdcular to Aboriginal peopIes. Even if the

Crown did establish a valid concern, they would fail the justification test due to the more
equitable alternatives available, their discriminatory treatment, their f~lureto abide by
their own Immigration objectives, the lack of Aboriginal input and findly due to the

imparable h m d e f e d by the Aboriginal travelers, their families and communities. In
addition, the considerations for Abonginai people with regard to crimina1 activity and

mobüity shodd be afforded rights comparative of the rights of non-aboriginal peopIe. In

non-aboriginal Canadian society, Canadians are fiee to move about their tmitories
wïthout regard to their criminal records. For example, a person whether convicted of
hud, assadt, possession or rnandaughter is fkee to have1 the temitory of Canada, h m

province to provincewithout restrÏ~tÏ~n.
Aboriginal peopIe shodd also be fhe to traverse
the& traditional territories regardes of the^ crnnmalrecords.

The cases dealing with the specific issue of Aboriginal mobility are very few and
are to date oniy lower court decisions. It is surprising that they have, for the most part,
failed to make the appropriate aualysis regarding Aboriginal and Treaty rights. The k t
case cüiectiy on point was Smith v. Canada IM where the Aboriginal applicant, an
American indian, made an application for an interlocutory injunction against the Minister
of Employment and Immigration to r e m the respondent Minister fiom proceeding with

the Immigration inquùy penâing a hearing of the constitutionai application. The
applicant, Tracey Smith, is a member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians and
holds Amencan citizenship. She has three chiIdren who are American citizens and Live on
a reserve in the United States and two more children, with her common-Iaw spouse, who

Iive on the Stanjikoming reserve in Ontario. These children are registered Indians under
the In&

Act and Canadian citizeml"

Smith codd only obtain medicai benefits h m the United States despite her new
membership in the Canadian reserve, the rasons for which were not addressed. She thus
had to travef to the U.S.for a dental appointment, d e r which she was refused re-entry on

the grounds that she did not have, nor hd applied for, a Visa Only four days Iater, was
she penn0ttedto re-enterCanada and wait for an Immigration Inquirysuiry
She asked for

pamission to visit her chiidren back and foah mitil the hearhg, but was refirsed. The

court heard evidence of Smith'smembership in the OjibawayfChippewaNation who,
accordmg to the evidence, have dways traverseci the lands between Canada and the US.,
19" Sm'tii v. Cmada (Mahier of EwIoyment and immigrart'on),C
l9931OJ. No. 395, odine: QL (OJ.}.
p?reh&erSnn'th!$

and have therefore acquired AborigÏnaI rights to do so. As well she argued that the Jqr
Treaty conferreci on her the nght to traverse the border. The court decided that similar

cases relating to the right to be free fbm the payment of taxes and duty at the border,

namely, ~ r m c e s 'and
~ Vincent"' decided that the Jay Treaty was not a valid treaty
under section 35(1) of the Comtr'tutionAct. Yet, the court decided that there remaiaed
the Abonginai rights question which constituted a serious issue to be trieci.

IS0

The court went on to analyze the potentiai harm to the applicant should the
injunction not be granted. As a result, the court decided in favor of Smith, as it felt that
Smith's common-law spouse and smdi children would SUffer irreparable harm if she had

to live in the United States and her children in Red Lake wouid suffer equally should
Smith be forced to live in Canada The harm wodd be minund to the respondent, as al1
the Minister wouid have to do is tempomily exempt Smith Eom the legislation. A

consideration of the public interest established the seriousness of dealing with indigenous
North Amencan people. It was ordered that the hearing be suspended lmtiI the
constitutional application was heard and that Smith have fiee passage until fina1
disposition."'

It is mteresting to note that in this cas+ the court referred to the applicant as an
Indigenous North American as opposed to classifying her as an American Indian, because
of her American citizenship. The court did not hesitate in considering the poss~iiIityof
Aboriginal rights as they have been defined in Canada, a s extending to an American

'* I6X
"Frm& v. The Queen, [195q S.CK 618. DeremafterFrm&].
"R K. &cent (1993), 12O& ( 3 4 427 (0ntCA-), ïeave to a p p d to S.CC e e d , CI9931 3 S.C.R. k
mefemafter

Indian. As this case was an application for an injunction and the criteria for acceptance o f
the argument was a serious issue to be trie& it is signincant that the applicant got past
this stage. The oniy update to the Iitigation &ce that thne is an application to the Ontario
court for an order with respect to costs. The otha case is an appeal Eom the order for
costs. Perhaps the Immigration Tribunal is awaiting a detemination in the Watt v.

Canada (MinWter of Citizenshipand Immigration)" and Mitchell v. Canada (Minuter 4
National ~evenue)" cases before they make their detedation given the Abonginal

rights in issue.

In Watt,mpra, the Federal Court Trial Division descriied the applicant as a
Native indian who was also an Amencan citizen who desired to enter and remain in

Canada. Watt was seekingjudiciai review of a decision h m the adjudicator who had
ordered his departure nom Canada. Watt is an Amencan bom Indian who had been
convicted of growing cannr'bis in Canada The motionsjudge felt that there was ooly one

issue and îhat was:

... whether an Aborigmalpmson who was neither a
Canadian nor a regktered fndian hud a riglrt tu remain in
Canada because 6e belonged to a Irioe whose traditional
tenr'rorystraddled the Canada-UnitedStates bordm?

The Triai Division dismissed the application and held that Watt had no right to
remain hi Canada, The ïmigration Act pmvides that Canadian citÏzens have a nght to
enter and remain m Canada (section 4) and that registered hdians have the same rights a
fiidii5ï-d
Watt v. Canada (Mitrister of Ci&ensh@ and fdgratluo) (1994) 82 F-TE 57, (FedTD.), BeIemafter
WmL (1998) 169 DLK Qh 336. (FdCA)[Pereniaffer W iAppeak
'nMrScM v, Cànada(MinrSter of N'unal Revenue), CI9981 F-CJ. No. 1513, ontme: Q L (Fed.CA)[rieteidterMitchell Appeu&
'%

'"

Canadian citizens (section 4(3) ). and that no otherperson has a right to enter and remah

iu Canada (section 5 ). The Federal Court of Appeal in Waflsummarized the Trial
decision as follows:
The motionsjudge dismissed the application on the boaris
that, whether such aboriginal nghts had erisred or not. or
whethm the appellant was entitled tu rely on them. any
nrch righs must have been mtinguished by sections 4 and
5 of the Immigraton Act us quoted above. nese sections.
she observed, had been adopted in 1977,five years before
the adoption of the Constitution Act. 1982. She noted that
section 35 of the latter Act on& recognires and affrms
'Casting"aboriginal nghts. Shefomd the extingtiikhment
of such Rghts by the Immigration Act befoe 1982 to be
ampïj clear. IS5

Reed, J. therefore decided that there was no ambiguity in those provisions of the
Immigraton Act and held that the applicant had no right to remain in Canada as an

Amerbn M a n , but since there was a senous public interest issue, he should have the
right to appeai. IS6 The Federd Court of AppeaI adopted the issue as stated by the motions

judge as:
The issue in this case is whether an abonngrnaIpersonwho
is neither a Canadian ctCLtrzen
nor a regstered Indiun hm a
right to remaz'ir in Cmada becuuse fie belongs to a hibe
whose traditional t d t o r y straddles the Canada-United
States bordm. '-"

The Federal Court held that the motions judge appiied the fiteral meaning ofthe
I i q a t i o n Act, but had done so in 1994, and since that tirne the jurisprudence fiom the

Snpreme Court of Canada had coIlSiderabIy evoIved with regard to Aboriginal rÏghts and

"Wort,supmnote 152
WattAppeaL, supra note 152.
16rIfl Wm.supm note 152 at 58.
'%

LOO
the test for extinguîshment. The Court understood the new jurisprudence to stand for the

principles that: (1) Parliament needed a clear and pIah intent to extinguish Aboriginal
rights, (2) a generd regdatory scheme which affects Aboriginal nghts does not constitute

their extingukhment, and (3) that:

...thefaiiure to recognke an aboriginal right. and afailuze
to grant specidprotection to it. do not constitute the deur
and plain intention necessq to ati~ngulihthe rigfit...
Tlie merefact that the relevant sovereign power did not
recognke the existence of such n Rght is not en@ to
negate its e~r'stence!~~
As a resuit of the court's review of the recentjurisprudence, with regard to the

motionsjudge's niiing, the court held:

I beiiae that in the height of th&fin'spnudence it U not
possible to assume thut, regardles of how the right may be
dGned O estdished &yevidence. it muy be tukm as
extingubhed by M m e of a lm inconsistent with that nght.
Itnn thmefore of the view t h the rnorionsjudge erred in
Jinding extinguishrnent of the nght as clairned There w u
neitfieradetpate evrevrdmce
of the existence and definition of
the right nor of a governmental intentr'on to atinguish it!"

The court went on to state that due to the lack ofevidence, they couid not make
determinations of fact necessary for a determinationof the continued existence of an
Aboriginal right to remah in Canada Before they made their f i a l detamination, the

court did address some ofthe arguments with regards to the inhefent rights of a sovmign
state,

such as the nght to protect its borders- An overview of Strayer, L's explmation is as

-

"WmtAppeaL supmnote 152at 346 .

Canada has by its Constitutioon limited the exmise of
govenmimtu~powerswhich may be inherent as O sovdign
state- ...
As long as the Constitution rmains unarnended. Canadian
mthorfties are d j e c t to this limitation on what wotdd
othm?vrre be an incident of sovereign power. ...

mis dues not mean, of course, thut proper c o n t d of the
border rnay not be a@t@cation for Canada to c o n t d or
lirnit in some way the exercise of relevant and
unertinguised aboriginal rights. ...
Ium therefore of the viav that the sovereign nature of
Canada is not a iegul barnberper se to the a'stence of the
abo~gt'nalt f g h us ciaimed, ...'*

The court also found that the adjudicator has the necessary powen under the
Iintnigratotz Act to make such detenninations, and therefore aiIowed the appeai. They
ais0 quashed the depamire order and referred the matter back to the adjudicator for a

determinationunder the Imiqation A a of these rnatters. WhiIe the court held that the
adjudicator will not be able to declare the invaiidity of any of the Imigroton Act
provisions, she wi11 be able to treat the provisions as invalid as applied to the applicant

and refuse to make a departure order against him i f that wouid codtute an
unconstitutïond infnngement of his Aboriginal rights. The case is to go before the
Supreme Court of Canada shortly,

The issue as M e d in the FederaI Crown's SubmÏssions to the Supreme Court in
this case is the same as stated by the motionsjudge and adopted by the Court of Appeaî

as quoted above? The Crown hopes to prove that by virtue of Watt not having proved
that the Aboriginal group to which he belongs, has no "4stei' group in Canada, he can

not be considered an "Aboriginal peoples of Canada". They assert that because of the
events of settiement and the movement of Aboriginal peoples, that there is no "organized

society"of Amw Lake peoples in Canada, and therefore a connection with that group
wodd not avail the appellant of any Aboriguiai rÏghts. This is a narrow view of the

evidence that has been included in the submission.

The Supreme Court of Canada in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and
Nodieni Aff&),le

is a recent decision regarding discrimination under the Indian Act of

the votùig nghts of those registered Indians who live on reserve and those who Live off

reserve, took into account the historicai and social reasons for how and why off reserve
[ndians have corne to live off reserve. The court decided not to use the wrongs of history
to the disadvantage of this on-reserve group. The Court in Corbiere explained:

The enfianchisementprovisionsO
of the Indian Act were
designed to encourage Aboriginalpeopie to rmounce their
hmirage and identity, undforce them to do su ifhey wished
tu take a/icILpm in Cànadian soaCfety....
This history shows t h AborigrnaI policy, in the pust, often
[ed to the denial of statzcs and the severhg of connections
6etween band rnembers and the band .--

FinaIiykthe mterest @ccted k aho signifcmt becme of
the ways in which, i~ thepart. ties between bandmembers
and the bmd or reserve have been ~ o ï m t a r t ~or
ly
reluctant!y severed. Those Hected or theirparents may
have lefi the reservefor ntany remons that do not signa[ a
la& of interest rir the r a m e @en the v a r r a rhr'storicd
r~
'61

Watt*fppeaLmpm note 152 :Taken

W iSu6mrS.stbm~.
Corbiwe, supra note 18.

the Feded Crown's Submissiom in the Matter. ITieremafter

circuntsrmcs surrounding resme commmities ut Canada
mch as an ofien Riadequate lmd buse, a s e h t l s Zack of
economic opportunities and housing and the operation of
pmt Indian status and band membership d e s imposed by
ParIiament.

So too, shouid the Crown be mindfui of holding the events of history a .the
negative effects of colonization a g a i .the appIicant in WU& It can not be said in good

faith that the negative actions of the Crown inmovbg Abonginai groups or disbandhg
reserves can now be used to assist the Crown in avoiding the recognition of Aboriginal

rights. As noted in Van der Peel, supra, Abonginal rights do not have to have been

exercised continuously since contact Î n an unbroken ch&.'& Certaùily hterruptions in
activity occasioned by the Crown should not be held against the AbonginaI claimant.

This kind of action would not be in keepîng with the Crown's fiduciary duty towards
Aboriginal peoples, nor would it uphold the honor of the Crown.

The Crown aiso asserts that the activity of crossing the border c m not be
considered an activity integrai to Watt's culture, and therefore not an Abonginai ri& as
the movement of people within Canada and over Canada's borders are aaivities shared

by all cultures in Canada. I think that this bold assertion is an extreme overstatement and
blatant mischaracterization of the actual situation in Canada WhiIe it is inre that

Canadians have the nght to and some do, fkeIy move about Canada's territory, not aiI
IbùL at para 88.
Y i der Peet, supra note 12 at 557. LamrCJ.held in regards to coatmuity of the: Y would note thun
concept of contUtuttUtutty
dues not repite a6ori@raf gropr to p r d e mifenceof uur m 6 m h ch& of
customs and traditions, md those wiiich erirled pnor to
contmuity 6etween th& c~~~entpructrces.
contact. It may be thatfor a pmod of t h e un aborr'gntaIgroup.fisonre reason, ceased to engage in a
pramëer custom o r traàïtfotz whiëh exbtedpnur to contact, 6ut thm renned thepractice. ctcstorn or
mdition at a Imer d ~ t Such
e an irrterruption willnotpreclude the esta6Iidiment of m ~16orijgrnaï
rigk
TiuIjitdgtsshouh? adopt the ssonrflexr'6iIi@ regwrfmgthe at06lrSliment of contimity thm. us b

Canadians traverse the borda, Iive near the border or have ties to family and fkiends on
the other side. Nor have non-Abonginal peopte in Canada lived near the border since
tirne immemonaI or have coastitutiondy protected Aboriginal nghts. I thuik it is obvious

that he Crown has attempted to deff ect the issue, and detract nom the Aboriginality and

sui generisnature of the nghts in issue by comparing the appellant to non-aboriginal
Canadians. The issue is the right of an Aboriginal person to traverse the border based on
Aboriginal practices stemming from his membership in an Aboriginal culture, as a

protected Aboriginal right under the Constitution Act, 1982. It is irrelevant where
Canadians as a whole, travel. What is at issue hem, is where the appelIrnt travels and
whether this travel over the border is integral to his culture. 1 have Bttle doubt that most
Abonpinai groups in Canada wodd be able to demonstrate that they have Aboriginal
rights to hunt in their haditionai territories. It c m not be said that simply by m e of

other cultures or even many cultures s h a ~ shxdar
g
rights, that the ciaimant's culture can
not therefore have that right based on his own cuIture's ancient practices.

The Crown asserts that because there exists evidence that the Arrow Lakes group
ceased to exist as a band mder the Indimi Act in 1953, that they can not therefore be
considered an Abonginai group within Canada 1think the cite fkom Corbime provided
above wodd again show that the Abonginai cIaimant shodd not d e r h m the negative

eEî of history brought on by barrîers created by Parliament under the Indian Act- In
addition, what is required of the cIaûnant is that they estabIish a substantid comection

with the Aborigmal group, not that they o r their group have met the administrative

dhtrssed @Fa. they m e to adopt
r e g d to the m'iiencepresented tu esta6Ikh the pnor-m-contact
pra~n'ces,cwtom and tradiïîoorrs of the abon-@ha[group makrng the claan to an dori@tai njgkn

requirements o f theIndian Act. The court in R. v. Jacub~'~~,
whiie o d y a lower court
decision regarding Abonginai rights to cross the border, explained that the Indian Act has

litüe to do with establishing Aboriginal rights entitlement:
There is no suggestion that the detominution of
membership depends. us a matter of law. on regktration as
an Indian, or as a member of a band. pursuant to the
Indian Act, ..,
EwVIdenceof regrstration or rnembership in a band may,at
most, help demonstrate the connection of an aboriginal
person to a partzrtzmIar
aboriginal cornmunity. ..!66

The Crown proceeds 6orn this argument to provide some historicd background

on the J i Treaty and how international treaties cm be "...in.stmctiveos histoncal
documents in conshuing aboriginal rfghts.. ."'" While 1wil1 be deaiing with theJay

Treaty in detail in the next chapter, it is interesthg to note that the Crown felt that theJqy
Treaty was of iittie use in the Watt case, as it invoived ody the indians of Eastern

Canada. This, of course is the very group upon which I have focused my thesis. The

Crown argues that there cm be no Aboriginal right to corne into or remah in Canada as
this nght wouId be "...fundmental&inconsistent with the pupose of ther3S(I) of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982, to reconciie aborigrnaiprartices with sovereîgnty.""

regard the Crown argues that:
At the core of the concept of sovereignty W. the interest of
the stute irr self-presmation.As reflected in both
htentutionai and domestt'c Imv, one of the primmy w u .in
which a stateprotects firis interest is &ynrmntmnntg
control of its borders. Serf-preservationrequires tliat the
R Jacobs CI9981 B-CJ.No. 3144, onIine: QL.(B.CJ-)- ~erebafkJacobsI.
fiid at para II 8,
'" W m Subm,lcEoons.mpra note 161at para. 44.
' 6 ~ Y.

'66

las

fiid. at para 45,

In this

state c o n t d the admission ofpersoons onto its trn't0t-y.
ne Supreme Courtof Canada has recognised that the stote
has a "cornpellinginterest" in protecting its b d m in the
imrnigroTort cuntext'"

What the Crown is missing is that the defence of Aboriginal mobility rights is not
about uMugration, it is about the fkee movement of Aboriginal peoples within tbeù own
traditional temtories. as they have done since tirne immemorial. The Crown insults the
Indigenous populations o f North America by citing American case Iaw which holds that
sovereign nations have the right to "..forbid the entmce offorerLmerswithin its
duminions...".'"

The status of Aboriginal peoples in Canada is that of the First Nations

of this land, and their specid status is recognized in om CoiEsttution Act. 1982. The

Suprane Court ofCanada has already emphasized this specid status, k t in S'ow,
and c o b e d it in later decisions as discussed above. The court in Spamow, supra held:

In iny M m , the dochne of Aboriginll rights exkts, and is
recogniked and afimed by S. 35(1), becaure of one simple
fuct: whm Europems arrhed in North Amerka,
Abori'nal peoplar were alrecdy hem. living in
comntunitiés on the land, andpartic@atingin distnchire
cuitwes, as they had dmefor centuries. ft U thisfact, and
thisfact above al1 others. which separates Abonn@ai
peoples fiom al1 other minoriîy groups in Canadian society
and which mandates their speaal legal. and now
constih~tionaistatus!"
It is tmbe1ÎevabIe that we as Aboriginal peoples codd be compared to

''foteignerC h m o

h countrÎes m the worId. 1would hope that this line ofreasoning

wodd bo quickly dismissed at the Suprerne Court Ievel. The court inJnco6s, supra,
corisidered the Soprane Court ofCanada's decision in De&amtnrwk supra and the

'*iôîd at para 46.

"fiid.at para 50.

Crown's sovereignty argument, and held that the Crown's position in this regard was

fataly flawed. Macaulay, J. explained:
In my view, the C m 's argwnent &fatanyflawed, The
sovereign power enacted Iaws to ossm its sovmeignty: in
this case the CtlstontsAct and Excise Act. and

Ahhough 1accept that the state, generali'y speakr'ng hm a
compelling or pressing interest in protecting its borders, I
do not occept that a right ofpussage by aboriginralpersonr
for purposes integral to their disrinctive culture is
irreconcilable with that interest*

1rqect the C m 3 assertibn that the aboriginal right
esrablhhed isfindamentally ineconcilable with the
assertion of sovereignty. In reaching my concluïion, I
found it helpfiï to com'der the observations of Lambert,
JA. in Delgarnuuwk v. British Columbia, [1993] 5 W.WJZ.
9 7( B LC.A.). ut pp. 362362, respecting abonginal rights
that would have bem imp[icitlly ertingzkshed by the
assertion of British Sovereignty and newr absorbed as pari
of the common l m , including hose se rightr which were
so entireiy repugrtant to naturaijustice, equiS, and good
conscience tfiat they could not. without modtJiccatioion, ever
be a pmt of the common lm..
".
The rights established here
do notfit within this category?

The right to cross the border by border mies is not irreconcilablewith any of the
concerns Canada may have with 'Yoreignd' fiom other cormtries. The Crown also
assRts that if the rÎght exists, that the prohibition on entry to those Aboriginal peopIes

with Çriminal convictions is a reasonable Lunit on the exercise ofthat nght, and seeks to

jnstifL any possibIe hfkingement in this case on that basis, The Crown cites case law to
supporttheir contention that the Govenime~~t
has the right and the duty to keep oat and to

"' Vmderfeet.stcpranoîef2at538.
m~uco6s,supra note 154 at 7 2

expel "aiiens" fkom this country ifit considers it advisabIe to do so. Once again, 1 do not

think it accurate or cutturally appropriate to compare or label the Indigenous peoples of
this continent as "aliens) as ifthey have no better claim to this land than an immigrant

f?om China, or Iraq or Nigeria, whose nghts postdate the settling of Canada's
international boundaries. This misleadhg characterization of Aboriginal peoples resident

in what is now Canada and the United States, once again ignores theirsui generis status

in this country and specifically that the origin of their rights pre-dates the senling of
Canada's international boundaries,

With regards to the issue of criminal convictions, as stated above, it should not

prevent AboriginaI peoples fkom exercising their rights, no more so than it would apply to
non-aboriginal peoples in their own political Canadian temtory. While I consider that al1
the territory in what is now Canada, is rightfully Abonginal land, and that out rights to
the use and occupation of this land shouid be paramount to the claims of al1 others, I will

use the current politicai situation as an exampIe. Presently, if a non-aboriginal person has

a criminai record they are sti11 fiee to travet within the temtory that is considered theirs;
Le. Canadian territory. There is no restriction of movement ffom province to province

based on criminal convictions. It shouid fo1Iow theu, that Abonginal peoples with
Aboriginal or Treaty rights to traverse their territory which just happas to cross the

Canada-US. border, should be dlowed to do just that without regard to their crùnùiaI
records. In addition, 1wilt argue that the Confederacy Nations have a rÏght of fiee passage

based not o d y on thektnditiond Abonginai and treaty rightspbut that these rights were
recognized in an international treaty known as the J i Treaty-It Ïs my position that the
promCsesmade undatheJby Treaty s h d d be treated as an Iildian treaty and protected

under section 35(I) of the ConstiMion Act, 1982, and at a minimum, it should provide

ampIe evidence ofthe existence ofthe right offiee passage for the purposes ofAborigùiaI
rights litigation. It is to the J i Treuty that the anaiysis now tums.

CHAPTER THREE:
IN THE SPIRIT OF JAY:
MORE BROKEN PROMISES OR CAN JAY SAVE US
TWO HUNDRED YEARS LATER?

%ut Brothers, this Iine, which the King marked out
between hîm and the States even supposed the Treaty
had taken effect, could never have prejudiced yoor
rights*""

THE JAY TREATY OF 1794:

IRrZRODUCïTON:
The Jày Treaty, concluded on November 19,1794, cded the Treuty of Amity

Commerce and Nc~igation'"was made between the United States ofAmenca and His
Majesty ofGreat Britain. The Treaty was named after John Jay who was Chief Justice of
the United States at the tirne, who negotiated the articles ofpeace. The main goal was to

establish a permanent peace between Great Britain and the United States. nie US.Senate
advised that the Treaty should be ratified, and was arnended by the U.S.Senate on June
24,1795. Then, on Octoba 28,1795 there was an exchange of ratifications, and it was

ratiflecl by the President of the United States. The Treaty was finaDy proclaimed on
February 29,1796.'''
With regards to how theJq Treaty was treated here in Canada, there was

Iegislation impIcmenting ArticIe III (the mobiIity cIause) ofthe Treaty. This IegisIation
was passed in 1801, but repeaieà m Upper Canada in 1824. It was passed in 1796 and

ahwed to lapse in Lower Canada in 1813.'" The Treaty was concIuded in order to settle
the drfferences between the two imperid powers with regards to trade and commerce, the

men

Mfichefl PM.n<pm note 13 at para 190. The comt was quohg a speech
by Lord Dorchester m
1791to vanous hdian Nations expIaining the J i Treaty" ' J i ne*, supra note 6.
fiid
*S. ClpperC L801.c.5S. trPperC 1824.c.40; S. LomrC. 1796,~.7::S. LowerC. LBtZ,c5.

"

passage of their sea-going vesseIs and the extent of their territories for these purposes.

ArticIe III dso addresseci Indian concerns over Indian land and their rights of both free
passage and the carrÏage of their goods wïthin their temtories without being taxed.

This Treaty was necessary, for aIthough there had been the Treaty of Paris in
1783 which recognized the independence o f the United States and fked boundaries

question" unanswered.
between the two, it has left the bblndian
No clearpoliticai conception iiad beenfonnulated of the
relationship ofthe Indians either to the oid or the new
govemment especiaity in respect of rights in the lien& over
which the natives hadfonnerij roamed ut wil[: and their
protest was that tlie British had prported to tramfer m the
United States. a titie which they did not possess. As a
meawe of min'gation. the Britkh conceived the idea of
setting apmt a neutrui zone between the two countriesfur
Indian sentement, but this did not devehp to the point of
definite proposal..'"

It was the Indian concem, dong with some other border fictions between the

United States and Great Britain, that eventuaiiy Iead to the Jqy Treaty and the indumon
of AmcIe 3 dealing with the fiee mobility ofthe Indian tribes. WhiIe the Treaty deait

with various other issues, it is the part specificaIIy devoted to the concem of the uidians
that is of importance to the issue of border-crossing rights today. The relevant portions

read:
It ik agteed that it diail at all tintes be@e tu His Mqesty's
subjects. and to tlie citkens of the United States, mîi also
to the Indfiansdweiling on d e r side of the said boundq
IhJi-eelytopars and repass 6y Imid or inlimd nuvigatrbn,
arlo the respective temitories md countnes of the two
parties, on thecontr'nentof Amenka, (the camhy w'thin tlie
lfmitî of the Hudron's Bay Compmty a c q t e d ) und tu
.

-

.

-

Franc& supra note 148 at 624-625.

nmgate al2 the l h , f i e r s and waters thmeof;andfreely
to cany on trade and commerce with each other. '"

No duty of enby shall mer be [ M d by eitherparty on
pltriès brought by [andor inland nmtigation into the said
tm*toriesrespective&, nor shall the Indians passing or
repashg with their own proper good and effects of
whatever nature,puy for the sume any impost or duty
whatever- But goods in bales. or other large packages,
unusml m n g Indians. shall not 6e considered ar goodr
belonging bonafideto Indians. 17'

This Article specifically provided that the Indians who dwell on either side of the
boundary had the nght to pass freely over the border as well as cany on trade. This
Article aiso provided that the M a n s who cross the border with goods would not be taxed

or have duty Ïmposed upon them. Ifthere was ever any doubt as to whether this Article

conveyed any rights or was rneant to binding into the hime, an ErpIanato~Artide ro the
nird AmcLe of the Treaty of November 19,1794. Respecting the Liberty tu Pars and

Repars the Borders and to Cuny on Trade and Commerce was conchded to address that
very concem. This article was concluded on May 4,1796 and mped by both

commissioners of Hi5 Majesty of Great Britain and the United States of Amenca This
Explanatory Article provided additional assurances that the Bghts contained in the J i
Treaty would net onIy be recognized, but couid not be derogated nom in any fiiture

agreements and provided in part as folIows:
Whereas by the t h ~ ~ cof ithee treaty of am@,
commerce md navrgation,...

.At was agreed that it s h d d ut al2 t h e s be@e to His
Majesty f subjects und to the c i ' e n sof the UnitedStates,

and ulso to the Indim dwelhg on eilier side of the
b o u n d q line. mmSLgned
by the treaty ofpeace to the United
States..fieely to p u s and repars, by [and or inland
navigation. into the respective tm'tones and cornnier of
the two contractingparties,on the continent of America?
(the COwithin the lfmits of the Hudron 's Bay
Company only excepted.) and to navigate ai2 the lukes.
rivers and waters thereof;andpeely to carry on trade and
commerce with each other. subject to the provisions and
limitations contuined in the said article:.,.

And it being the sincere desire of HLF Britannic Majesty
and of the United States that this point should be so
explained as to remove al2 doubtr andpromote mutual
satisfaction andfiendrhip: ...

...and do by thesepresents erplicitly agree and declare,
thar no stijndatiom NI all)rtreaty subsequentlj concluded &y
either of the contractingpartres with uny other Stute or
nation, or with any Indian tnbe, can be understood tu
derogate in any mannerfrom the righrs m e intercottrse
and commerce. secured by the aforesaid third amkie...

...and to the Indimrs dwelling on either side of the
boundary line aforesaid; but t h al1 the saidpersons shall
remain atfull libertyfieeiy topars and repas,by land or
inland nawgation?into the respective temitories and
corntries of the contractingpartrCes,on either side of the
said boundmy lme. andfreely to curry on trade and
commerce w5h each other. uccording to the stip~ationsof
the said third article of the treaty of antiîy, commerce und
navigation."
Nthough it wodd appear by the above expianation ofthe thMl article,that there

is a dennitive right for Aborigînaf peoples to f?eeIy cross the border, the c o m i~n Canada
have not been willùig to accept the Treaty as holding any enforceabIe rights for
Aborigind peoples. The focos has beai in discotmting the J i Treaty as an dorceabIe

intemationai treaty in Canada, and in disquaiiQhg it as an Indian Treaty with
constitutional protection under section 35(1). What is misshg in these cases is an
appreciation of the suigenerisnature o f Aboriginal treaty nghts and an openness to

inchde the specific provisions of the Jày Treaty relating to Indians, as either an Indian
treaty, or at Ieast as a unique treaty that c m aiso be protected as the other treaties

protected to date. At a minimum. the promises that were made under this Treaty to
appease the concem of the Indians shodd be upheld as part of the honor of the Crown in

W i n g its fiduciary duty towards Abonginai peoples. 1will review the case law with
regards to the Jay Treaîy and offer an analysis of how each case compares with modem

interpretive principles in treaty interpretation.
CASE LAW:

FRANCS v. THE QmEm

The first Supreme Court of Canada decision to ded with the.@ Treav and
Indian mobility was Francis v. Cmada in 1956."' This case involved a Canadian uidian
who was registered mder the Indian Act, and lived on the S t Regis Indian reserve in
Quebec, adjoming an Indian reserve in New York, U.S.A. T'he members of both reswes

are ail £iomthe sûme triie. The appellant brought articles into Canada nom the United
States as a test case on whethcr or not he had to pay duty on these articles. He based his

c l a h in part on the J i Treaty of 2794, Article 3. partidarly the second part which
states that Indians pascihg and repasshg over the border wilI not pay any duty on their

'"

Ecpimatory ~nicCe
O the mird Artieof the Eeuty of N o v m k 19.1794. Respecthg the tiberîy to
P a s and Repass tiie Bordets and to Cimy on Eade and Commerce-ConcIuded May 4,1796; Ratincation
adviseci by Senate May 9,1796- ~ereiÏ&erEcxplrmato~Amde].

goods. The contention was that Artide 3 ofthe J

i Treaty effected the enactment of

substantive Iaw and did not need statutory enactment because it was a provision of a
treaty of peace. It was argued that the treaty was an exercise of the prerogative, includhg
a legislative hction. ChiefJustice Kerwin's respouse for the majority was that since:

The J i Treaty was not a Treaty of Peace mid it is clear
that m C d a such rights andpriideges as ore here
advanced of subjects of a contractingparty to a treaty are
enfurceable by the courts only where the treaw has been
h p h m t e d or sanctioned by [egisution.."
Thus, Chief Justice Kerwin decided that any relevant rights o f the appellant in the
J i T m @ were not justicable in the courts of this country. The appehnt's argument

went on to state that the treaty of peace was now law and was not e t e d by the war of
1812, and even if it were, the 9th Article of the Treuty of Ghent "'in 1814 between the
same states, restored the tfghts under Article 3 ofthe J

i Treaty. '" Article 9 of the

Treaty ofGhent states:

And His Brittanic Majesty engages,on his part, to put an
end. immediateiy ajer the ratifiation of thepresent Treuty
io hostiIities with all the tri'6es or Nations of Indiam with
whorn he may be at war at the rinie ufstich rat@catioon; and
forthwith to restore mch Tnbes or Nations, respective&,
ail the P O S S ~ S S IRRigs
~ I ~ Sund
, Privikges, which they may
have enjoyed or be entitled tu ht 1811,previour to such
hostiIitr'esProvided always, that such Ribes or Nitions
shall agree to desrStfiom ah!hostiIitiries agmnst His
Bntannic Mwesty, und tlis Subjects, upon the Ratifiution
of the Present Tireay being notiifed to such Tribes or
Nùtzbns, and sirall so desiPt a c c ~ r d i r t g ~ ' ~ ~

"' Fruncir:,supmnote 148.
16id at 621-

"T r e w of Ghenr, 1814.From Tredik andAgreementsAffe~n'ngCumaduiiw F i Bdmrn 8 ï k
Maj~styand the UnitedStotesof Amda witk Subsidiary Documents 1814- 2925. (Ottawa=
Department ofExter~I
M i 1927)- ~eminafterTreutyof Glientj,
la

16id
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Justice Rand went on to explain that a peace treaty is defïned as a treaty which
concludes a war, and the Treaty of Pmis of 1783 was such a treaty. In contrast, the court
felt that the J i Treuty was only a treaty to work out some problems with regards trade

and Indian concems. Rand, J. stated that a treaty is an executive act between independent
states acting in sovereign capacities, but its impkmentation may still need legisiative

action. The différence is that seictly sovereign matters such as establishing borders are
deemed executed, whereas provisions for future social or commercial relations are those
within the scope of municipal law. That being so, without a constitutional provision

declaring the Treaty to be Iaw, it must be supplemented by statutory action. Thus,
h a n c i d provisions such as duties must be Iegislated. in terms of the Treaty of Ghent,

Rand, I. reiied on a United States case which held that the parties to the Treav ofGhent
merely "engaged" themseives to restore the rights of Indians by legislation, but never

did.'86Finally, Justice Kellock dedt with section 87 of the Indian Act deaIing with M a n
treaties and merely stated that the J i Treaty did not falI within that definition.'" So, the

Supreme Court of Canada decided that the Ctutoms Act was in force in regards to

Indians, and thus, there was no right by the hdians to bring goods over the border duty

fiee. 18"
One ofthe problems with this case is that it was decided in 1956, Iong before the
new Constitutionalprovisions for AborïgiaaI peopIe and long before courts had
-

'16
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United States v. G a m (1937)88 Fed EL (26) 318 at 321.

'" Seciion 87 (now sec. 88) of the ii&m Aa. nrpm note 21: '38. Sub.jcz u> rhe temrs of any aemy md
arty 0th- Act of Pmliment; an im of geneuiappIicatiotfj5ont time tu hme irt force at any province me
applicabfeto andin respect of Iizdictlfsin the Prow'irceCexcept to the ment thut fiose Iaws mdeproVU.ron
for mry matterfor which provlm'on ik made by or under thk Act"

'" Francist supranote Mi?,

developed the policies behmd Aboriginal claims and the basis oftheir nghts. This is ali

too evident in the passage of Justice Rand, who iooks back nostdgicaily on the struggles

between the Indians and the Newcomers and comrnents:
ZRerefolbwed the slow but iheviiabIe mmch of events
paralleled by t h in thk country; and today there remain

a h g the border onlyfagmentq reminders of the pust.
Die stnfe had waged over thefiee and ancient hunting
grounak and theirfiuits, lands which were divided between
M>O powers, but that ire in its original mode
and scope hm long since disappeared."'

Justice Rand continueson to Say, in regards to the Indian Act, that it is these
considerations that:
...Justify the conclusion that 60th the Crown and
Parliament of this counhy have treated the provisional
accommodation as having been replaced by an acIusive
code of new and special rights and ptfvileges. lW

Yet, it is the very fact that the traditiond Iife, cuittue and practices of various
Aboriginal groups have not disappeared, that these ways are still practiced and that these

struggies for their traditiond hunting grounds have not been forgotten or given up on in
any way by Abonginai groups. It is for ail these reasons that they continue to assert their

rights and take them to court to have them validated, and why these rights are now
protected m our Constitution Act, 1982. 1would argtie that in light of the Constitutional

protections of Aboriginal rÏghts and as a remit of the Crown's fiduciary duty to
AboriginaI peopIes, that this case ought to be reconsÎderedm Iight of these more cecent

judicid standards.

The case ofMitchen v. Cmadu, supra'" wi1I soon be argued in the Supreme
Court of Canada, also de& with the vaIidity of border-mssmg rights under the Jay

Treaîy. This case will be discussed in more detail below. One of the issues that the Crown

is addressing is the effect ofthe Francis case. The Crown is arguing that the Francis case
is determinative of the issue of Jay Treav rights as it was a Supreme Court ofCanada
case. Counsel for Kanantakeron argues that the Francis case does not stand for

extinguishment and states ui their submission:
niejudgement in Franck v. the Queen. ri9561 S.C.R 618
stands at ntostfor the proposition that in 1956, the treaty
guarantees in A d D of the Jiy Treaty cudd not be
enforced by the courts of Canada as there was no domestic
legislation irnplemenring those treaty guarantees. The
essentiai holding of the Supreme Court of Canada in
FranciS was that the nghts guoranteed in Art.m of the Joy
Treaty codd not be enforced by the courts of Canada since
there was ''no legtslation inforce impIementing the
stipulaion". (per Rand J. at 629)
RandJ. esplcitiy deciined to consider the question of
whether the treuty rights had been extinguiished, stating
that gg[w]hether.
then. the tirne of its expiration h m bem
reached or not it is not necessury to decide" fat 629). '91
With regard to the recent evoiution ofthe law dealing with the rights of
Aboriginal people, couosel in the Mitchell case dso argues tbat Spmrow, supra, and the

other cases dkct the aualysis o f the J i Treaty that mandates a reconsiderationof the
issue since Franck They explain at paragraph 116 oftheir submission:

Be l
m of C m d ahaP evohred Franak artrrtrcuIutes
a
conception of pmliarntmtary sovereignty before the coming

"' MltcheRAppeal.supra note 153.

"Memorandlunr of Factand Law of A p p e l h t on the CrossAppeal- VoIimit 2 -Counsei for the

Respondent-h4'itcheiIAppeul, supra note 153 at para 109-1 10, PereinafterMitcheflSu6mrS~fOrts].

Nitoforce of the Conrt*&tionAct. 1982. Theprinciple
t h m t of the Sireme Courtkjùdgement in Sparrow w m
that afier 1982 there existed a remedyfor Abonginal
peoples not availaole to them befre 1982- B a t ronetfy
conskted of being able to successfuIly assert Abon'grkal
and treaty rights against the actions of the legidatures
which curtuii dose ngits, o r inaction by the IegrsIatures
protecting those rights. Rights that prior to 1982 were not
judicable, becamefidicable afrr 1982.Io''

The Appellant in Mitchell argued that the Treaty of U'echt and the Treaty of
Ghent were r e d y peace treaties and were thus self-executing and needed no domestic
legislation in order to be implemented. These treaties provided nghts for the Indian
Nations and confirm the rights under theJay Treaty. They at least provide evidence to

support Article III of the J i Treaty as a treaty in the sense of binding obligations on
behaifof the Crown. It is my position that the Francis case ought to reconsidered in Iight

of the rnost recent case Iaw on Aboriginal and treaty rights. Even if the Francis case was
rightly decided in its time, and the rights mder the Jay Treaty were not justiciable pnor to
1982, section 35 of the ConstitutionAct now makes these rights judicable. A more recent
case fiom the Ontario Court of Apped attempted to ded with the modern case Iaw and

fgiled to make the appropriate anaiysis. What foIlows is my rriticism of the case m
Regina v. ficent'", and why I believe that, despite having the case law before it, failed
to make the appmprÏate anaiysisS

REGINA v. mCENT:

In Reg*

v. Vincent a member ofthe Laureate-Humnband, Elizabeth Vincent

UnlawfuIIyimported tobacco hto Canada fiom the United States and was foud guiity at

fiid at para L 16,

triai, a s she had not estabIished a Iawful excuse as per the Curtoms Act. She appeded the

decision on the basis that her Iawfiil excuse was that Article 3 of the J i Treaty,
coafirmed by Iater treaties and promises of the time period conferred upon her an
exemption fiom custom duties, rights which are now protected under S. 35 of the

Constitution Act. The first item to note is that the court initialIy dealt with theJ i Treaty
as ifit were valid today. Lacourciere, J.A. stated that because the tobacco hported by the
appellant was contained in seven Iarge cardboard boxes, it could not be considered
exempt f?om duty as the Article specificaily prohibited exemptions on "... gooh Ni bales

or oiher largepackages unma2 among Indiam.". As weI1, he outright rejected the
appellant's contention that the expression: "...thek own gooh and effects..."excluded
only those goods not belongiag to Indians. '"
Aithough Lacourciere, JA. held that this was sufncient to dispense with the
appeaI, he went on to deal with the issue of whether or not the Jizy Treaw was a treaty

within the meaning of S. 35 of the Constitution Act which states:
35. (1) Ine mktiing AbongrgrnaIand treaty righis of the
Aboriginaipeoples of Canada are hereby
recognLred and f l m e d .
in considering thisquestion, they reviewed the authonties on the subject and came
to the conclusion that the fiamers of section 35 mtendedthe word "treaty" to have the

meanhg already recognhed m Canadian courts, that being Indian Treaties, or they wodd
have chosen another word They ais0 decide that since court decisions prior to 1982

-

"Vfuientpsupm note 149.
= J i Remy. supm note 6.
ConstitdonAct f982, s35,

-

stated that the term 4'treaty"in section 87 (now 88) of the Indian Act did not refer to
international treaties, that this makes it clear that:

...'treaty 'in thir section does not extend to an international
treaty such as the J q Treaty but on& to treaties with

Indiam wiiich are mentioned throughout the statute.

'"

Finaity, the court ended by statùig the unweIcome resdts should the court accept
the appeUant7sarguments, namely that:

...each time that Canada signed an international treaty
which might produce Gectsfor Indium and their ban&:
(a) Canada would [ose its sovereign rights to
mend, &end tenninate or denounce a treaty
without the consent of the Indianr and their
respective ban&; ...
(6) the Parliament of Canada w d d be obliged tu
maintain the treaty inforce, men ifthe other
connacting c o u n q refused to respect it or
unilaterall'y renounced if.unlas the Abort@dls
consented to the abrogation of the Law;and

(C)the Govenmtmt of Canada would be obliged to
continue to confer on the Indians ofCanada the
beneftts they would lime been able to d mfrom it,
regardles of thefate of the treuty. 'CM

Aithough the Franck case was somewhat problematic, it was somewhat explained

by the fact that the case was decided m 1956, before the benefit o f the ConstitutionAct.
19BT and the recent cases which explain Aboriginal policy issues in interpreting the rights

they daim. The same can not be said for the Vincent case, which had a i i the benefits of

ment Supreme Cowt deckions as weii a s the hterpretiveprÏncÏples for adjudicating
AborigùiaI rights. RespectfbIIy, 1wodd argue that this case is wrongly decided in its
mFrmr&t supra note 148 at 631.

conclusions and its methodology in adjudicating the issues. The problem is exacerbated
by the fact that leave to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused.

The Ontario Court of AppeaI interpreted Article 3 to mean that since the appellant
transported the tobacco in seven large boxes, they are not exempt nom duties, without
explmation as to how they made this interpretation, other than IiteraIly. It is submitted
that the court failed to use the principle as enunciated in Nowegijik v. me Queen before

making their holding. The principle stated that:

...treaties and statutes reluting to Indians shotdd be liberai&
constmed and uncertninties resolved infavor of the Indians.

"'

In addition, they negiected to read on M e r in the passage where the quaüfier is
added: 'i..not usuaI among Indians...", which could aiso imply that large baies or
packages which are usuai among Indians would still be exempt from duties. This is a
treaty which relates to Indians and should be constnied accordingly. Thus, if the court had

any probIems with interpretation or there was any arnbiguity as to what the words meant,
they shouId have resolved that problem in favor of the Indians. Yet, the court did not

mention the consideration of any evidence as to what is 'iisuai" among Indians then or
now. In the absence of such endence, they shodd have p i v a the benefit of the doubt to
the appellant and at Ieast directed that the matter be refened back so that evidence could

be provided to address these gaps.

SmiiarIy, with the second phrase regarding ownaship of the goods, the court did
not provide a b a i s upon which they ~jectedthe appebmt's bterpretation that it onIy

applied to goods that were not those ofthe Indians. The principk in Nowegijick wodd

'96

Vincent. supra note 149 at 441.

apply here as we4 had the court had any question about it. On its face, it is submitted that
the court erred in its interpretation of the fïrst two parts of the appellant's contention

based on the interpretive principles that have been established for these issues. Ifit is the
case that was Little evidence before the court, the matter couId have been referred back to

consider new evidence.
In regards to the question of whether theJay Treaty is of the kind which is

included in section 35 of the Consritution Act. 1982, the court takes a position which is

not in Iine with the balance of the authorities cited on point in that case. Specincally, the
court cited Briau Slattery who stated that the expressicn treaty rights is niaciently broad

enough to include treaties between the C

m and other sovereign States when such

treaties indude stipulations in favor of Aboriginal people?" The court dso quoted
Rofessor Hogg in support of Slattery's position with regard to internationd treaties
holding rights for Aboriginal peoples.
These authorities coupled with the broad interpretive principle were enough to
convince the triai judge of the ÏncIusion of the Jay Treaw in section 35, yet, when faced

with the choice, the court of apped went the other way. They focused on the fact that the
miters al1 mentioued that there is some doubt as to whether the treaty codd be indudeci,
based on the Iack of case law on the point. Yet, Judge Lysyk expressed his opinion that a
liberal interpretation of the text of the Ciimer wodd not necessarily give the same

meanhg to the word treaty as wodd the Indian ~ c t ? 'It is submitted that the Court of

"Nowegjr'ck, supmnote49 at 36.
B. Sattery, The Cortstitunconof Guarantees ofAbon'ja1und T
at 243- [peremafterSImery].
Yincertt*Supranote 149-

m"

JRi@

(1983) 8 Queen's W. 232,

AppeaI erred in not properly considerhg the broad interpretive principle niNowegijik
and should have resolved the doubt as to whether the treaty was mcluded in section 35 in

favor of the appeiiant.

Similariy, the court states that because pre-1982 cases said that the term treaty in
the Indian Act did not include intemationai treaties, that the same should be true now. Yet

the court fafiecito establish upon what line o f reasoning that holding is based. The

judicid p ~ c i p l e and
s iriterpretive policies have changed since 1982 precisely due to the

mclusion of section 35 Ui the Comtitutr'on, and more equitable views of Aboriginal Bghts,

thus the pre-1982 cases should be re-examined in light of such changes. To simply
dismiss the possibiIity ignores the major changes Aboriginai Iaw has gone through in the
1st decade or so. Lacourciere JA. concluded that the lndian An was a cornplete code

which governs the "tights and privileges" of in di an^.^

The Indian Act determines sorne of the nghts of registered Indians who üve on a
reserve and most of the provisions are in relation to band members. It does not m e r the
questions of Aboriginal hunting and fishing nghts, seKgovemment rights, land claims,
the nghts of Metis or the off-reserve AboripinaI people and thus is obviousfy not 'the'

source to Iook to in attempting to define Aboriginai mobility rights, espa5aiIy those that

may be fomd m an international treaty such as the Jay Treaty. It is submitted that the
Indian Act and its provisions should be looked at with the fiduciary duty of the Crown in
mind as entmciated in Gu&

v. Z?ieQueen m5 and a broad I i b d intqretation of the

word %eaty" withui the Indm Act shouid be adopted. Regardes of the def'lnition ofthe

word %eaty" as found in the Indian Act, the court couId incorporate this unique form of
"promise" Ïnto the word "'treaty"as used in the Constitution Act, 1982, so as to protect

the honor of the Crown in making such promises.
As explained in the previous Chapter, the courts have held that it is to be assumed

that the Crown intended to honor its promises to the hdiitfls, and the Jay Treuty should be

no exception. The very purpose of section 35(1) is to reconcile Crown sovereignty with
the fact that Aboriginal peoples were aheady living here in organized societies. The cases

from Sparrow to Van der Peet to Delgamuuwk, dl stress that Crown sovereignty must b e
reconciled with rights of Abonginal peoples. This purpose was partially FuKlled Ui 1794

when the European powers worked out how they were going to divide their politicd lines
as between thernselves, but assured the Indian Nations that this border was never intended

to affect them. The inclusion of protections for the Indian Nations in the Jay Treaty was a
solemn promise by both European powers that the border was irrelevant to the Indian
Nations as far as kee passage was concemed. How codd the Crown now argue in good

faith that they no longer have to reconciIe their assertion of sovereignty over Indian
Lands with the Aboriginal and treaty rights of those Nations to fiee passage over the

border?

The finai error on the part of the Apped Court was to use possibilities and
hypothetlcd situations to help determine the issue, which only se&

to distort the

issues. The colnt stated that each time that Canada signeci a treaty "'...which might
produce flects for I n d i a... ",, they wouId Iose their right to amend or terminate the
treaty without the consent of the Indi2~11~.
The coust was not deaIing with possiile fimne

treatles, they were dealing specifrdy *th t h e J i Treuty,which had aIready been

signed by the British and American parties. Thus, this was no?an issue of an imaginary
treaty which mriy have produced effécts for Indians. The Jay Treaty specScaUy

mentions Indiaus and was partialIy brought mto existence to que11 hdian concerns about
border travel. The J'y Treaty was read aloud and explained to the Indians for a purpose,
and one c m only liberally constme that it was to ensure they understood the benefits,
rights or recognition of rights that was embedded in the Jay Treaty.

The nrst concem was that Canada wouid lose its sovereign nght to amend or
denounce treaties without the consent of Indians. My question is how the court came to
this conclusion. Aboriginal people are seeking to have the rights that were promised them
m the J

i Treaty recogized once again and e e d . They are not seeking to have dl the

provisions ofthe treaty upheld. Certain rights were promised to the Indians and the

Crown's honor being at stake, together with its fiduciary duty demand that these rights be
recognized as promised years ago. It is not rny understanding that ail Canadian Indians
have asked for a veto on dl Canadian treaty making powers. To suggest such an absurd
resuIt takes away the focus of what the case was about: a promise made to be upheld.

The same c m be said of the courts second concern relahg to the hypotheticd fear

that Canada wodd have to maintain the treaty in force even if the other country
renotmced it without Indian consent. The focus of the c l a h is to recognize the right of

fiee passage of Indians, not to usurp Canada's treaty m a h g powers or political powers

with mternationd commimity. Again, such far-fetched claims are not what is behg
adjudicated. The ri@ advanced is the rÎght to pass fkeeIy over the border as promiseci in

the JqV Treatypnrsuaot to o d y one Article of the Joy Treuty. Some flex1iZty remai&
with the courts of this country and with the Iegislattïre morder to accommodate pre-

existing commitments to the Indians. It is not so fx fetched to imagine that Canada couId

incorporatethe nghts into the Iinmigration Act, or choose to uphold the promises it made
without declaring the treaty as a whole must be upheld.

The thud concem was that Canada wouid be obîiged to uphold the benefits
conferred on the Indians despite the fate of the Treaty. Why woddn't they uphold
promises made to the Indians, given that that would be in keeping with the honor of the

Crown and the fiduciary relationship it has towards to the Aboriginal people of this
country? How the court could classiS. this part as "absurd", is absurd in itselt Because
the court irnagined these imaginary absurd consequeuces, they held that the J i Treaty

could not be considered an indian Treaty. 1believe the analysis shouId be the other way
around, in establishg the exiexistence
of a treaty and then review the benefits conferred
within. No where in the J q Trea~,
did the text express the intention to confer such farfetched rights on the AbonginaI people as suggested above. The court did not uphold the
honor of the Crown by deflecting the issue Eom what was before it, to imaginary resuits
oot sought by the Mans. It is well-settied Iaw that the Crown owes Aboriginai people a

fiducïary duty to protect their interests and has recognized and afnrmed their AbonginaI

and Treaty rights in the Constitution as discussed in the prevîous Chapter. Thus, to ignore
the promises and assurances given to the Indians so many years ago given to procure th&

peace and fEendship wodd be acting below the hÏgh standard that has been set by the
courts* In this regard, coume1 for Kanantakemn at the Court of Appeai in the Mitchen

case, staîed:

At the Fort EeRe Conference in Augusi 1795.overlûû
yems ago. Lt- Gov. Sntcoe refmed to ArtrcCe
Ji
Treaty and the Treuty of Utrechtstatr'g: '"Brothers:By the

Present Treatyyour nghts me guarded. und specijically
piaced on ;heir anc~~entfooting.
"...
Tie Constitution of Canada, through the promise of ~ 3 . 5 ,
now m r e s tliat the w w d of the white man c m be kept?

It is my position that shce there has been no definitive ruiing fiom the Supreme
Court of Canada on the utility of the J i Treaty, that at le& legaLIy, the possibility

rem&

that a proper anaiysis can be completed to give recognition to the promises of the

Crown. As stated above, the court in Smith dismissed the applicant's arguments that the

J i Treaty conferred on her the right to traverse the border- The court decided that
previous cases, namely Francis and Vincent. decided that the Jay Treug was not a valid
treaty under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act. As such, while there remained the

Abonginal rights question which constituted a senous issue to be tried, there would be no

relief based on the Jizy Treaty-fo5
The Jay Trenty was immediately dismissed without
consideration of modem interpretive principles, so that the case became one of
Aborigind nghts and oot the J i Treary?

Similarly in Watt, as stated in the previous chapter, the Court of Apped upheld
the application forjudicial review of the adjudicator's decision to deport Watt and held

that there was no evidence that Watt's Aborigind nghts had been exthguished and sent it

back for review. This case was aIso treated as maùily an Aboriginal rights case, and made
no dennitive statement on the J i Treuty.

The next case that I will deai with, Mitchell v. Canada (Mhisterof NationaC
Revenue -M.ALR.)'Lis
"a case that relates to the impositionof duty on goods brought

across the border by an Aboriginal person. While primarily a duty case, Mitcheli, supra
dso addresses the Jny Treaty and M a n nghts which may flow fiom this treaty as welI as

the other international îreaties, namely the Treaiy of Ghent 'Og and the Treuty of

U~echt.'~
This case is of phcda r significance, as it wil1 soon be argued in the
Supreme Court of Canada
MALAL v. MITCHELL:
In the Mitchell case, the Abonginal respondent has met with his Council of
Mohawks and decided that since the federal goverment refused to negotiate their border
nghts, he wodd cross the border, and bnng goods back over to Canada &er fifit
declaring his goods and asserting his Abonginai rights. The Federai Cornt of Appeai

upheld the triai court's decision in Mitchell "O that the Aboriginal respondent, Grand

Chief MÏchael Mitchell, dso known as Kanantakeron, did indeed have an Aboriginal
right to carry goods across the border for non-commercial scak trade without having to
pay duty at the border. The Cotirt of AppeaI restricted the tnd judge's dedaration, to
irade ody with other First Nation comrnunities in the geographic area of Quebec or

Ontario, with gpods bought in New York State. The Court held that the use must aIso be

for personai or community use. On the issue of the J i Treuty the apped court felt that
their hdmg of an Aboriginal right was not based on the Jay Treaîy.WhiIe at the same

Mitchelt Appetzi, supra note 153.
Treaiyof Ghenc supra note 183Treutyof Utrecht 1713 Dereinaiter Utrecht].
'"Mitcheil Apped, nrpm note 153.
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the,

they heId that the J i Treaîy could not be used to limit the scope of an Aboriginal

The triai judge had aiso decIared a right for the Mohawks to p a s and repass fkely
over the Canada-US. border. The amended declaration by the Feded Court of Apped

reads as follows:

...the

plainw as a MohmvR of Akwesene resident in
Canada has an msting Abo~ginal right which is
constitutionall'y protected by sections 35 and 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, when crossing the international
border at Cornwall Island, to bring with himrerf in
Canada.for personal use or consuniprion. orfor collective
use or colfsumption by the rnembers of the comrnunity of
Akwesame, goodr boughht in the state of New York without
h&g
to pay any dus> or taxes to the Canadian
guvernment or autiority.."'

The Federal Court of Appeal heId that while they were amending the hialjudge's
declaration, they wanted to make it clear that they were also endormig his numerous
factuai and Iegd hdings. It is for this reason that I wiU tum to the hiddecision to

review the J i Treaty and its -Ris at international law as this case is soon to be argued at
the Supreme Court of Canada IeveI. I wiII use both the Triai Ievel and Court of Appeal
IeveI of Mitchell, for my treaty analysis of the J i Trem and why it shodd be considered

a treaty, or at Ieast a source that evidences the Crown's obligationstowards the border
Nations with regards to fiee passage-

LNFORMING AN ANGLYSIS OP THE JAY TREATY=

Most of the cases dealuig with treaty interpretation Eom the Supreme Court of
Canada and courts at the apped level, have dedt primarily with treaties that were
negotiated directiy between the M a n s and Canada. It is submitted that the policies
behuid adopting such favorable interpretive tools in regards to Indian rights pursuant to
these treaties ought to apply with equal force to treaties, clauses, promises or declarations
that are made to Indians oa behalfof the Crown, both Amencan, Canadian and British.

The fact that Aboriginal people ail over this continent have relied on these treaties to
ensure their survivai, and that of friture generations, signifies that when the question of
treaty &ses, it should be considered very carefblIy. These issues require some

understanding of the unique and sacred aspect of these documents. in R. v. White and
Bo6, the Supreme Court of Canada held :

... 'Treuty'is not a word of art and ...it embraces al1 such
engagements made with persons in authority as any be
brought within 'the word of the white man ' the sanctity of
which w u , at the time of British erplorution and
settLement, the must important means of obiaining the
goodwiil and CO-operationof the native tribes and enstcring
that the c o h i î i s would be protectedfiorn death and
destruction, On such assurance the Indians refied"'

It is o d y with a cIear undenitandihgof this inbalance of power that the courts

shouId attempt to mterpret these sacred treaties. As 1stated eartier, 1do not beiieve that
the courts are the best way for the Crown to deal with our treaties. GNen the honor of the

Crown that is at stake, and the fiduciary duty that they have with regards to our interests,

1believe that they shouid aclmowtedge the validity of each of our treaties, and be&

discussions as to theu scope and how to protect our rights, as opposed to constantly
denying them. This is no Iess appropriate for the Jay T'eaty and the promises contained

therein. For the puposes of my thesis, 1wiIl aiialyze the rights tmder the J' Treaty
according to the legd principles as discussed in the previous Chapter.

In order for any of the western powers to secure any presence in North Amenca,
they needed the alliance of the then powerful AborÏginal Nations. The agreements which
resulted fiom such alliances shouId be upheId without regard to superficial formaiities as

form, precedent or otherwise. The Simon case stated that in interpreting treaties it must be

remembered that indians were not "on p a f with sovereign aates and thus fewer
formaihies were required? Aiso, the Supreme Court in Sioui "" cited a passage h m an
Amencan case, Jones v. Meehan which enunciated the poiicy behind constniing the

Mau rights contained in treaties LiieraUy. A Liberal construction serves as recognition of
the fact that the bargainhg powen of the parties were very unequd; the court states in

part:

In constnïing any treaty between the United S~otesand an
Indian m-be,if nust always...be borne in mind that the
negotiationsfor the treaty are conducted, on the part of the
United States, an enlightened andpowerfuI nation, by
representatrves skiilid in dipornacy, masters of a wn'tten
fanguage, unàérstmdr'ngthe modes andf o m of creating
the v a n a ntechnica2
i
estates known tu th& lm,and
assirsted by an interpretet employed by t h s e l v e s ; t h the
treaty k d r m irp &ythem and in then- OWR language; that
the Indiuns on the other hand. are a weak and dependent
people, who have no written hguage andme whollj

'"R v. WhiteandBo6 ( 1964), 50 DL&
h o ~supra
t ~ note 46Sian, ~ p note
m 51.

"S

"'

( 2 4 613 (B.C.C.A,) at 649- [heremafter Whiteand BobI.

unfàmiriar with all thef u m flegal expressiu~,and
whose only knowiedge of the t m in which the treaty is
framed is that irnparted tu t h m by the interpreter employed
by the United States; and that the treaty m m thmefore be
construed not occording tu the technical meaning of
its wordr to lemed lawyers. but Ni the sense in which they
w d d natwaI& be understood by the ~ndian-"*
It is important to note that whiie 1 have relieci on this passage for the legd

p ~ c i p l e it
s espouses, I am very much aware that it aiso speaks of the Indian Nations as

weak and dependent people. The Indian Nations of this continent have asserted their

independence and strength since the very first contact with the European Nations. Were it

not for the rnilitary and poütical strength of the indian Nations, there would have been no
need for the British and Americans to work so desperately to secure alliances with the

various Nations through the treaty process. Aîthough this passage is problematic, the
uitimate point is an important one - that since the treaties were written in the Ianguage of,
and pursuant to the Iegai system of one party, dl doubts respecthg ünplementation

shodd be construed in favour of the other party. This reasoning is in h e with recent case
Iaw mentioned earlier, that states that treaties shouid be LiieraIty constnred and

ambiguities resoived in favour of the uidians.

The courts to date have rejected the idea that the J i Treaty as an intemationd
treaty to be considered a treaty akui to those protected under section 35 of the

ConstiMion. Sttreiy the reasoning in the most recent cases to deny the tmty because

there is no decision sa*

that the J

i Treaty is an India.treaty, is a circdar argument,

&en the modem day principIes regardhg treaty interpretation. In the Ontario Court of

AppeaI in Vincent. supra, Lacouciere JA. at 436-437 stated:

It is obvious that accordmg to Canadian court decisions
the word "treaiy': when it de& wifh Abon'ginaIs, h a
always had the rneaning of a treaty b e e n the C m and
the Indium. There ir no court decision wliich grves it the
rneaning of an intmationaI treagr.
1disagree that it is so obvious that by wtue of our courts having only been faced

with "hdian" treaties as they are sosalied, that the ratio to take from that, is that a treaty
which may not fit a previously considered format, must therefore be exempt fiom
consideration. The court in Sioui, seemed open to the possibility of treaties behg other

than the standard surrender of land type and heId that it could also include treaties which
oniy deait with social or political nghts:

ï k r e is no reason why on agreement concerning
something other than a tm*toty,such as an agreement
about political or social rights, cannot be a treaty within
the nieaning of S. 88 of the hdimi AC^?
It would appear to me that when faced with such a document, as the J i Treaty,
one wodd keep the principIes of hierai interpretations and the resolution of ambiguity Ï n

favor ofthe Indians in the forefiont. 1beiieve that @en

these principles and the recent

court decisions regardhg evidence and interpretation, that Article III of the J i Treaty
codd very weU be considered a treaty deserved of protection under the Constitution Act
$1982. Understanding that the J i Treaty dso dealt with o t h a non-AborÎginaI issues,

m I y the above princÏpIes aord the interpretatiionof these promises some measure of

recognition. 1see nothmg in the case Iaw to date that wodd prohibit a hierai

"6

Sioui, SUP~Qnote SI at 1043-

interpretation that would make the Crown responsibIeto fiilnll its obligations as they
relate to the Aboriginal beneficiaries.
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the Supreme Court in Simon set out a

method by which the Iower courts must interpret treaties. The following is an anaIyàs of
these interpretive principles and how they relate to the Jay Treaty. The nrst question

relates to the validity of the Joy Treaty. In relation to Indian treaties, the Supreme Court
in Sioui explauied the Simon case:

In Simon tfiis court noted that a treaty with the indians i$
uniqzie, that it is an agreement sui generiS which is neitfiei
created nor tenninated according to the rules of
internationai m
l ".'
In Shon, the court spoke of the way in which treaties were made:
nie treaty was an exchange of soiemn promise berneen the
Micmacs and the King's ropresentative entered into lo
achieve and gumantee peuce. It is an enfrceacrble
obligoton benveen the Indians and the white man and. as
such, fails within the meuning of the word "treaty" in r88
of the Indian Act. "'
I have noted that the court in Mitchell summed up the characteristics of treaty

From these extracts it is c&ewt h wfiat characterkes a
treaty is the mtention to create obligations, the presence 4
mutua&&bindmg obligations and a certain nieustn-e of
solentnity.
Tire Supreme Colat h a heïd that formaiities me 4
secundmy importance in decidig on the nature of the
document containihg an agreement w'th the Indim. L m e r
L k Siaa. supra m 1045 stated that the factors irr
detennnn'igthe existene of a treaty me the sme unes thut

'* fiid.at 1043,

''' SnIro~~
supra note 46 at 410,

as.& in detennining the intent of the parries to enter into a
treaty. He sfuted:

...Among thesefactors a t c
( I ) continuous e~~mciise
of a right in the past and at

present,
(2) the reasons why the C r m made the
cornmitment,
(3) the situation prevuiling ut the t h e the document
war signe4
(4) eviLdence of relations of mutual respect and
esteem between the negotiutes, and
(5) the subsequent condiet of the
As stated above, i think there would be sufficient evidence to show that after the

Jizy Treay was read to the Indian Nations, that both the Crown and the [ndians treated it
as though the rights were in effect. The subsequent conduct would include the action

taken by both the Americans and the British which incorporated those treaty rights into

their tegislation. The factors listed in Sioui wouid al1be met in this instance. Certainly,
aAer Simon, it is settIed law that exeinsic evidence may be used in the determination of

mcertainties or ambiguities that are often fotmd in treaties. The Jay Treaty was
negotiated between Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Minster and Amencan Chief
Justice John Jay, The trial corta's decision in Mitchell, is a good example of how these
issues are deait with and the kind of evidence that is needed to address them. As the Court
of Appeai in Mitchell adopted the facts as detemineci by the tnaIjudge m that case, their

m a r k s are nseful in thisandysis of how to go through the Sinion test.

eL'

Mitchell T6aIt supm note 13 at para 176.

The court in Mitchell, accepted that had this been a treaty-making mission, that al1
the parties had the requlled authonty to bind themselves in the J

i T r e a of
~ 1794. The

court stated in part:

...The C m representatives wou(d have been viewed by
the First Nations present nt these meetings as authorrZed to
speakfor the Crown and the First Nations had the capacity
to enter into treaties...=*
The court even went so far as to accept the evidence that the same protocol was
used at the various meetings where the officiais went to the Indians aad c o b e d the
protections of the Jizy Treaty for the Indians, and stated in part:

...1 accept the Plainrif/s evtiience describing the protocol
followed at these meetings and accept that this protocol is
comrStent with that trsed by First Nations in treaty
cmncils .?
The Crown Ui the Court of Appeal in Mitchell argued that by vimie of the fact that
the Indians did not sign any documents relahg to the rights under Jay Treas that
despite the similar protocol which was foiiowed, that the J i Treaty codd therefore not

be comidered a treaty. This issue has akeady been addressed in Sioui, where the Hurons
had neither signed their treaty nor was their evidence of the usuai soIemnÏty that
accompanied the conclusion of a treaty. The Supreme Court held that a treaty had in fact
been conduded, and that uniess the treaty document itselfspecincaily Iays out ail the

circurnstances surmuading the conclusion of the treaty, the absence of Indian signatures
or wampmn belts is not determinative of whether a treaty actuaily exists and extrùisic
evidence may be usedto support its vaüdity:

Tiie appellant argues that the Hurons did not formul.&e
the document either bv th& s~ncrturefwfiich woul..not
be absolutefvnecesse to muke it a tteatwl or by the use of
necklaces or belts of shelk wliich were the traditional
m e t M wed &y HUTOMtoformtzlke agreements at the
time. Cleuri), trhk argument h m wezght only jcthe
document accurate& indicates ail the events swotrnding
the signature. OththenvLse. extninFcproof of soiemnities
could heip to show that the intended to enter into aforma1
agreement and that thgy rnmifested this intent in one way
or another.." (emphasis added)

The court in Mitchell also relied on the testimony of many experts, one o f which
was Dr. Robert Venables,a cultural historian who explained that the background to the

Jày Treaty o f the situation prevaiig at the thne and the reason it was concIuded with

provision relating to the Indians. Its inclusion was due to the grave coacem by the British
and Americans to avoid M e r conflict on the fiontier with the Indian Nations?

One

document, which helped put the J i Treaty in context, was the foliowing speech given by
Lord Dorchester to various Indian Nations in 1791. Lord Dorchester was anmering
questions h m the M a n Nations and stated in part:

Yuu have told me, there werepeople who s ~ ythnt
; the King
yuur Father wlien he made peace with the United States,
guve mvay your lm& to t h
1 cannot think that the govemrnent of the United Sates
would hoLd that langurrge, it must corne fiom iII-informeci

ind~duak
You well know that no man c m giw.what i s not his OMI.

Wnen the King made peace md gave independence to the
United Jattes. lie made a Treaty hz which he marked out a
lime between them and irin; tins mlpli&sno m e than that
beyond this lhe he wmid not exîmd LLr mtifeteme ....
m

-Sieur; mpnr note 51 at 1048,
Mitchen mai, nrpm note 13 at para 187- 190.

"

But Brothers, this line. which the King marked art between
him md the States ewn supposed the Treaty had tukm
gect, codd never have prqudiced your Rghts.
B e King f nghts with respect to your tem'tory wme
agaihst the Nations of Europe; these he resigned to the
States. But the King never had any rights against you but tu
such parts of the Country ar had been fairly ceded by
yarrseives with our ownfree cornent by Public convention
and sale. How then c m it be said that he gave away your

Rofessor Charles J o W o n was qualified at trial as an expert hisonan and
explained that Lord Dorchester was acknowledging the creation of the bormdary in 1783,
but that the border did not apply to indians. Professor Johnston testified that the British

were faced with the serious risk of war with the powerfil lndian Nations, should the right
to pass and trade over the border area, not be prornised. This view was corroborated by

Dr. Venables, who stated in part:
For the Bn'tisA and their Indian allies, the JÙy Treaty
would assert through international lm what had befre
been asserted by the presence of British troops in posts
such as Oswego and Niagara. For its part, the United
States gained the concession of the fort. For both Britaiit
and the United States. the absence of a guarantee of Indian
fiee made across the borders w d d have meant residing a
w m not unifie the w m Imched by Pontiac and his
followers m 1763 - - that war hmfng been c a t d 6y cr
British strangulatron of lndfmtrading rr'ghts?

The court in Sioui addressed the g e n d situation that existed as between the
European powers and the Indian Nations with regard to the capaci@ to heat and indeed

f i f i . . at para 190,

f i f i at para 203,

the necessity of concludiug peace treaties if the European powers had any hope of senling
here saffeIy:

The mother counmes did everything in theirpower to
secure the alliance of each Indinn nation mrd to encourage
nations allied wtlh the enemy to change sides. When these
efforts met with success, they were incorporated in îreaties
ifoliance or neutraliq, Inis cfearlv indicotes that the
Indr'an natrfns were reparded in their reicrtrôns with the
Eurmean nations which occupiod North Alnerira as
Both the British and the Arnericans treated with the hdian Nations as Nations and

their inclusion in the Jay Treaty is evidence of that treatment. The Treaty contained very
important rights for those Indians who Iived near the border regarding h e passage and
duty fiee importation of goods.

treaty deait with political and social rights as

contemplated in Sioui. FinalIy, whiIe the indian Nations were not signatories to this
Article of the J i Treaîy?the case Iaw holds that this is not a necessary part of
establishhg a treaty. Given that the conferences focused on the border rights of the

Indians, and that the Jay Treaty M y acknowIedged the Indian presence and the risk of
war; a situation of both give and take for the Western powers and the Indians,the Treaty

shouId therefore be considered a treaty under section 35(1) of the ColtstihitionAct, 1982.
C e W y any ambiguity or uncertainty in domg so, wodd be resolved in favor ofthe

Indians

The Supreme Court of Canada was abIe to recognize a "IegaUy"new form of land
holding known as Aboriginal titIe m Delgamuuwk TheÎr reasonbg expIained that
AboriginaI rÎghts are Mique and sui gaierisand the court proceeded to devdop a test for

"Sioui. mpra note 51 at 1053.

the establishment ofAboriginai titIe. By cornparison, the courts couid find a way to

incorporate this type oftreaty, the J i Treaty, into the Constitutionai meaning of b a t y "
in section 35(1) based on the suigeneris nature of such rights. The relevant provisions of
theJoy Treaty could be classined as an Indian Treaty without having to incorporate the

provisions which do not relate to M a n s .

The next issue to consider is whether or not the J q Treaty contains direct
mobility rights or rights incidental to the exercise of the primary nghts which wodd
mcfude a mobiIity right, and the scope of those rights. The court accepted that the case
law has demonstrated that a fair, Iarge and iiberal interpretation of treaties is necessary. It

is to be noted that the treaty is to be read as understood by the M a n s not that of the
Crown's Iawyers. Again, the scope or extent of the cights should be considered from the
perspective of the 'hatural understanding of the indians", ln this case, the mies

throughout history stressed repeatedy the importance of their ability to pass keely within
their territory which was not fashioned around the politicai borders of the English. in the

later J i Treaty, the Indians were given an exemption nom border duties to compliment
their right of Eee passage.

As stated previously, the Jay Treaîy q&caUy

addressed the right of h e

passage in Article III which provided for: "...the Indians diveiling on ei'ther side of the
said 6oundaiy iine,fiee& to pars and repass by l a d or inlrmd nawgation, into the

respective tm'toIr'es und countrrtrr&s
of the two portes, on the continent of Amerka?.

There is no ambipCtym the words stating that the Indians on both sides of the border
have the right to p a s and r e p s fi=eeIy.Even had there beai ambigttity, the honor of the
Crown, and the Liierai hterpretatlon prlncipIes wodd demand that d Ï s section be read in

favor of the Indians for the rite of fiee passage. Given the important rights that are

recognized within the Jüy Treaty, the presumption shodd be that this Article should be
considered a treaty under section 35(1). The court m Sioui held that given the important

clauses provided in the treaty at issue in that case, that the presumption is that the
document was indeed a treaty:
While the ana&mk thusfmse- to suggest that the
document of Sèptember 5 is not a treuty, the presence of a
c h s e guaranteeing thefiee amcise of religion, automs
and tmde with the EngIish cannot but raise serious doubts
about th& proposition It seems erhemely sbange to me
that a d o m e n t whicfi ik supposedly on& a ternporaty,
unilateral and informal safe conduct s h d contain a
c h e guaranteeing rights of such importance. As BBisson
54.noted in the Cowt ofAppeaIjt~dgment,t h e wmld
h m e been no necessity to mention theJiee aercise of
religion and customs in a document rhe Gects of which
were only to ïastfor a fmdays. Stich a gumantee wodd
dflniteiy have been more namal in a treaty wfime "the
word of the white man" b

Given the above andysis of domestic treaty pinciples and the historicai evidence

around the Jay Treaty and its importance to both the Eumpeans and the ùidians, there
remains no doubt that theJay Treaty ought to be protected under S. 35(I) as other Indian
treaties. It is snbmitted that the conference minutes, meetings and promises made therein

an:enough to constitute a treaty on theu own shodd the J i Treaty d o m e n t itself, fail

as one protected in section 35(1). Aside h m the acrual readng and explanations ofthe

J i Treaty to the Indians by British officiais, 1note the foUow0ig promises, made to the
Indiarts contemporaneous to the signhg o f the Jay Treaty with the United States.

"Sioui,, ~ p m
note 51 at 1048-

Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe addressed the Indians and made a link between
the Treaty of Uhecht and Mcle III ofthe Jày Treuw
Brothers: By the presort treaty your rights are gunrded.
and spec~jicali"y
placed on their ancientfooting. ...
Upon these principes the present treaty Ls established, you
have a nght to go to the Bn'tr'sh settfements. or those of the
United States as shall suit your convenience. nor shall y o w
parsing or repussing w'th your own proper goob and
effects of whatever nature. pay for the same any impost or
duty whatever.
Brothers: You see therefore that by the Treaty n perpetuul
and constant communication is secured between you and
the King 5 subjects and ourfiture Trudeand Nitercourse. is
guaranteed on the most unresrrained and General
fi~ting.-~

In the minutes of yet another meeting ofBritish oficials and the uidians, Colonel
McKee, the Deputy Superintendent Generai of Indian Anairs, refemd to the Jizy Tireas,
and explained:
Taken the greatest cure of the rights and independence of
ail Indimr nations who by the î ~ s rtreuty with America, are
to be pqectiy free and unmoiested in their trade and
hunting grouna5 to trade with whum they pie-

WhiIe these meetings were ofien hefd with different groups of hdian
Nations at different times, the minutes show the intention of the Crown to ensure

that the border was between the Western powas only, and wodd not in any way
dkct the rights of the Indians.

In the CotmciI of August 1796, between McKee

and the Chiefk of the Ottawas and the Chippewas, reference was again made to the

ChiLdren, ...but hm notwithtunding taken d e greatest care
of the &hts and independence of ail the Indian Nations
who by the lmt Treaty with Amenencap
are to be perfectly
jFee and unmolested in th& Trade and hunhng groundr tu
trade with whom t h e y ~ l e a r e ~
(emphasis added)
With regard to the language of Article III of the Jizy Treaty, it is tme that
the article aIso promises similar border crosshg rights to American and British

citizens. While the Ianguage is superficiaily the same, the context of the Article

means something much broader for the Indians. It is significant that the Indians
were singled out in the article as to who had border crossing rights, and f.irrther
duty Eee rights were recognized for them that were not for the British and
American citizm. This implies that the uidian Nations, as beneficiaries, stood on
a very different footing and needed to be provided for specificdly so as to satisfy

their concems. This is furth- evidenced by the fact that their rights included more
than those of the British and American citizens. The conferences settie any doubt
as to what was intended, even if the words of the Article do sound similar a s those

for the non-Indian citizens.

Even between the officids writing back and forth, they ail acknowledge
the necessity of satisfyhg the Indians and promising them their right to ffee

passage so as to avoid war. Thus the avoidance of war was the Aborigmal side of
the bargain. The Ianguage in the above documents and meetings are not

ambiguous. They expresdy provide that the Indians wodd r
e
m h m hostilities
so Iong as th& rïghts w i i regard to the border were protected. These discussions

were held with the Indians at the time the treaty was made. These meetings were

heId with capable parties who wodd be considered parties of authority and the
protocol used at these meetings, foIiowed that o f treaty-making forums. The

M a n Nations upheld their end of the deaI, yet the Crown has Failed to honor its
promises by letting the implementing legislation lapse. The Ontario Court of
Apped in R. v. T i l o r and Wiliams had this to Say about the reliance by Indiaas

on certain rights over time:
Ine accepted evidence was that this understanding of the
treaty has been accepted and acted on for some 160 years
without intemrpton. In my view, it is foo [de now to
deprive these Indians of their hiktonc aboriginaf nghtsr R.
v. Whiteand Bob at p p . 648-49 D.L.R."
Again the Supreme Court in R v. Adams has held that the Crown's refusai
to give legd effect to Aboriginal or treaty Rghts cm not be used to deny those

nghts. The Court stated at paragraph 33:
The fact that a partrwcularpractice, custon or iradirion
continued foilowing the arrivai of Europeanr, but in the
absence of the fumai giuss of Iegal recognition fiont the
European colon~ers,s h d d not undennine the protection
accorded to aborigrkat peuples. Section 35(1) w d d fuiil to
achieve its noble purpose of presennng the integral and
definhgfeatures of distncttve uboorigaf societies ifit on&
protected those d@nhg f e a t ~ ...
e whick received the tegal
approval of Brffih and French colonkers.

It Ïs my position that whether the actuai Jày Treaq itseifcan be considad
a treaty, at a minimum, the minutes andor promises are enough to constitute a

bindmg obligation, ifnot a mat.under section 35(1), ofa sui generis nature. The
case Iaw to date

has provided the courts with a means by which to hterpret

treaties. The process is

and should therefore remain open to other kinds of

treaiies or obligations that wilI be given the force of treaties. The general nature of
treaties and the lack of specific requirernents to establish such was addressed by
Lamer J. in Sioui, who explaineci:
In White and Bob, supra, Morris JA. also disatssed the
nature of a treaty under the Indian Act. As he rnmtioned in
the passage I huve already quoted. the word "treuty" is not
a tmm of art. It mere[v identifies agreements in wiiich the
"word -the white man" is &en and bv which the 1made cettufi o f the Indians' co-opetution. Noms JA.
also wrote ut p.649:
In view of the argument before us, it is
necessary to point out h t on numerous
occasion m modem days, nghts under what
were entered into with indians as solemn
engagements, dthough completed with what
would now be considned informality, have
been whittIed away on the excuse that they do
not comply with presmt day formal
requirements and with rules of hterpretation
applicable to transactions between people who
must be taken m light of advanced civiiization
to be of equai statu. M a n c e on instances
*
wbere tbts
been done

-.

(emphasis added)?'

The third issue in the interpretation of this Jay Treaty is whether or not the Treaty,

in form, the J i Treuîy or the promises as treaty, has been teminated or limited." In
Simonr.v a ,the court deait with termination by hostilities and termination by

exh&ui*shmentand held that once it has been estabiished that a valid treaty has been
entered hto, the party argoing for its tennination bears the burden ofp m h g the

T i f o rd WiiZI'ents, supra note 76 at 368Siout supra note 51 at 1044:Deljgmmk supra note 143 at para 106.
'3f S h n . supra note 4 6
'40

circumstances and events justifying the termination. Thus, in regards to a daim for the
nght to fke passage, it wodd be up to the Crown to identify any specific hostiiities and

prove that these hostilities if any, had the effect of terminating the Treaty. The burden is

the same should the govemment dege extinguishment I beiieve that the Crown wouid

have no more evidence in a c i a b today to establish termination or exhguishment, than
they did in Simon, and thus the Jày Trenty.solely in respect of the Indians and

specifïcally their rights of fkee passage across the border, is of as much force and e f k t
today as a sui generis treaty, it was at the thne it was concluded.

The fourth issue is whether those who submit a clairn are covered by the Jizy
Treaty. I wouid argue that the Aboriginal Nations of the Confederacy, be they now
Canadian or American, have a complete right to fkee passage based on their Treaty of
1725. The specinc Aboriginal people who would be entitled include the 'status7*

"Mans7' as deked in the I n d h Act, as wel1 as the treaty signers' descendants. I wouid

argue that based on the case 1aw and the liberai interpretive principles regarding treaties
that alI the Wabanaki members wouid be beneficiaries of the maty rights be they

Canadian or American, based on their substantiai comection to the treaties as

descendants of the signatories.

The commitments made at the counciI meetings discussed above, were
commrmicated to other Indian Nations in 1815 by reIating the contents of a previous

Iettg3 for the Chiefs o f Caughnawaga (Kahnawake) to at least the Passamaquoddies of

Maine, who are members of the Wabanaki Confederacy:

In a m e r also the W u m p n which you have sent to us in
retuni thmefore we send to you ours, specifLg Our ireaty
which tookplace A B . 18110 [sic likeij 18151. Ther@ore, all
nations and hr'bes of Indiam from the East and West and
for the North and South wherein our Chiefs fium every
nation and tribe were present. tlierefore we should bind the
good doing of our ancestors in this treaty of peace. nte
EngiISA and Am&n
generals were present Laving fieed
all the Indiam of Wars inairrihg between them. and no
bounda~y line s h d d mSt between us crnd the Indian
b r e t h , rrot any dun'es, taxes or cusioms should be levied
on ta. fW

The Passamaquoddies, as members of the Confederacy wouid have no doubt
communicated this message even ifrepresentatives for other Wabanaki mies were not

there. I beiieve there is mom for more subaantiai research into this are* but is beyond
the scope of this thesis, other than to mention that dong with the Mohawk, Iroquois,

Ottawas, Chippewas, and numerous other M a n Nations, the Wabanaki were Iikely
hcluded in the passing of this message about the J i Treafy and its rights.

The United States is presently wresthg with the same issues, a1thoug.h to a lesser

extent than Canada. Megan Austin's article: A C u b e DMded by the United States
Menirco ~ o r d f l *compares
,
the plight of the Mexïcan Indians with that of the Canadian

- -

"Thejudgement in the MitcheN Appeai, supra note 153, states.that the previous Ietterwhich was read to
îhe PsrssamaquoddlesofManie in 1815 but was dated L 870, which obviom1y can not be the case. lt was
lifrefy a letter dated shortfy before 1815 witli reg& to theJlry Treaîy.
Mitchen S U ~ ~ ~ O
supra
IIS
no,te 192 at para î51.
"'M-S. Attstm, A C u i ~ e ~ d6ye The
d UledStates -Mexico Bord@: B e Tohono 0'0dha.m Clfor Borde CrossikgRighîs (1991) 8 2 Ariz I. of W
l & C o q . L. 97.

Indians on the American border. Austin explains that this issue of the J i Treuîywas
raised in an American case in McCmdless v- United States ex rel. Diablu. '36 This was a

decision which favored the Mohawk accused and his rights to cross the border fieely.

They held that the Aboriginal person had an inherent right Aboriginal right to cross the
border. Mer that decision, the United States amended theis Immigraion Act of 1924 to

reflect the rights of Canadian-bom, Amencan Indians to enter and remah and the United
States so long as they met a certain blood requirement." Austin then pointed to a more

recent case; Atkinr v.

which held that Indians have the right of free passage. The

court held that there was an "...aboriginal right... to movefreeij within their own
temitory without regard to the Intenational Boundary andfree of the reshictions

imposed by the immigration i a u ~ . 'The
' ~ ~situation appears to be different with regards to
the issue of paying duty on goods brought over the border. Austin's solution to the
problem of the inconsistent application of the J i Treaty nghts regarding border crossing

is comprehensive border legislation which wouid uphold the passage rights of border
tn'bes*-'
In Denise Evan's article: Tie Jày Treaty and Aboriginal Righd4', she expIains

that the courts in the United States have been reluctant to recognize the right for

AborighaI people not to pay duty on the goods they bring over the border. She cited two

ra McCandess v- hited Stuîes ex teL Diabo, 25 F-26 7 1 (3d C i . 1928)-

"Immigration Act of f9Z4,A p d 2,1928, ch. 308,45 Stat 401, repfaced by 8 U.SC 1359 (1982) which
provided in part Wothing in chis subch;ipter shaii be comtmed to affect the rïght ofAmerkm Indians
born Ïn Canadato p a s t6e bordas ofthe UnitedSates, but sac6 right SM
extend only to petsons who
possess at feast 50 percent quantumof blood of the Amexkm Indian race."
mr Arkrirs v- M e 380 F-Supp,1210 @- Me 1974).
=Ibid- at mo'"a A u t h , mpra note 235,
'"'D-Evans, TtieJizy Treatyand AbongbraLf&hts (1995),3 Dai J. Le@ Studies 215- I_heremafterEv411~I.

cases which essentidy held that Article III of the J

i Treaty codd not be considered to

have granted rights in ~erpetuity.'~'Evans points out that while the courts in these cases
held against the right of duty-6xe passage, that neÏther court considered the issue of
inhere~ltAboriginal rights. Evans States that the case Iaw has created two very ciiffient

policies with regards to border nghts; one recognipng ftee passage, and the other failing
to recognize any duty-fiee nghts. '43

Another Amencan article, me Medicine ~ i n éwritten
~ , by Sharon O'Brien,

details the Amencan treatment of the J i Treaty as it relates to Indians living close to the
Canadian-Amerkm border. O'BBen's opening paragraph puts the border in an Aboriginal
perspective:

Again and again Blackffeetwam-orsfleeing northward ufir
raiding attack watched wtWtth
growing amarement as the
purming troops of the United Sates Anny came to a
mdden. almost magical stop. Again and again. jleeing
southward, thqr saw the same thing happen as the
Canadian Mounties reined tu an abnpt halt. Ine tribes of
the Bluckj&eet Confedwacy living aiong what k now the
United States-Canada border came to rejèr to that potent
but im'sib[e demarcation as the "Medicine linet: It seemed
to them almost a supmatwaL m a n f i t a t i ~ n ~The
Confeedeacy members Lad hunted. roamed, prayed and
allied w*thm'besfiorn norrhrmr Alberta and Saskachavan
ail the way down to Yellowstone. For these Indian Natfons,
the "Medicme Line" was ne*
inpossible to
compreirend: M m did not dMde a land; rather, rivers and
rnountaim hterrupted the lands u&y. '4s

"KamufAv. UnitedStizteser reL Ahro 279 U.S. 231 (I929bSe+ais0 G

m t nrpm note 186.
Evans, supra note 241 at 223.
IY S. O'Brien, Ine Medede Late: A Border Dibidmg TnbaCSoverer'gnty.Ecunonries und Fmniies (1984)
533 FordhamL. Rev. 3 15- [fieremafterOtBn-en].
xfiriZ

O'Brien argueci that even if the nghts and the positions of the parties to the J i
Treaty were unsure as to what exactly these rights meant, the rights of Eee passage for the
Indians were reafnrmed two years later when Bntain and the United States concludeci an
Explanatory Article which repeated the stipuIatioas of Article III of the Jay ~reaty?

(Thisexplanatory article was discussed earlier in this chapter) O'Brien then focuses on an
issue which results in iïmited border movements within the America and Canadian hibes,

especiatly those ûiibes of the Wabanaki Confederacy. O'Brien notes that according to the

U.S. Department of State's publication: Treaties in Force Jon.1. 1984. that Article DI of
the Jày Treuty, in so far as it relates to the hdian nght to pass across the border appear to
be in force? Again, regardess of whether the rïghts under the Jby Treaty have been

given the ''formal gioss" of legd recognition, the rights remain and such Iegislation could
be used to support the Crown's original intention.

To date, the Canadian cotuts have rejected the idea that theJay Treaty and the

other supporthg international treaties, nameIy the Treaty of Utrecht and the Treaty of

Ghent, have justiciable rights for Aboriginal Nations. It is nevertheh my submission
that there remaius possibiIities at the international Ievel to argue that the provisions of the

'Y Exphtory Artide, supra note 180: That no sti@ations m any treaty subsequently conchded by
eiiher-of the contracting part& with any 0th- state or nation, or with any Indiau triie, can be tmdesstwd
to derogate in any mamier h m the ri@ of fiee mtercomse and commerce, secured by the do-d
Thed Article ofthe Treaty of A d y , Commerce andNavigation, to t6e subjects of His Majesty and tu the
citizensof the United States, andto the IiiclTans dwelIingon eitha side ofthe botmdary h e d o m - &bm
h tdi the saki person SM
rrmaniat fidl h
i k I y to p a s and r e p a s by land or idand navr'gation,
mm the fespective temitories and cornitries ofthe contracthg p&es, on eitherside of de said bomdary
linsand W y to carry on trade and commme wnb each other, according to the stipalations ofthe minI
article of the treaty of amityI commerceand navigation,
O'Brien*supra note 244 a t 335.

Jizy Treaty at Ieast in respect of the Indian Nations whose traditional tenitory straddles

the border, remab in force. The word of the white man was ail that the Aboriginal

Nations of this country had to rely on when considering the firme oftheir children.

When the Aboriginal Nations concluded Treaties or agreements or held meetings with the
western officiais, they no doubt assumed that whatever the officids promised in exchange

for their alliances wodd be honoreci. It is rny position that the very essence of
international treaty law: pacta sunt smandu, meaning an agreement to be honore&
appiïes to the J i Treaty. The Vienna Convention does not preclude the pursuit of treaty

rights by Fkst Nations of the J q Treaty even if they are unable to reach the status of a
state. Certainly, international Iaw has a role to play in interpreting the Jùy Treaty

domesticdly for the benefit o f Indian Nations in Canada On the subject of domestic
courts t a h g judicial notice of international Iaw i
n their cases, Professor Macdonald
states:

In Canada, a h , fhe standurdpractice hm been to notice
&diciaNy Intentationai law. alfhougfias in E n g h d . the
Canadian courts have not mual&seen fit to comment on
this point directly. There have. Rowever. 6eee several
judicial comments whieh make clecrr that hternationaflm
isjudciah'y noticed fit the sume way t h t domestic Imv is.
In Ine North, Dmes, J. in upholdmg the Iower court
fntdnzg, soid that the hot pursuit doctrine "beingpmt of the
C
mof nations wasproperlyfidiciaIly t a h notice of and
ucted upon." Thtr stutement c m on& mem that cusionimy
mks which are part on iiztentatrônaflm me to be
judcfÜ& noticed In the Anned Forces refwence,
TmchereauJ.saw his task ar,firsr"tu seek ifthere d t s "
rire CtlSfomaryrule in quesftbn. Tire implcatrun in t h h
statement isthat it ik t w d g e whu murt do the seeking
as lie dues in domestic [mu; infactPin domestc law, the
t m k cwld be desm-bedmhg exact& the ssmn wordir; to
seek iftliere exr'ststhe domestic ruCe iir questtkn. n e

conclusion t h international h v V being treated as part of
domestic law in th& regard is inescapabe.

While Johnston is refeming to customary law, it is submitted that the principle of
pact stmt satanda n o m customary Iaw should apply to the domestic interpretation of the

Jay Treaty. The rnaximpacta sunt servanda is a general principle of law which means an
agreement to be honored? This concept was part ofinternational customary law at the

time contact was made in this continent and so widely accepted that it found its way into

the Vienna Convention on the L a w of Treaties. Article 26 of the Convoition provides as
foIlows:
E v v treaty in force is bindmg upon the parties to it and
must be perfonned by thent in goodfaiih. 3o

The requirement for an international treaty is that the parties are subjects of
intemationaf Iaw, they must intend to create binding obligations and the agreement must

be governed by international law. ui regards to the J i T q ,1don? thmk there is any
doubt that both Britain and the United States wodd have then and still are viewed as
International parties. It has dso been argued that the Indian Nations, were a sovereign

independent people who were Nations, or at Ieast treated as Nations, that need to be
treated with. At the very least, Lamer, 5. in Sioui held:
Iconsider that, iitstead, we can concludefiom the
histoncd documents that 60th Great Britain and France
fert thaî the Indiian nations had suflcfènt indepeidmce cmd
played a large enough role h North Americafor it tu be

xsR St S. Macdonald, DM. Joimsio~fedr, TneStructuremrd Proces of intmationaC Lmv (1983). at 111.

Ibx
ViennaComentio~
on the he of Theananes
(1969) II55 UN.T.S- 33 1, in force 1980. [IiereMafter
Kenna],

goodpolicy to maintain relations with thern very close to
t h e m a i n t a i d between sovereign nations. 'S1

The Court in Siouiwent on to explain:
nie colonial powms recognired that the Indians Lad the
capucity to sign treaties direct& with the European nations
occupyrhg North Ammicnn tern'tory- The sui generis
situation in which the Indians werepluced had forced the
European mother comrnès to achowledge thut ihey had
s
u
m
e
in
t outonomyfor the valid creation of solemn
agreements which were called "treaties ",r e g d e s s ofihe
snin meaning givm to thut word then and now by
international hX
The historical evidence illustrates that the British depended a great deai on these
uidian Nations for their successes in the New World and very much needed their

alliances. Rofessor Johnson testifying in Mirchef[.supra stated:
WTtatever the Indians' cornmitment and rofe. it is meMdent
that withart th& physical or moral support the British
cause early in the war would have been in serious trouble,
thut is. at a time w h the British forces were

cornparatively thin on the ground

20

Chief Justice Marshall of United States Supreme Court in Worcesterv, Georgia
commented on the recognition ofsovereignty of the Indian Nations when concluding
treaties:

TIte words "treuty" and "nution. " are wordr of our own
fmrguage, se[ected in out dipontatic and legislafie
pmceedings, by mselves. havhg each defmite and wellunderstd memring. We huve applied thent to Indias, as
we have appled h e i n tu 0 t h -nations of the earth; they me
applied to all in the sme sertse?

Sioui. m p m note 51 at 1052.
1056zs Mitchell mat*supra note 13 at para 226,
Woreesterv. Georgia (1832) 31 U S (6 Pet)515.
'St 16id at

"

Ms.Holma, an expert in Mitchen, explaineci that during the negotiations of the
Treaty of Ghent which c o h e d the previous cights granted to the hdians in the Jay
Treaty. the British Minisiter asserted the nght to include their Indian allies in the treaty.
Even at that t h e , the British were more than aware of the Iegai impIications of including

the Indian Nations in the treaty, as evidenced in diplornatic correspondence of the time of
negotiations:
..A is Mth equul astonishmt and regret the tmdersigned
(British MhistersJfind that the Amerfcan P~enipotentiaries
huve not only declined signing any provisional Article by
which the Indian Nations who have tuken part witli Great
Brituin in the present Contest, may be included in the

Peace ..,
The British Plenipotentimies huve yet to l e m that it is
c o n t r q to the acknowledged principle of public lm [O
hclude Allies in a negotiation for Peace. or thut it is
contrary to the pructice of al1 civilzed Nations to propose
that a provision shouid lie madefor theirfuture semnty ...
155

The Indian Nations were a force to be dedt with if fkiendy relations could not be

maintained and thk was done by acknowledghg in meetings*that the indian Nations
were independent and certain promises were made. The fact that these promises were

between two Nations, elevated the Treaty to an intemationd treaty, despite the form these
promises took; that being either orai promises or written promises Ïncorporated in a

different document; The J i Treaty. The mterpretationof a treaty, even an international
treaty, shodd be made wÏth the view of the parties at the tirne-Coupihg this with the

"Lettex f b m threeBritishMniisDers to the ChutedStates Ministers dated Septe-4
W-RM0117nng

1814 pubüs6cd m
L784 - 1860

e d D@Ioma!ië Correspondence of the UnitetiStutes, CmadimReIatrOns,
(Carnegie Endowment for hternatlod Peace, 1940) at 641-646,

Iibd interpretive prhcipIes in regards to Indians, wouid certaidy lead to the c o n c 1 ~ o n

that while the form may have been différent, the Indians no doubt considered these very
strong promises a treaty made with the British as they had exchanged promises as welI.

William Claus, the Deputy Superintendent Generai of M a n M
a
K
s addressed the

Indians on A p d 24,1815 and stated:
I amfi<rherinstructed to infom yyou that in making Peuce
with the Government of the United Sates of America. your
interest were not neglected, noo would peace have been
made with them Lad they not consented to inchde you in
the treuty. ...

Nothing is required in r e mfur y a v Father 's benevolence
towardî you. but a renewal of the Engagements made by
p u r ancestors and yoiirselves?6

ui Mitchell. Professor lohnston testifïed that this meeting doue was suficient to
amount to a treaty as the parties had exchanged obligations. The British offered

protection and in return the M a n s wouid offer support in times of need as their
ancestors had done. Thus far, we have international playen signing a treaty between

Nations, exchanging promises regarding the border in the Jay Trecty. Iater c o b e d by
the Treaty of Ghent. By viitue of the very subject matter of the J i Treaty,peace and
borders, it is goes without saying the international law was at the foremost of the

negotiators minds as evidenced in the excerpt cited above.

The Court ofAppeai in Vincent held that since the J i Treaty was an internationd
treaty it dÏd not f
d under the protection of section 35(1) of the Consthtion Act, 1982.
They went on to h01d that since the treaty was not @lementeci by IegisIation, that

therefore preciuded the hdians f h n seekùig to have thek border crossbg nghts

enforced. Yet, the admission is made that the treaty was implemented by national
legislation in the United Kingdom, The United States and Upper and Lower Canada, but
was aiiowed to expire in the nrst decade of the 19" century in Canada Surely, the Indians
relying on the honor and good faith of the Cmwn ,couid reIy on its implementation in

domestic law, as a recognition of these treaty rights. By this legislative action, the Crown
evidences its intention to recognke these border rights. The Indian Nations of the

Wabanaki Confederacy as weii as other border Nations in Canada and the United States
stiII hold the Jizy Treaty as a valid and binding agreement that is as sacred as the other
treaties signed so long ago.

Regardless of this legislation, this international treaty is one which was made and
there rernains an obligation to uphold the promises, despite the Iegal impIications of when
and how Iong the treaty was implemented under domestic legislation. Article 27 of the
Viennu Convention provides in part:
A party ntuy not invoke the provisun of its intemal iaw as
jiatr~catitionnforitsfâiiure to p - f o m a treaty. 257

The Nation to Nation d d g s between the British Crown and Aboriginal peoples,

coupled with the constitutionai recognition of Aboriginai treaties, puts international
treaties specincally dealing with Aboriginal peoples m a specia.Iposition. Even if
mternationd treaties are not generdy considemi executed in Canada without domestic
IegisIatiou, in defetence to the principie of ParIiamentarysovereignty, that the principle

of ParIiamentary sovereignty is itseff subject to the principIe of coIISfitutïonaI supremacy.

In Light of section 35(I) of the ConrtatutioonAm, 1982, the absence ofdomestic

implementation of the Jay Treaty can not be a valid answer given the purpose of s.35(1)
to reconde prior Aboriginal presence with the assertion of crown sovereignty and to

uphold the honor of the crown. Even if the domestic courts couId not accept that the
Vienna Convention applies to this Treaty, they could at Ieast inforrn their interpretation of

the Treaty by international law principIes for the benefit of the Indian Nations. I wodd
argue that to do any less would fly in the face of aiL the case law which supports large and

liberal interpretations in favor of the Indians and the principle of reconciling the Crown's
honor and duty to act in good faith with these very real promises made to the Indians.
Assuming for a moment that an Aboriginal group was unsuccessful in arguing
that this international Treaty, the J i Treaty, is either a section 35(1) treaty, or the

promises made theremder could be treated as an indian treaty, then what of their rights as
thkd party beneficiaries? The meetings, letters and the Treaty itseif is evidence of the

grave importance to the security of the colonies in includmg the Indians in the Trea*/.

The very purpose of Article III was to gant them border crossing nghts so as to avoid
cextain war with the Indians. Not only were the Indians mentioned in the Jay Treaty, they

were apprised of the negotiations as they went aIong and promised indusion and were
well mforxnedof the content of the rights contaùled therein by Whie of many meetings

and the spread of information. Even stronger was the knowledge that the British claimed
they wodd not have even made the treaty ~ Ï t the
h United States udess that mcIuded

rights for the Ifidlausans
Section4 of the Viema Conventionprovides that rights may be created For third
states so Iong as the parties to the heaty htended nghts be granteci for them. The third
Yienno, supra note 250, Artide
27.

party's assent is presumed so long as the contrary is not ùidicated Once this rïght has
been created, the resulting obligation may only be revoked or modined with the consent
of the parties incIuding the third state. 'S8 This was certaÎdy one ofthe arguments put
forth in Mitchell, and it was argued that the promises in the J'ày Treaty were intended to

be permanent and that it was a "stipulationpour artrut" at international law. In regards to
the assertion that the tbird party must be a state, at that time, the formal requirements of
statehood were not a necessary requirement of British Treaty making in the mid-18' and
19' centuries. The historicai evidence reviewed earlier provides evidence that the indian
Nations were treated as Nations The Crown consistently relieci on the Nations as allies

and &en addressed them as Nations or independent peoples and made treaties with them

as though they were Nations. What other party has been afTorded such treatment other
than Nations or states? Ifthey're not Nations or states, by international standards today,
they were as close as one could get, and were at least a sui generis body who were

afforded the sarne treatrnent and should therefore be afforded similar rights today.

The appellant in Mitcheil argued that the status of the Indian Nations at the h e
of the J i Treaty must be understood in light of the d e s which prevailed Ï n that time
period?9 The provisions of the J i Treaty and the other conternporary treaties
disthguished between Indian Nations and the subjects ofAmerican or European nations.

The Sian case reviewed the history and found that the Iiidian Nations w a e û-eatedas
'Nations":

mr Ilitd

Artides 34-37.
C i e Concemihg the RigRt of Passage overhdïm Terrjtmy,M e 1.C.L rep. 1960, p.6, at44; See
also D.P- O'ConneE, Intemanima[ L m ,VOL1 (London=Stevens & Sons, f 9 6 3 at 303-304. [herehdb
îïndim TerritoryI.

The mother couniries did everythikg in th& power to
s e m e the allimce of each Indiun nation and to encourage
nations allied with the enemy to change sides. men these
efforts met w.ith success, they wme imrporated in treaties
of alliance or neutrahy. Tiiis clemly indicutes that the
Indian nations were r e g d d in their relations wilh the
European nations which occupied North America as
independent nations?

This capacity to treat with the Crown is not a power tbat British or Amaican
citizens had with the colonial powers. Even if they codd not be consideml a s
independent states, there is no such requirement to be considered beneficiaries o f
sripuutions pour aumi.As the Indian Nations were not direct signatones to the J'
Treaty, Article III of the Treaty codd be viewed as a stiplclan'onpour autrui. "' ui the

Cere of the Free Zones of Upper Llpperavoy and the District of Ger."' the Permanent Court of
International Justice held that the essential critena for determinhg the existence of a
stipulation pouraum<i is the intention to create a right. There is no doubt in the case of
the Jay Treaty. as evidenced by a.üthe historicd records, that the Crown intended to

mate a right for the border Nations. Once these rîghts were created, as stated above, they
couid not be extinguished without the consent of the Indian Nations.
The appellant in the Mitchell case made a good point about the character of what
is protected under section 35(I). They argued that the emphasik of the constitutional
protection is on "treaty rights' and not the treaty itseEm Therefore the protection is of

260Sh<i,
supranote 51 at 1053.
Indimr Tévitory,supra, note 259 at para 51-

26t

Cme of the Free Zones of UpperS<rvoymd the Diraiet of Gex, (1932)P.C.L.ï. S&es A No.32, p96 at
148,
Y MitchellESUbhons. supra note 192-

the right and not the instniment evidencing the right In Sioui, the Supreme Court
explained:
On the one hand. we have be$ore UP a document thefonn of
which and some of whose dject-matter suggest t h ii is
not a treaty, and on the other. wefind it to contain
protection offindamental rights which supports the
oppsite conchsion...'64

Those Indian Nations that attendeci the meetings and conferences which explained
the protections afZorded hem under the J i Treaty have the benefit of its provisions, but
so too would the other neighboring border hies. Aside fiom the histoncai excerpts

provided earlier, there is additional evidence that the Crown intended that these treaty
nghts apply to d l the hdian Nations. At one particular Council held in present day

Ontario, in 1815, William Claus, the Deputy SuperintendentGenerai of Indian Affairs

read Article III of the J q Treaty to al1the Chiefi present. What is interesthg is the fact
that Claus requested that the M a n Nations in attendance present the news of the Treaty
to AU the Indian Nations by way of the Wampum Belt in accordance with ai1 their

customs.'" As a resuit, ail of the neighboring border Nations should have the right to pass

and repass Eeely over the Canada-U.S. border by Wtue of their association with the
Passamaquoddy, thruugh the political and social Iinksof the Wabanaki Confederacy.

The J i Treaty is considered a sacred document for the its promises that the
border wouid have no affect on the border Nations and they shodd pay no heed to it. The

Aboriginal Nations were free to travel the lands which crossed the newly imposedborder
without mtemrption. This promise was one that made by both Emopean powers in

exchange for peace f b m the border Nations. Given the sui generis nature of Indian

Treaties, and the liberal interpretive principIes fiPm the case law, there stands little reason
why this treaty cm not be treated as an Indian treaty under s.35(1) at Ieast in so far as
Article DI is concemed The Explanatory Article eliminates any problems in detenninuig
the scope of the right, which is simply fiee passage. The historical record clearly shows

that what was intended was exactly what was promised to the Indians: that the border
would not affect them and nevertheIess. their nghts were guarded under the Jùy Treaiy.
Canada cm not now Say that by vllhie of their indrf'ference w i i regards to the

implementing Iegislation that they c m now avoid their corI1Iliitmentsto the Indians given

the honor of the Crown which is at stake. The honor of the Crown demands that the rights
of the member Nations of the Wabanaki Confederacy, being border Nations, be
recognized and protected under s.35(1).

CHAPTER FOUR:
SAVING THE HONOUR OF THF,CROWN:
SOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

uOur history has showa, anforhuiately, a i l too weU, that
Canada's Aborigind peoples are justinied in worrying
about goverment objectives...w2"

SOLUTIONS FOR TRE FUTURE:

FIDUCL4RYDUTE

The best solution right now wodd be to immediately start dialogue between the
Aboriginal groups affecteci by restrictions on rnobility and corne up with some ways to

ded with the wom cases immediately. These wodd include those persons who need to

traveI back and forth over the border to see orbe with their families. This would have to
include Mans with American citizenship as well as Canadian citizenship. What is

needed is consuItation with al1the border Aboriginal Nations in order to properly assess
their concems and work out a mutually satisfactory way of incorporating their rights into
the way Immigration officials carry out their mandates. The governrnent has a fiduciary

obligation to actively c o n d t with Aboriginal peoples with regard to Iaw or poiicy that

may affect their Aboriginal rights. This is the minimum standard that wilI satisfy the
fiduciary duty that is owed to Aboriginal peopIes. Otten, it wilI take more than

The very concept offiduciary duty as it relates to Canada's Abonginai peopks
was nrst enunciated in Gumn v. Km,ajudgement h m the Supreme Court of Canada

which took the duty which was owed f b n a political and mord IeveI to that of a Iegd
one. rii that case, the Department of Indian Mairs and Northem DeveIopment
266

Spwow. supra note 15 at 11f 0,
'6T DeIgamuuwk, supra note 143 at para 16û-f 69,

@JAND.) had agreed to Iease temis over m d e r e d Indian land that were different

h m what the First Nation had agreed to, and they were much Iess favorable terms. With
regard to these facts, the court held:
In my view, the nature of Indian title and thefiamework of
the statutory scheme establishedfor disposing ofIndian
landplaces upon the Crown as equitable obligation,
enforceable by the courts. to deai with the [andfor the
beneft of the Indians. Bis obh'gation does not amount to a
tmst in theprivate l
m sense. It U rather afiduciary d&y.
If, however, the Crown breaches thisfiduciay duty it will
be liable to the Indiam in the sanie way and to the same
ment as ifsuch a hurt were in effect.
Thefiduciaryrelatiomhip between the C m and the
Indimis Iias its roots in the concept of aboriginal, nntbe or
Indian title. n efact that Indian ban& have a certain
interest in land does not. however, in itselfgie rise tu a
fiduciq reiationship between the Indians and the C m .
The conciusion that the Crown is afiduciav depends p n
thejhher proposition that the lndian interest in the land LF
inaiienable except upon surrmrder to the Crown?

While this case is seen as important one inthe protection of Aboriginal peoples in
the assertion of their rights, it is aiso probletnatic. Some have asserted that the above case
Iimited the fiduciary duty ofthe Crowa to mereiy reserve land transactions. Had there
been any doubt that this was not the intention of the Supreme Court,Chief Justice

Dickson and La Forest L in Spmrow heId:
In out opinion, Guerr'n, together th R v. Tùylor and
IViiiims...g r m d a g e n d guidingprinciplefor s..W(I).
Bat ir, the govenmtmt hm the responm'6iIity to act iit a
fiduciarycapaciîy with respect to ubort-ginaLpeoples.me
reldionship between the governent und aborigàrak is
trust-Me, rather t h aàvetsmùl, and contemporary

-de

Gueriir, supra note 106.
16X at 376,

recognition and #matr'on of aborigi'irui~ g h t must
s
be
defmed in iight of thiî liiptotfcr e l a t f ~ n s h @ . ~

AIso, Leonard Rotman in: ParaIIel Patlis: Fiducia~~
Doctrine and the CrownNative ReIutionship h Canada" explains that the precise nature of the fiduciary

obIigation has yet to be expanded upon by the courts. In regard to Guerin, which came
out m 1984, Rotman States:

Yet, more thon ten yeurs latw, the Canadianjkdiciary
remainspoised at theperimeter of the Crown 's duty,
reftîsing to venture into its core,

B e irnpiementution offiduuary doctrine to simultaneous[y
md rnonitor the Crown-Native reiatr'onship h m
desmCTIbe
created dficuities 60thfor tfiejudichyand legal
scholars, UnMe rnany other areas of the law, such as
contracis. thefiduciaryreian'on - and its concomitant
dtitie~~
obligations. nghts, and benefts - U not very well
understo~d.~~
Rotman then goes on to explain exactly what the fiduciary duty entails with
respect to Abonginai people and states in part:
The Crom-Nativefidueimy relatiowhip. in actuaiity. is
cornprtked of two distrnct types, or genres, offiduciary
relatiomhips. The Crown owes a generaI, overarching
fiduciary duty to aboriginalpeuples as resuk of the
historr'ctd relationship between theparties duting back tu
the t h e of contact. lit additz'on, the Crown aïs0 owes
specificfiduciq dutrutres
or obligations to particular Native
grmps stemmbtgfiorn its reiatiionshijm with those groups
orporn spe@c treattès, agreements, or aI1imce.s that it
entered mto?

Spmow. supra note 15 a L 108.
Fiducr'my Dactn'ne and the Crown-Nathe ReIotromhip iir Cmtuda
(Toronto: UniiversïtyofToronto Press, 1996)16iddat 34, ILI$,

-?O

* L L Romian, Pmanet P&

"

fiid at 11-18.

The importance of negotiations to Abonginai peoples and their inclusion in
decision-making by government is evidenced in the more recent court cases dealing with
the fiduciary duty of the Crown to Aboriginal peoples. The court in Perry v. 0ntan'09',

was faced with the Ontario Game and Fish Act which provided that ody "status Indians"
would have the benefit of Abonginai hunting and fishing rights. The court granted the
order for a declaration that mtil the issue had been superseded through negotiations
between the province and the Aboriginal groups, the legislation wouîd be read as though
the word "status Indian " was replaced with the word "'AboriginaI person."

The court

stressed that AU Aboriginal nghts are protected under s.35(1). They aiso held that the

government has a fiduciary duty to ensure that ALI., AbonginaI groups are included in
negotiations. consultations and the benefits of programs aimed at promoting the exercise

of Abonginai rights. Justice Cosgrove particularly stressed the messages previously
stated in Spamow:

Our hktory har shown, unfortnute&, aall too well,
that Canada S~60riPriai~MPples
erepsnfed rk worm'np
*
about POvernntent obrecttves
that may be superfcially
neutral, bubut which comtitute defacto threats to the
anstence of Aboriginal rights and interests."
He went on to cite R. v. Jones and N u @ i v ~ n ~th
~ , regards to the actions of
govemment Ministers m their dealings with Abor@m.I gmups Iookmg for input mto how

their rights wiI1 be affected by Iegislation or policy
What sltould be stated, however. is that a &h-handed ana

I
4
R Peny [I996]2 CNLR t6I.(Ont T.D.)*[riereinafterP m 3 [1997] 148 DL& (49 96.(ûnt
CA).
m~pmrow,supra note 15 at 1110.
Db R Y. Jones & Nadmon, (1993)3 CXLK 182-

u d v ~ ustunce
i
on the iiatt ifthe Minwin neither
me@ the c o n ~ o n u~lu i r e m e n twith
s which, one
would erpect, ii would consider itserfduty bomd to
corn& nor will itvroviae un enforeable regulato~
scfieme capable of achieving the commarion goals which

it s e e k ...(emphasis added)

I do not think it was ever suggested that there would
necessnnIy be no at@msmientsrequired or no costs
invdved,

Govemment politics aimed at excluding particular Aboliginai groups as in the
Immigration Act as discussed earlier, or those failing to provide adequate time or rnoney
for consultation, negotiations and information dissemination will resuit in unenforceable

Iegislation against the Aboriginal groups based on the Spamow test. The Immi@atiion Act
may prove to be one of those acts which exclude a portion of Abonginal people, an action
which shouid not be accepted by the colllts af'ter the constitutiond protections aorded to
Aboriginal rights in 1982.1 wouid argue that the binden on the govemment is a heavy

one which involves more than mere "'token" meetings or meanhgiess der-the-fact
consultations. The recent case of the Union of Nova Scotia fitdims v. Canada (Minrîter
of Fisheries))" is illustrathe of the '%gh-handedness" of the govemment and a failure on

the part of the Minister to act on this fiduciary duty towards the Abmiginal Nation. This
case isjust one example of what Aboriginal groups have to ded with on a daily basis

when trying to protect their nghts,These groups o h have trouble even getting various
governent departments to the table to discuss their rights.

The situation m the UN-SI. case hvoIved the approval of a project that had the
potmtid to be e~fremelyhannfiil to the Milanaq fishery. The Mi'kmaq mderstood tbat

the process would involve codtatiori with the Mi'kmaq before any deciQomwere
made-thatcouId affect their fishery. The Minister proceeded without regard for the

Crown's fiduciary duty to these Mi'kmaq and the project was approved without
infortlfing the Mi'lanaq. With regard to this action on behalfof the Minister, the court

held:
It is not surpnSing that the decision rnakingprocess is
perceived as unfair by the applicants.for the UNS1had
receivedfindingfm DIAND to undertake an independent
revr*ewwith the assistance of connrltants, it had received
micou~agingresponresfrom the Ministen of DFO and of EC.
attdgeneral assurances of the importance o / W S I involvement
in the usesment process. Yet the decision was made before the
meeting, arranged at the WSIk request, with DFO scientists to
discuss the applicant 's concernr...

Ine Crown 'rfiduciary d q to the appiicants as representing
Abongrnal people continued throughout the assesment process
and therealier...
1am persuaded tfiat by their/aii[ureto consider thefiduciimy duq
here owed to the applicants, when the dect'sr'onwar made on behaifof
the Ministers. those acting on behaifof the Mintkters did breuch that
dzq.

"

These are the kmds of issues that Aboriginal peopIe must deal with on a daily
bans. Despite &gs

by even the highest court in our country with regard to the fiduciary

duty owed by the goverment to AboriginaI peoples, govemmentai actions ofien fd1 far

short ofmeeting this doty. GeneraiIy, the Aboriginal groups are ofien left to prove their
rights in court as opposed to haMig the opporttmity to work out viable s01utions with the

varÎous goversment agencies. It is hoped that with the guidance provided by the Supreme

Union of Nova S'cotia Iidiuorv v. Cmada (MnrSrer of Fcsiimerres
and Oceau-), C199q 1F C 325.
Ibid, at 334342+

Court of Canada in Delgamtmk that this situation may improve. The Court attempted to
elaborate on what this fiduciary duty entds:
Inere Lr dwavs a due qfconsultatÏon. mether the
abo~grnal
group has been connrled is relevant tu
detennining whether the inJFingementof aborigrnaf titie is
jtlst@ed, in the sarne way that the C r m'sf d w e to
consult an a b o n ' a l group w i i A respect to the tenns by
which reserve land is [eased m a .breuch itsfiduciary duty
at cornmon l m Gtienennn
The nature and scope of the duty
of connftation will v m y with the ctLrcumstances. In
occasionaI cases, when the breach is less seriou or
relative& minor, it will be no more than a dity to disms
important decisons that will be taken with respect to landr
held pursuant to aboriginal titte. Ofcourse. men in these
rare cares when the minimum acceptable standard is
consultation,this cohpultation m u t be in good faith, and
wilh the intention of substantiuily addressing the concems
of the abon'grnaipeop[eswhose lands are at issue.I n moH
. .
than mere
çuses. it will be smtficantlv de.
.
consultanon. Some cases mav even reaurre full consent o f
.
.
un ubonmnal nation, pcrrftCrrftcuiarIy when the provinces
enact htnting andfishmg regdations in relation to
abonginal fan&.

Second, aboriginal n'fie,unlike the abokgirial right tofLFh
for food, hm an inescapably economic aspect,particuiarîj
when one takes into accuunt the modern uses tu which
landr IieIdpsuant to aborighai titLe c m beput. The
economic aspect of abon'grnui titk suggests that
weik a possibility suggested in Sparrow md which I

repeated in Gladktme. Indeed. compensattatron
for breaches
offiduiary duty are a well-estubMiedpart of the
fmdscape of ubon'gotaal rights: Gumn.In keeping wïfh the
duty of honor mdgoodfaith on the Cimm, fair
compensuhon will ordinananl'jr
be requived when aboriginal
title is hrfrmgedw (emphasis added)

There remains the fact that with the cases on fidtttiary duty, it is now obviously
cIear that the Department of Immigration must take steps to meet with AbariginaI peopIe

and at least begbi discussions on the existence of a right to cross the border hely, the
scope of that nght, and its impIementation. As c m be seen in the Watt and Mitchefl cases
that are soon to be argued in the Supreme Court of Canada, this is not the course they
have chosen to take. Once again, the Crown has decided to deny the rights of Aboriginal

peoples at ail costs, without taking the preIiminary steps of consulting with the border

Nations. There remains one other very important aspect of border crossing rights that has
yet to be expIored in this thesis. A claim by the Aboriginal Nations in the Wabanaki
Confederacy for Aborigind titIe in their traditionai lands might dso address border

issues, given that their traditionai lands ùiclude lands on both sides of the border.

A fair assesment of Abonginai title in this area, as a result of a land claim, wouid
involve an in-depth review of historicai and anthtopological Somation which is beyond
the scope of this thesis on border crossing rights. It is a very important aspect of

Aboriginal rights which wodd more properly be the subject of its own thesis.
A successful land cIaim based on Aboriginal titie provides for more than just a
distriibution of land to that claimant Abonginai Nation@),and opens the door to a wider
mandate for negotiations. These topics include govemmentd powers and responsibility
within a tenitory and couid indude negotiations with both Canada and the United States

over how to resoIve the border issue. A land cIaim in the AtIaotic provinces wouid be
submitted on the basis that an AborigmaI Nation or Nations have valid Aboriginal titIe
clamis to a comprehensÏve area, Iike New BnmSwick for ïnsmce. This is done through

"De~mmnnvk,supra note 143 at para 16û-f 69.

specific claims, for smalIer, detaminable land pieces. such as an expansion to a reserve
area, or a cornprehensiveclaim to dl ofNew Brunswick, which involves larger,
m d e h e d land areas of New Bnuiswick. Land claims based on Aboriginal title cm:
expand resewes, provide new land bases offreswes, provide compensation for past use
and exploitation by the Crown and other entities, create a different tax system for

Aboriginal lands, provide the Abonginal Nation(s) with a percentage of revenues fFom

natuml resources used by the provinces, capital for economic development, h d i n g for

self-government initiatives and other arrangements for the Aboriginal group(s) to give
effect to their rights. Land clairns require years of research, and negotiations with the
federai and provincial governments. It is an alternative to takuig a claim to court an

asking for a court to declare that the particular Aboriginal group has Aboriginal title to an
area, aithough this remains an option shouid land claim negotiations fail.'"
There has been some question over the Iast few decades as to whether or not

Aboriginal nghts such as fishing righfs depend on the estabiishment of Aboriginal title to
the Iand where they propose to exercise their nghts. Recently, two Supreme Court of

Canada cases, Adam and Cote have senled the question. In Adams, a Mohawk was
charged with fishing without a licaise within the historicd botmdaries ofNew France on

Iand that had been ceded m 1888. The court cited V m der Peet and held that AboriginaI
titIe was just one maniféstation ofAboriginal rights and that Aboriginal rights do not

have to be based on a c l a h of Aborighai titIe to an ana, dthough the exercise ofa

particdar right may be site specifrc. As for the land cession in 1888, the cotrrt heId that

-

-

a'liidiari and NorihemM iCanada,Cirnpr&ertsnre Land C t b Polfcy-(ûîtawa, 1986).

while the land cession may possiily preclude a cIaim to Abonginal titIe, it in no way was
a clear and plain intention to exhguish f i s h g rights in the ares?'

Senilarly in Cote, an Algonkiau was charged for faiIure to have a Iicense to fish
and without paying a fee to enter the fishing area The court upheld the fee as it did not
h d e r the right to fish, it aided it in providing fùnding for roads, etc. The kense was

declared void as an Aborigind person could only obtain one by special discretion of the
Minister. This bIanket prohiiition against fishing cm not be justified as there were no
criteria or guidelines for the Minister to exacise his discretion. Like Adams, Cote
stressed that Aboriginal title did not have to be established to clah f i s h g rights.

As

weii, the absence of French recognition of Abonginai rights did not affect their protection
under S. 35(1).2g4

Thus, I wodd argue that the mobility rights of Wabanaki Nations contahed
specificaiiy in theJay Treaty did not need the " formai gioss of legd recognition"
demanded in the pre-1982 Francis case, and this absence o f formai legidative inclusion
of the treaty into domestic Iaw should not S e c t the Aborigind nghts contained withinAs weii, should a land claÏm fair in the area, thisshould not be an end for the assertion of

mobility rights as Aboriginal rights do not depend on Aboriginal titIe to an area. One
codd still argue a mobility nght based not only on the Indian treaties, but aIso as an
Aboriginal right mtegral to the society, regdess of a proven land clami.
As seekuig a court declarationof Abonginai title to an area Ïs a leagthy way to

ttd0mpkmpmnote 99Cote. supra note t OO,
'UAd', supra note 99"2

assert mobility rights, and land cl&

c m take decades, it is important to look to interim

solutions until the larger issues can be properly dedt with. Negotiation is aiways

encouraged by the courts as opposed to Iitigating these issues. Yet, Iitigation is the
direction that many Aboriginal groups wiU be forced to take to detennine once and for dl

their relationship with the rest ofCanada in relation to their valid claims, if the Crown
contlliuaily fails to îive up to its fiduciary duty to consuit. Aboriginal rnobiiity rights are
of an fmmediate importance, so there need to be some interim solutions.'"

The present reqykements under the Immigration legislation represents an
unnecessary burden on Aboriginal mobility rights with regard to the border. Immigration
Act challenges, through the courts may seem to be the quickest route to force negotiation

of cross-border passage for Abonginai people, but it is the Ieast desirable option, given
the direction given by the courts towards consultation and negotiation. As emphasized in

Sparrow. there is a swng move towards negotiations between the Aboriginal groups and
the governments to establish the beneficiaries of the rights and the scope of the rights

themselves. TEs duty by the Govemment to consdt includes al1 Aboriginal peoples

within a specified temtory, and not just band members. The idea is to work out a process
to incorporatethe AborÏgind mobility right bto ImmrImmrgration
law and policy, m order to

avoid firture conflicts between Aborîgmal people and Immigration officids. More
importantly, we must seek immediate interiin soIutiom to prevent imparable harm done

to Aboriginal families caused by the absence of a family member that is detained at the
border or refùsed admission,

The courts have recognized Abongmal and Treaty ri@, and now the federai and
provincial governments will have to be more active in negotiations and consultations with
the Aboriginal people in order to facilitate the full exercise of their rights, as part of their
fiduciary duty. It is my position that suice this is clearly Abonginai territory which
includes Canadian and Amencan land, then special provisions ought to be made for those

mobility issues that were guaranteed would be protected both prior to the establishment
of the border and after. AfteralI, the Aboripinai groups have been travershg that area for

a substantial period of t h e prior to contact before borders existe4 and have continuaily
travmed the border area since contact, without interruption or haWig to pay duty on theù
personal goods, until ment restrictions.
I suggested earlier that the best way to start the process is to have representatives
of the immigration Department and the affectcd Aboriginal Nations get together and mise
the issues around border-crossing. W l e this thesis has focused on the right of passage,

other issues would inchde the right to m o r t goods duty-free and the commercial
implications of those rights. This is a political process which demands good faith on both
sides and a true cornmitment to work out a mutudy satisfactory solution to address the

issues at Ieast on an interim basis. With regards to the specinc issue of fixe passage,
Ieaving duty for another day, the simplest way to permit ftee passage without opening up
the border to a fke-for-d, w d d be tu agreed to a fom of identification that wilI Iet the

rmmigrationofficiais (mow who has a rïght to pass fkely. A simiIar identification

process was worked out after Spunow in terats of identifjhg the Aboriginal peoples who

were validly exercising their Abonginal right to fish.
In the Atlantic provinces, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans @.F.O.), have
met with the current structure of Aboriginal ~

O ~ P Sbeing
,
the Bands, the Unions which

represent the Bands, and the Abonginal organkations that represent the interests of the
status and non-status and Metis Indians that do not reside on a reserve. What has corne of

these meetings are the Aboriginal Fisherks Strategy (AFS)agreements with each

Aboriginal organization. There is currently a division in the community as to whether
these agreements are more harmN to our fishing rights than they are beneficial. Again,

this is another issue which is deserved of its own attention Ui a future paper, but for now,
1will use it as a precedent for an interim solution to the border crossing issue.

As the precise scope of the fishing rights in this area has yet to be determined, on
an interim basis, the groups have agreed that for the purposes of the AFS Agreements that
these rights whatever they are, will not be prejudiced by the Agreement. An agreement

that was in force between DFO and the New Bnmswick Abonginal Peoples Council

(NBAS-C.)Ïn 1997, provided in part:

L(1) Tlrepurpose of this Agreement is to provide for the
management of thefishay and the invoLvement of the
Abonoginalorgmizatr'ort in the numagement, protection and
enhancement ofmenenesresources andfish habitat mea....

L(3) The Parties agree thatthis Agreement SMnot serve
to d i e or to I h i t abonn@zalor treaty n g h and LP trot
intended to be, d s h a K not be int.preed io be, und
agreement or a: treaty withnr the rneaning of sectrbn 35cf
- the ConstzutronAct. 1982,

L(4) The P d e s recognize thut this agreement k the result
of dimsions c o n d ~ e dwi'thin the context of m e n t
legisrtion.iurisprudence and govemment policy and, as
such. does not constitute. and shall not be hterpreted as,
d e n c e of the name or extent of uboriiginal treatyfishing
rightr and made wi'thoutpr@ce to thepositions takert by
either Party with respect tu aboriginol or treaty *hts or
title.
1451 Nothing in this Agreement is Nltended to. nor shall be
interpreted tu, affect any aboriginal or treuty nghts of any
other abor+grgrnal
group.

L(6) Tne Panies intend that thb Agreement wiii estabksh
the relationship between the Parties witli respect to ali
maners and bsues that this Agreement addresses and wiii
supersede mrd replace all other arrangements and
agreements between the Panies with respect to those
rnatters and issues, wiwiruout preiudice however to aw
P the partie^.^

Given the politicai nature of Aboriginal rîghts, an hterim border crossing
agreement could echo some of the same purposes at the outset. Their Whereas clauses

couid detail the history and note that the agreement is made in the spirit ofpartnership
with Aboriginal peoples and that it is an mterhn step in the process to corne ta a h d

soIution. With regard to identification of those Aboriginal people who by Nation or
temtory have a right to EeeIy cross the border, Immigration and the AboriginaI group

could agree to a unique card that wodd be issued by either party which is specinc to ody
border crossing that could be both traced and venfied through documentation fÏIed in
support ofthe card This infomation codd be heId by both parties or solely by the

Aborï~d
organization, so Iong as the card nrmiber couid be matched with the name of

*Agreement 6erweert DFO mdNBMC with Respect IO FiShenerres
- 1997-CA-M)17. Dated 1997.

an Aboriginal person with border crossing nghts. The issue ofproof was addressed under
the example AFS agreement as foIlows:

54'1)ï7iefihing descn'bed in th& Schedule will be camed
out bypersons who are designated in accordmice with thk
Schedule tojkh.
542) abject to tlzh subsectim. ail rnembers of the
Aboriginal Organikation who have a rnembmship card are
designated tofish. The AborigrnaZ ûrganhation muy
designate additonalpersons as set out in subsection 7(1)
of thtk Schedule. The Abon'grnal Organikation mayprepare
a Iist of members of the AboriginaI OrganPation who have
a rnembership card but who nevertheless are not
designaed toe h . Once the list ispruvided tu DFO
pursuant to subseckion 7(3) of this Scheduie, the members
of the First Nations whose names are on the iist are not
designated tofish.

X(3) A person fishing as set out iIr this Schedule will cany
a NBAPC membership card or a designation card at ail
times while engaged injkhing or any other activity
r@med to in th& Scheduie. inchding the hantesting,
tramportig and Ianding of@h and wiil present the
NBAPC card or designution card to a DFO fishery oficer,
a D F 0 f i h . y gtiardian or an Abori*grnaCFisherrerres
Guardian on request.
7.(1) Tire Aborigmal Organizmon wiil designatepersom
tofish &yissuing designation car& Each c m d wilC be
personaC and non-tranrferabIe and win bear a mipie card
molber und the name of theperson designated.

7.(3) Before thefiiring descrïbed in th& Schedde
commences.the AboriGal ûrganizration willprovide to
DFO a fikt of names of the mm6ms of the MBAPC who
havel\rgAPCmembersliipcm& but who nevdeless are
not ddgnated tom and a fi& of nmnes of alpersons
desigrrated tomptrrsuant to subsectr'on (1) together wt'th
th& dmesIgnatrkn
cmd number-

744) TheAbor(ginal Organization rnay amend the names
and designation cmd numbers in the Iists refewed to in
subsectiun (3)?

The above represents an example of how some of the nghts issues codd be dealt
with on an interim basis. The second part provides an option for dealing with
identification issues at the border. The key to the hterim resolution of the border crossing
issue, is not so much how the identification will look, but that a process is set up to deaI

with the issue. Given that most passing problems have been with Canadian unmigration
authonties, an interim solution involvuig the Canadian govemment is most pressing. But
given that the issue concerns the Canada - United States border, tri-partite arrangements

among Canada, United States and the Aboriginal Nations would be preferable. Thus
wodd dso be appropriate as a modern day updating of the Jay Treaw process. Aboriginal

Nations shouid be fidi signatories to whatever interim measmes are made.
CONCLUSION:
1have concluded that there exists a strong argument for an Abonginal mobility

right for the rnembers of the Wabanaki Codederacy to pass tkeely over the Canada and

United States border. The J i Treaty of 1794 is a source for the explicit recognition of

such a right as contained in Amcle KU. AIthough some I o w a court decisions have
decided against this treaty confefnng any rights, the coints in di those cases fded to do
the propa analysis as mandateci by the tests set out by the Suprmie Court ofCanada in
Sparrow and V m der Peet and Simon. As welI, the protections afforded mder section

3x1)ofthe ConstitutionA a 1982, mandates a reconsideration of the pre-1982 cases

which dismisseci the Jay Treaty as a valid Indian treaty. At a minimum, the promises
made in the Jay Treaty and in the subsequent Erphnation Article shodd be protected in

the same light as other Indian treaties in section 35(1).Tbe courts have stressed repeatedly
the principles for large and liberal interpretations in favor of the Indians in the case of

ambiguities or doubts. The fiduciary duty owed to the Aboriginal Nations of this country
by the Crown, demands that these issues be dealt with so as to prevent any more harm to

Aboriginal families and communities.

The AbonginaI Nations which comprise the Eastern Indians, the Abenaki, the
Wabanaki Codederacy or the Treaty signe= of the t7007shave Iived, hunted and
traveled the area of OId Nova Scotia since time immemoriai. It is theu status as the First
Peoples of Turtle Island (this continent), which entitles them to special protections under

Canada's Constitution and the highest court in the country has recognized thisfact.
Nearly ail the AboripinaI Nations of this country are survivors of the devastating effects
of contact; plaques, oppression, genocide, discrimination, abuse and a hoa of other

tragedies. The dark winter which once covered Aboriginal people in theù traditionai
tenitories has been Iifted and the nght for recognition of their Aboriginal and Treaty
nghts continues with a aew to protecting the rights of their chUren, seven generations

hto the htttre. The family is central to Aboriginal life and al1the Nations of Turtie IsIand

or North Amerka are family and as such often work together to effect their mutual rights.

The Canada-US.border is symboIic of the division which have been imposed on a i l
North Amerka hdigenous gronps. It is the h e which M

e s our peopIe at the heart of

o m cnlture; orn f d e s . Whder the right of fkee passage to travel the border is upheId

as an intefnationaf treaty nght, and Abor@naI Treaty right, an Aboriginal right or as part

of negotiated powers mder Aboriginal titie and land cIaims, it must be done now. This
nght must be protected in order that Aboriginal families no longer have to M e r as they

have to date. The year 2000 should mean a new begiIining for Aboriginal people and the
goverxunents of Canada owe a duty to Aboriginal people to facilitate this process legdiy

and rnoraiiy.

These treaty s i g n a of the Wabanaki Confederacy have Lived off the lands and the
seas of this area h m t h e immemorial. They have a basic Aboriginal nght to sunive

and adequately sustain themselves fiom their traditional occupations and go on thriving

for generations to corne. They have sustained themselves Eiom the land and seas within
their t d t o n e s for thousands of years and the courts have held that Aboriginal rights are

not fiozen in time and permit th& evoIution over time. Therefore, it is only naturai that
they should recognize that the Wabanaki culture has evolved to such a stage where

Canadian and American travel is a way to sustain themsehes and their famiües spinhialiy
emotionally and cuItudIy and economicaIIy. This group has an Abonginai nght to cross

the border fkeely. This right can easily be reconciled with sovereignty and the Crown's
right to protact its borders by implementing a system of identification. This is the easiest
way to both ident*

rights hoIders while mterfering with the exercise of the right as iittle

as possibIe. These rights shouid be guarmieed to rnembers of the Confederacy regardess

of deIr citizenship as Americans or Canadians gîven their special reIationshÏp with the

Crown, which is the same either way.

These groups also have Indian trait.rights which impIicitiy guamtee fiee
passage over the border in pdt

of their traditiond activities as provided for in the

Treaty of If52 and the Treaty of i72&'26. These treaties rights are pmtected tmder

section 35(1) of the Constiuzion Act, 1982. The Merence between these nghts and

Aboriginal rights, is that treaty rights should not have to go through the process of
teconciliation, as the rights contained in the treaty are in themselves the result of the

Crown reconciluig thek interests with the rights of Aboriginal people. Therefore, the
rights should stand as they presently read in the treaty. This wodd also apply to the Joy
Treaty shouId it fhally be interpreted as an Indian Treaty desenred of protection under
section 35(1).
Thus, not ody should ail the Aboriginal groups be included in any benefits
received fiom treaties or rights adjudication, Iegislative participation or negotiations, but
this shodd happen h e d i a t e l y . There is certainly no worry of a "flood gates" effect

shouid a temporary exclusion be made for Aboriginal people in the
legÏsIation, or a border agreement is negotiated and signed. The Aboriginal people in

Canada comprise less than 3% of the population and those specific Aboriginal people in
this area around the Wabanaki Confederacy here ,wodd comprise even Iess of that
population. The administration of nich border crossing activities wouid be no more
difficult than the AFS agreements. A fom of identification that would be mutudy
acceptable to both parties couId deviate concems on both sides of the border. Regardess

of the effort that wiïI be required to work out a solution, or the degree ofdifncdty or
expense that Ït will entail, the honor ofthe Crown demands that they live up to their

fiduciary duty to the AboriginaI Nations ofthe Wabanaki Confederacy and work out a
solution to assist these groups m thenright to fixe passage as promise so long aga
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